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
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CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

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PLATO'S *SOPHIST* AND THE FIVE STAGES OF KNOWING

M. W. ISENBERG

I

IN A well known passage in the *Seventh Epistle* (342 A ff.) Plato describes the five stages¹ which one traverses on the road to the knowledge of what is real. If this epistle was written about 353 B.C., its explanation of Plato's method, whether it is primarily directed to the beginner or the advanced student,² should have an intimate connection with the method pursued not only in the early and middle dialogues, but especially in the works of Plato's old age. Since the *Sophist* is one of the latest dialogues and has been generally considered one of the most difficult it may not be too far from the mark to inquire whether a right understanding of Plato's five stages of knowing in the *Seventh Epistle* may not be of use in the interpretation of that dialogue. In this way, perhaps, some difficulties which that work has raised may be solved and a more intimate acquaintance made with Plato's dialectical method.

It is, then, the purpose of the present paper to show that the movement of thought in the *Sophist* follows closely the description of method in the passage of the *Seventh Epistle* referred to above. All descriptions of method, however, tend to be more simple and more rigid than the actual application of the method itself.

This fact is especially true of the writings of Plato. The dialogues cannot be understood, in any but a superficial manner, by any literal modes of interpretation. Consequently, Plato continually complains of the inadequacy of the written word. It is, then, the task of the reader to make his words live and move as they lived and moved in the mind of Plato himself. Although this is, perhaps, an unattainable ideal for the Platonist, yet only by striving to attain that ideal can the problems and their solutions in the dialogues be grasped adequately.

At the very beginning of the *Sophist* (218 B ff.) the stages on which the dialectic is going to operate at first are stated explicitly. In order to find out what the sophist is (218 C 1),³ it is necessary to acquire a common understanding of the "thing" (πρᾶγμα), the "name" (ὄνομα), and the "discourse" (λόγος). In the *Seventh Epistle* the five stages are given as "name" (ὄνομα), "discourse" (λόγος), "image" (εἶδωλον), "science" (ἐπιστήμη), and the fifth which is called "that which is known and is truly being" (ὃ δὴ γνωστόν τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ἐστιν ὄν).

Two of these five, the "name" and the "discourse," are mentioned, here, in the *Sophist* while the "image" of the *Epistle* is the more generic term for the "example"

(παράδειγμα) of the *Sophist* (218 D 9).⁴ These three stages of the dialectic are generally used in the early Platonic dialogues where a definition (λόγος) is being sought. The "name" is equated with a "logos," clarified by an "image," and, then, the whole is contrasted with either a contradictory "logos" or "image." The salutary results of this procedure are well described in connection with the sixth *diairesis*, that of the noble sophistic (230 B 4—D 4).⁵

The thesis of the present paper is that it is only with "name," "example," and "discourse" that the dialectic of the *Sophist* operates up to 251 A, where the Stranger begins his solution of the problem of being and nonbeing. At this point, the dialogue ascends to the fourth stage of "science" as the passage, 252 E 9—254 B 1, indicates. Having brought in this fourth stage, together with the fifth, the dialectic then descends to the lower stages, from which it has ascended, in order to solve the problem of what the sophist is. Furthermore, the matters discussed in the ascent differ from the matters discussed in the descent since in the latter process the mind of the Stranger and Theaetetus can view the whole from a higher vantage point. If this thesis is correct a number of results follow which may solve some of the vexed problems of the dialogue.⁶

One term, however, found in the passage of the *Sophist* at 218 B is not mentioned by Plato in the list of the *Epistle*. In this passage of the *Sophist* we are told that it is necessary to agree about the "thing" (πρᾶγμα) together with "discourse." The "thing" is another one of the terms in Plato which cannot be fully understood unless the structure of the whole dialogue be firmly kept in mind since the "thing" can apply anywhere on the dialectical line. In this passage the "thing" is used for what the sophist is at the beginning of the whole enterprise and

as such it partakes of the indefiniteness and vagueness of any sensible. It is almost indistinguishable at this stage from the "name," for the "name" is just a sign⁸ of the thing. It is only after the soul goes through the dialectical process and can see the "thing" from the vantage point of a higher stage in the dialectic that the "thing" then becomes the fifth stage of the dialectic or, as it is stated in the *Epistle*, "that which is known and is truly being."⁹ This result is, of course, the main purpose of the *Sophist*, as we will endeavor to show.

II

The dialectic employs only "name," "example," and "discourse" from 218 B to 251 A in which section the subdivisions are well defined. First, an "example" of the method is given by the *diairesis* of the angler and the six *diaireseis* of the sophist follow in accordance with the "example" (218 B—231 E 7). Second, because of the "many appearances" (231 B 9) of the sophist, a seventh *diairesis* is begun which is then broken off because of the problem of nonbeing (232 A 1—237 B 4). Third, the problem of nonbeing is treated which results in no solution (237 B 4—242 B 5). Fourth, the problem of being is discussed which also results in no solution (242 B 6—251 A 4).

What is meant, then, by the statement that the dialectic from 218 B to 251 A employs only "name," "example," and "discourse"? We may take up the section from 218 B to 231 E first. The place of "example" in this section is quite evident. An example of the angler is given as the model *diairesis* which will be used in order to find out what the sophist is. What the *diairesis* will, then, do is apparent. Given two people who have a "name" in common, in this case "sophist," a common agreement on the "thing" is possible if we can go through the appropriate "discourse" (218

B 5—D 6). The *diairesis* is, then, the "discourse" which can penetrate through the "name" to the "thing" itself. This is, of course, a special kind of *diairesis*. The term in Plato's writings, in general, is of broad extent and means any sort of division whatsoever. It can be used wherever "the one" is made "the many." Here in the *Sophist* its use is restricted to the formal downward¹⁰ process from a broad genus like art to a specific art by dividing a genus or species into two parts, rejecting one and then dividing the other.¹¹

If, then, we are operating only with "discourse" and not with "science" at this point, the function of the series of *diaireseis* in the dialogue becomes evident. No "scientific" proof is here intended.¹² All that is done here is to collect a series of "discourses" which seem¹³ to be relevant for the understanding of the sophist. Thus it is not completely arbitrary when the Stranger finally selects the term ἀντιλογικόν (232 B 6), which he takes from the fifth *diairesis* (225 B 10), to start the *diairesis* which breaks off because of the problem of nonbeing. The subject matter is, indeed, well covered. Starting from the first *diairesis* (221 C 5—223 B 8), wherein the sophist is found to be a sort of hunter, we reach a point too high for the sophist in the sixth *diairesis* (226 B 1—231 B 8) which is a fair description of an aspect of the Socratic method.¹⁴ Somewhere between these two extremes lies the essential sophist if we can but hunt him down. In fact the series of *diaireseis* accomplish no more than the pitting of "discourses" one against the other as is done in the early dialogues. In the attempt to find a definition of the sophist the "artist," the "art," the "subject matter," "manner," and "purpose" of the art are manipulated one against the other. This is, in fact, no more than is done, for example, in the *Protagoras*.¹⁵ The form, in the *Sophist*,

is different and more rigid; the matter treated is the same.

Is the Stranger serious in his employment of this method?¹⁶ If he were not he would not speak of it as he does in the *Statesman* (285 C 4—287 B 2). It is quite true that the method of *diairesis* can make the practitioner more dialectical and more heuristic. Plato was well aware¹⁷ of the tendency of the younger men to run rapidly through the "facts" of the case in order to come as quickly as possible to a conclusion. This applies just as well to those who leap up to the realm of ideas without going through the necessary spadework which alone reveals the true import of the ideas. Philosophers from Bacon to Hegel have pointed out the same fundamental principle in other contexts. This may, perhaps, be the reason why Plato chose the problem of discovering what the sophist and the statesman are and thus directed the dialogue away from the ideas to a closer study of matters which can rationally validate the existence of the ideas. Plato had a great distaste for men who aped the learned terminology of those who know without having gone through the necessary preliminary training.¹⁸ Whatever is, then, the validity of the method of *diairesis* in the strict sense of the *Sophist* and *Statesman* it certainly does what Plato demands of this method in so far as it does make one more dialectical and more heuristic. As long as it is recognized that it only operates here with "discourse" there can be no serious criticism of the method.¹⁹

It may not be amiss to discuss summarily the companion term to *diairesis*, namely, *synagoge*. The term itself is not used in the *Sophist*, but a number of other terms or phrases are employed in its place.²⁰ *Synagoge* is, of course, the reverse of *diairesis*. Just as *diairesis* breaks up a whole into its component "parts," so does

synagoge bring together the component "parts" into a whole. The two processes, like most movements of Plato's thought, should not be thought of as rigid or fixed. They may be employed any place in the dialectical context. *Synagoge* can even take place in the midst of a *diairesis* (219 B 1, B 11). In other words, there is a constant reciprocity of movement between *diairesis* and *synagoge* as Plato applies both to the dialectic of some problem.²¹

III

Still remaining on the stages of "name," "example," and "discourse," we now pass to the section dealing with the seventh *diairesis* which leads directly to the question of nonbeing (232 A 1—237 B 4). As was pointed out above (p. 203) the salient feature of the sophist found in the fifth *diairesis* appears to the Stranger²² to be the fact that he is *ἀντιλογικός* (232 B 6). This, then, will be the start of the seventh *diairesis*. But the working out of the *diairesis* is interrupted by the fact that this "discourse" is contradicted by another "discourse," namely, that of nonbeing.²³ Whenever such a situation occurs in Plato either the dialogue, as in the case of the early ones, ends on a note of doubt or else a higher stage of the dialectical process must be reached to resolve the contradiction. As was pointed out before, this higher stage will only be reached at 251 A 3. Before we arrive there it will be necessary to investigate the "discourse" (237 B 4) of nonbeing. If we have found that the sphere in which the sophist operates is composed of falsity, likenesses, and semblances, which are not, then it is necessary to see how these can be. If they cannot exist, then the sophist has escaped our grasp.

The "discourse" which took the form of a *diairesis* now becomes the ordinary "discourse" of question and answer directed

toward the problem of nonbeing (237 B 4—242 B 5) whose solution must be attained before we may return to the *diairesis*, as will be done toward the end of the dialogue (264 B 9).

We may digress at this point to take issue with those who consider the ensuing parts of the dialogue to be the primary reason which led Plato to write the *Sophist* and who think the former *diaireseis* of lesser consequence.²⁴ This dialogue like all the authentic dialogues of Plato has a strict unity, which in the *Sophist* consists of a progression through the stages of knowledge listed in the *Seventh Epistle*. Such a progression and the ability of the mind to traverse such a road is, after all, the essence of dialectic. If the purpose of the *Sophist* and *Statesman* is to make us more dialectical, this is one of the ways to do it. Plato cares little for set philosophical problems divorced from the context which gives rise to them or, as was pointed out before (n. 4), set solutions embalmed in the written word. In the *Sophist*, the important thing is for Theaetetus and the Stranger jointly to ascend from the undifferentiated "thing," named a sophist, to higher discourses and still higher forms which will reveal the meaning of a sophist and then descend together from that high point back to the "thing" now seen in a new light. Now it is no longer a vague and undifferentiated "thing," as it was at the beginning of the enterprise, but a thing seen from above which makes it an "object of knowledge and truly being"²⁵ in a sense that will be explained later (p. 207).

We may return from this digression to the consideration of nonbeing. The important point to keep in mind in regard to the first discussion of nonbeing (237 B 4—239 C 9) is that here the Stranger descends all the way below even the lowest of our stages of knowledge of vague "thing," "name," and "discourse" so that not only

do we not know to what "thing" to refer the term nonbeing (237 D 1), but we cannot even give it a "name" or even "discuss" it.²⁶

What, then, can be said of "images," "deception," and "false opinion," the region where the sophist operates (239 C 9—242 B 5)? Are these also "absolute" nonbeing? Theaetetus suggests that nonbeing must have some connection with being (240 C 1). But how is that possible? It is evident, at any rate, that we cannot remain below all the stages of knowledge. That is plain even to a blind man (241 D 9). Although we must operate on the lowest possible stages in discussing these aspects of nonbeing, it is still impossible to operate completely below them. If, then, we must operate somewhere on being, we must arrive at some clarity in regard to being so that we may see how nonbeing can be connected, in some way, by it.

It is in this section, perhaps, that the problems raised by the philosophic position of the sophist come out most clearly and explain why Plato was forced to deal at such length with the "yunker" (239 D 5). What is a "maker of images" and what is an image (239 D)? Theaetetus answers that by an image we mean what we see in mirrors and in water and such like things. The answer of the Stranger is curious. The sophist will ridicule such an answer; he will pretend he does not know what mirrors and water are; he does not even know what sight is. He will insist, then, that one keep on the level of discourse.²⁷ The sophist's position is that it does no good to point to sensible things. He is not that kind of an empiricist and, in so far as the warrant of truth for the sophist is not the things of sense, Socrates and the Stranger would agree with him. But what then is the sophist's warrant of truth? Neither is it in the realm of ideas as

Socrates would maintain. Actually this warrant can be found only in the "discourse." But if we employ only "discourse," there is no criterion whereby a "discourse" can be false. All "discourse" is true. This is now the problem which confronts the Stranger.²⁸ If the Stranger will hunt for the sophist in the place of "images," "likenesses," "limitations," or "semblances," which are what "false discourse" and "false opinion" really are, then the Stranger will have to show that they are not "absolute" nonbeing, that they do exist, but are still nonbeing, and that something, in fact, can be pointed out as being of which "false discourse" is, in fact, an image.

The dialogue, then, swings over to a consideration of being (242 B 6—251 A 3). For the purpose of the present thesis it is most important to point out, first of all, that the Stranger is still employing "discourse." *But now "discourse" has become "myth."*²⁹ What does Plato mean by the term? The function of the myth in such a dialogue as the *Phaedo* is plain enough. Whenever the dialectic has reached its topmost level, Socrates resorts to a myth. If the respondent has followed the dialectic to this point he can "see" now the wonders related in the myth. Here in the *Sophist*, however, the myth performs a different function. The monists, pluralists, materialists, and idealists present a "discourse" regardless of whether Theaetetus and the Stranger "follow them or are left behind" (243 A 7). Whatever the truth of the "discourse" may be, it can only be a myth for these two. As a consequence the "discourse," which supposedly explains what being is, never ascends to a realm of being; i.e., it does not employ the stage of "science" or gain the fifth stage of the "object known and truly being." In such a "discourse" it is not too difficult to find contradictions as the Stranger points out

to the full, since the "discourse" never can be adequate to the "facts."³⁰

The way to deal with these myths, which the propounders themselves are not present to defend, is to try to make what sense we can out of them and to attempt to put ourselves in the position of the mythologists themselves (243 D 6). It is found, however, that they are all contradictory. If the Pre-Socratics say that being is many, it is pointed out that it is one; if the Eleatics say being is one, then it can readily be found to be many; if the materialists maintain that being is body, they are forced to admit the existence of some being which is incorporeal; if the idealists point out that being is rest, then it is shown to be in motion or, at least, that for it to be motion or rest is impossible.³¹ The point that Plato is making is that if we maintain being to be one of two contraries, it is not too difficult to show that it can just as well be the other. All these "discourses" are wrong because they are one-sided and incomplete. Consequently, when such a situation arises—when "discourses" can be pitted one against another so that we are reduced to an impasse—a higher stage of the dialectic must be employed which can resolve the difficulty from the higher point of view. Since we have now reached this stage (251 A 3), we must abandon the stage of "discourse" and ascend to a higher stage where the "discourse" can become "science."³²

From 251 A 4, then, to the end of the dialogue we employ the stage of "science," the fourth, and the fifth stage as well. This ascension Plato emphatically points out by his introduction of the dialectician and his science (253 B 8—254 B 6). Since some things have intercourse with one another and others do not, and since there is a science of grammar and a science of music dealing with the intercourse respectively

of vowels and consonants, low and high tones, so, too, is there a science of dialectic which deals with the intercourse of forms.

It would be too great a digression from the thesis of the present paper to discuss what is meant by the five forms themselves. It may be sufficient to say that Plato does not need to give the kind of account of these matters that various interpreters try to squeeze out of the text. He need only discuss these matters in so far as they effect the tracking down of the sophist of whom he never loses sight. Whatever the status of being, motion, rest, same, and other may be, these forms have forced themselves on our attention by two considerations: (1) The previous myths of the philosophers on the stage of "discourse" have given us no clear account of being and (2) the sophist still must be shown to be in some way bound up with nonbeing.³³

Nor can very much be said here of the intercourse of the forms with one another or with their "parts." If anybody still has failed to "see" how a "thing" which he supposes he knows, is, in fact, only truly known from the vantage point of some higher stage, the piling up of metaphors will only hinder him from trying to think the matter out for himself.³⁴ Given this vision or intuition of the intercourse of the forms, that intuition like anything else stated in philosophy is open to discussion and criticism. Without doubt a great number of objections can be brought against it as can be brought against any other approach to these problems. The great truths of thought are not so simple nor is truth itself so easily grasped that one can be dogmatic on such matters. Thus Plato was the least dogmatic of men.³⁵ On the other hand there are all kinds of discussion and all kinds of criticism. To tear apart the context and progression of Plato's thought, to pin down a term to its literal

meaning, to solidify and freeze the Platonic dialectic is neither discussion nor criticism but patent misunderstanding or even ignorance.

For the purposes of the present thesis it is sufficient to note that having reached the stage of "science" and the forms we can now descend from these high stages (257 B 1—264 B 9) by gradual steps. From the form of the other to descend to nonbeing is now possible. This is no longer the "absolute" nonbeing but the nonbeing which can also be (257 B 1—259 E 7). From this nonbeing we can descend to "discourse," "opinion," "falsity," "deception," "images," "likenesses," and "semblances" (260 A 1—264 B 8). The important point to note is that the descent is an entirely different matter from the previous ascent. The ascent started from an undifferentiated and vague "thing," "image," and "discourse" to a recognition of the need of forms and their intercourse for a solution of the problem. Once the souls of Theaetetus and the Stranger have gained this new vantage point then and then only can they descend from this higher stage to a solution of the problem.

The "thing" (cf. p. 204) mentioned at the beginning of the dialogue as that on which Theaetetus and the Stranger must agree by means of "discourse" (218 C 4) can now be really known and known "scientifically." At the beginning of the dialogue the "thing" was hardly distinguishable from its "name" as some vague, sensible object. Now by means of the dialectic it can be ascertained that it is connected with what is real or being as well as nonbeing which is, in some sense, being. In this derivative sense it has become an "object known and truly being," not in the full sense, perhaps, as the forms, but by its intercourse with the forms.³⁶

Without doubt this section (260 A 1—264 B 8) is difficult. It is true that the

Stranger has compressed his thought to an extreme degree. It is not true, however, that what is said is "vague and ambiguous."³⁷ Although all the answers to "logical"³⁸ problems will not be found here nor is the question solved as to how that which is linguistic can be referred to what is non-linguistic, nevertheless, in the context of the rest of the dialogue, the Stranger has given an answer which can be found in the text itself without looking elsewhere or making the Stranger say what he actually does not say.

We have already shown the sense in which nonbeing is. The question is do "discourse" and "opinion" partake of this sense of nonbeing. If they do then we can go on to complete our *diairesis*. If they do not then the sophist will escape us again (260 D 5). How, then, can we show that "discourse" does partake of nonbeing? For if this can be shown it follows that "false discourse," "false opinion," "deception," "images," "likenesses," and "semblances" also partake of nonbeing since they are akin to "discourse" (264 B 2).

The way to go about this is to find out what "discourse" is in its simplest manifestation. At this point we may digress a moment to discuss the many uses of the term. In discussing the five ways of knowing in this paper "discourse" has been used in its methodological sense as a stage on the way to knowledge. This actually is the sense of the word in the *Seventh Epistle* but since the example of "discourse" there given, of the circle, is in the form of a definition, some confusion may have arisen if the passage is taken in a literal sense. "Definition" is only one kind of "discourse" and can be more or less true depending on what is going on in the soul of the man stating the definition (*Ep. VII* 342 C 6). In this passage of the *Sophist*, however, "discourse" is used in the sense of a "statement" which is

the "first and smallest of discourses" (262 C 6). This use, of course, should not be taken too literally either, since it is used here almost as an example of the kind of "discourse" which the sophist does practice—such a "discourse" as we have for example in the *Protagoras* (320 C 8—328 D 2). The point of this digression is that the solution of the problem of the *Sophist* does not rest exclusively on the working out of the "statement" as Cornford (*op. cit.*, pp. 310–17) feels it must, but rather in seeing that if the "first and smallest of discourses" is in some way connected with nonbeing that all "discourse" is connected as well. Plato would hardly think that a single, isolated "statement" could ever be anything but an "image" or "example" of "discourse" in its full sense. Thus there is no need of a literal interpretation of the "statement" as such. It is this literal explanation of the "statement" that Cornford feels is one of the things lacking here.

Once, however, we know what a "discourse" is, we must agree that it is a discourse of something (262 E 5). This is the position that the sophist would take. He claims that all "discourse" is true because the man who discourses says something. He states a point of view; he states what he sees; he states what he does not see, with an ulterior purpose in mind, and so on. All "discourses" are "manifestations by the voice of being."³⁹ Where the Stranger and the sophist disagree is on the meaning of being. The sophist's being is a "private" being, true for himself. The Stranger demands some "public" being on which the interlocutor and the respondent can agree. This "public" being is, of course, the forms and those things which participate in the forms. Without such a being it would be a fact that all discourse

is true, the propagandist's "discourse" no less than the "discourse" of the man of science.

In addition to knowing what a "discourse" is and that it is a "discourse" of something, every "discourse" must be of some quality (262 E 8).

Thus, taking these three agreements let us look at one "statement." We know there is a being; we know what we mean by nonbeing. Does "discourse" partake of nonbeing? In the statement, "Theaetetus is sitting," we can say that this "discourse" is connected with being in the same way that anything else partakes of being and in a manner which we have already discussed. In the case of the statement, "Theaetetus is flying," we are talking about being, since Theaetetus is a being, but the statement itself is about being in another sense of being which we have already discovered; namely, nonbeing. The quality of the one statement is true; the quality of the other statement is false. In other words there are three terms involved:

BEING DISCOURSE NON-BEING

←———TRUE
←———FALSE———→

This is sufficient for the purpose of this dialogue. Once we understand the sense of "false discourse" and "false opinion" it follows that there are "deception," "images," "likenesses," and "semblances." It is "semblance" (*phantasia*), of course, in which we are mainly interested and the Stranger points out that it is a mixture of opinion and sensation. This is, then, the extreme point in the dialectical descent since, in a sense, in order to know what the sophist is, the lowest aspects of experience, where the sophist resides, must be understood. But it was by means of the dialectic

of the *Sophist* that such an understanding came about.

All that remains now is to complete the interrupted seventh *diairesis* (264 B 9—268 D 5). This *diairesis* is, again, our familiar "discourse," but just as the "thing" is quite different at the end of the dialogue from what it was at the beginning, so this final "discourse" is different from the first "discourses." The difference is that now we can understand being and nonbeing in the sense needed for the definition of the sophist; namely, from the higher vantage

point of the forms and the intercourse of the forms with "things."

Justly, then, does the Stranger say in the *Statesman* (285 C 4—287 B 2) that it is "discourses" such as these that make one more dialectical and more heuristic. The acquisition of knowledge is inextricably bound up with the correct method of acquiring such knowledge. Without understanding the method, the dialogues are composed of written words which are dead.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

NOTES

1. Plato does not use the word "stages." $\delta\iota' \alpha\upsilon\tau\eta$ (342 A 7) should be translated "instruments." But only "name," "discourse," and "image" are instruments. The term "stages" in the present paper is used in a loose sense to indicate the unfolding of the dialectic. It has no ontological significance. Various "stages" can only become definite in the context of the *Sophist* and its interpretation. It is important to note, then, that the various stages listed in this passage do not have even the apparent fixity of the levels of the divided line in the *Republic*, but are rather extremely fluid terms which flow into one another as the dialectic twists and turns. Note the term $\delta\iota\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta$ (343 E 1).

2. Harward in his excellent edition of the *Epistles* states that Plato is "quoting material from some discourse addressed to a single learner, apparently a beginner in philosophy, who has already had a grounding in mathematics" (*The Platonic Epistles* [Cambridge, 1932], p. 213, n. 95). This may well be the case, but many an advanced student may be benefited by an elementary exposition. The importance of the passage on either count is not diminished.

3. The search for a definition of the sophist is essentially the same as the attempt to arrive at a definition of something in the earlier dialogues. The endeavor to find a new kind of Platonism in the later dialogues as distinct from the "Socraticism" of the early and middle dialogues seems to the present writer to be based on a misunderstanding of Plato's thought. There is, it is true, a different orientation of the dialectic in the later dialogues from that of the earlier ones. This is made evident by the question Socrates asks at the beginning (217 A 6) as to whether the sophist, statesman, and philosopher are all the same man under three different names or, in fact, three different kinds of men. The tendency of the previous dialogues was to collapse all three into the philosopher who is the true statesman, as in the *Republic*, and the true rhetorician, as in the *Phaedrus*. *Synagoge* was the more important feature of the dialectic there. Here, in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, however, the opposing process of *diairesis* is the more prominent. Of these two processes we shall have more to say later (pp. 203-4).

4. It has been frequently pointed out that Plato has no fixed scientific terminology. His distrust of the written word, perhaps, explains in part the constant shifting of his terms. The important thing is that the reader go through in his own soul and mind the dialectical treatment of a problem. The solution of a problem apart from this dialectical experience is valueless. Consequently, fixed terms, as such, can only be a hindrance and an unwise short cut to correct knowledge. Once the shifting "structure" of the Platonic dialectic is grasped, the terms themselves take on a meaning appropriate to the context. For $\pi\alpha\rho\delta\epsilon\iota\chi\mu\alpha$ besides 218 D 9, 221 C 5, 226 C 1, 233 D 3, 235 D 7, 251 A 7, cf. especially *Statesman* 277 D 1—279 B 5. For the concept of imitation and its significance in the Platonic dialectic, see R. P. McKeon, "Literary Criticism and the Concept of Imitation in Antiquity," *Modern Philology*, XXXIV (1936), 3-16.

5. Cf. also *Laws* 895 D ff. for a simplified account of this process where "name," "logos," and "substance" (*oibia*) are the only three mentioned. *Epistle VII* 344 B 3—C 1 is the passage that, perhaps, best describes the whole matter. For the many meanings of "logos" see p. 207.

6. It may occur to the reader that the *Seventh Epistle* does not group the first three stages together generally but it does group the first four together in opposition to the fifth stage. The explanation of this, stated briefly, is that the "science" of this section of the *Epistle*, in a loose sense, may also treat of the $\pi\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ (342 E 3), as the first three do, which is opposed to $\tau\acute{o} \delta\epsilon$ (343 A 1). There is, therefore, a difference in the use of the term "science" in the *Sophist* and the *Seventh Epistle* which is understandable from the different orientations of the two works. Cf. A. E. Taylor, "The Analysis of ΕΠΙΕΤΗΜΗ in Plato's Seventh Epistle," *Mind*, N.S. XXI (1912), 361-65 for a thorough mathematical interpretation. At any rate the three are often grouped together (342 A 8, D 1, 343 E 1, 344 B 3—C 1). The monists, pluralists, materialists, and idealists of the *Sophist*, as it will be shown later (p. 205), thought they had science but they are shown to be only mythologists.

7. *πράγμα* and *ἔργον* are here used interchangeably. Cf. 221 B 2.

8. *σημείον*, 237 D 9, 262 A 6, D 9.

9. The use of the term *πράγμα* has, perhaps, this overtone in this section of the *Seventh Epistle* (341 A 7, C 4, C 7, 344 A 3). A. E. Taylor (*op. cit.*, p. 354) is probably correct in interpreting the passage at 341 C 7 as follows: "It is only after long fellowship in the business itself (sc. the pursuit of the philosophic life; the reiterated *τὸ πρᾶγμα* seems to mean something like 'the grand concern')." But the passage at 344 A 3 does not fit this significance too well. Taylor (*ibid.*, p. 386) translates it "our study." This may well be questioned. For the important uses of the term in the *Sophist* cf. 234 C 4, 244 D 3, 257 C 2, 262 D 8, E 12.

10. Cf. the combination of *καρὰ* with a verb: *καταβάντας* 235 B 9, *κατατέθοντες* 236 D 3 and 260 D 1, *καταδίδοντες* 239 C 7.

11. It probably had taken on this special meaning in the Academy. . . . Πίπτω σοι καὶ τὸν διαίρεσιν *Ep. XIII* 360 B. 8 Speusippus wrote on *diairesis*, *Diog. L.* 4. 5. So did Xenocrates, *ibid.*, 4. 14.

12. Aristotle's various criticisms of *diairesis* need not be considered in connection with the thesis of this paper mainly because he is criticizing the Academic use of this method and not directly its use in the *Sophist* or *Statesman*. In fact a good portion of his frequent criticisms is probably directed against Speusippus. Cf. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1944), pp. 54-61. For a general characterization of Aristotle's attack on the Academic *diairesis* see *ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

13. Note the frequent uses of *φαίνειν* and *φάντασμα* 223 C 3, 224 D 2, E 4, 231 C 1, D 2, 232 A 2, 234 E 1, etc.

14. If it is seen that the *diaireseis* are merely possible "discourses," the occurrence of the sixth *diairesis* should entail no great difficulty. It is needless to cite the literature on this point.

15. *Prot.* 311 B 1-314 C 2. A careful study of the *diaireseis* along these lines may be found rewarding, indeed, by the student.

16. Shorey (*What Plato Said* [The University of Chicago Press, 1933], pp. 294-95) calls it "half-serious" and he says "Plato is plainly smiling at his own terminology." The manner is certainly half-serious. See also the remarks of A. E. Taylor, *Plato: The Man and His Works* (New York: The Dial Press, 1936), p. 377: "The Aristotelian rule of definition by 'genus and difference or differences' is simply the condensation of the Academic method into a formula; a still more exact reproduction of it has been given in our own times in W. E. Johnson's account of the progressive determination of a 'determinable' (*Logic* I, xi)." Cherniss, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 46-47. Stenzel (*Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles* [Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1931]) believes that *diairesis* is a "reinste Deduktion" (p. 58). But he is not so much interpreting the *Sophist* as writing a Platonic dialogue which Plato, for some reason, never wrote; cf. *ibid.*, p. 57: "Die Begriffsspaltung führt auf das neue *εἶδος* also auf ein ἄτομον εἶδος, gleichviel ob dieser Terminus genau vorkommt [italics mine]." 17. *Statesman* 262 A 5-263 A 1, 263 C 3-264 B 4.

18. This is what he accuses Dionysius of in *Ep. VII* 340 B ff.; cf. also *Philebus* 16 E-17 A.

19. *Diairesis* in the broad sense as used, for example, in the *Philebus* needs no defense. The fact that

diairesis, in the strict sense of the *Sophist*, deserves no "scientific" treatment may be the reason why Plato is, perhaps, intentionally careless about the numbering of the series of *diaireseis*. The fifth *diairesis* of the summary at 231 C 8-E 7 is numbered the fourth by Theaetetus (225 E 4). Plato may mean, however, that the fourth time the sophist "comes back" (*ἥκειν*) is the fifth visit. In addition, a longer or shorter treatment is possible (*Statesman* 265 A).

20. *συνάγω* (224 C 9, 267 B 1); *σύνπαντα ταῦτα δικάζοντες* *ἂν ἐνὶ προσαγορευτοῖς* *ἂν ὁνόματι* (219 B 1); *ποιητικὴν τοῖσιν αὐτὰ συγκεφαλαιωσάμενοι προσείπωμεν* (219 B 11); *συνμνησθῆναι* (253 D 9); *εἰς ἐν συλλαβὸν* (234 B 3).

21. Perhaps the major criticism that may be made of Cornford's treatment of these two processes is that he believes that *diaireseis* and *synagoge* here deal with the forms and are scientific (*Plato's Theory of Knowledge* [London, 1946], pp. 181-87). There are a number of lesser points which may be questioned. Why must a "collection" precede a "division"? Plato does not use the methods so rigidly. Everyone knows that the generic term "art" is of broader extent than any single art. Again, it is a complete misapprehension to suppose "that these first six divisions actually, though not formally, serve the purpose of a collection preliminary to the seventh" (*ibid.*, p. 187). This has nothing to do with *synagoge*. It is true that the Stranger does set up a loose field for exploration, but to suppose that this is a *synagoge* is tantamount to saying that a collection of data in the realm of the sensible and changing is, in fact, directly productive of a unified notion. This is exactly what does not happen, as such a procedure is quite foreign to Plato's thought. The result of the first six *diaireseis* is, in fact, the recognition of the absence of a unified notion as both Theaetetus (231 B 9-C 2) and the Stranger (232 A 1-6) point out.

22. *Ἐν γὰρ τί μοι μάλιστα κατέφαση αὐτὸν μνησθῆναι* (232 B 3). How can the Stranger be sure that the beginning point is correct? The point is that he cannot be sure on this level. It is sufficient that Theaetetus agrees or that he himself supposes the starting point is valid. If the reader finds it invalid, he should sit himself down and write his own dialogue.

23. "this discourse," *ὁ λόγος αὐτός* (237 A 3). We are confronted by an *ἐναντιολογία* (236 E 5).

24. Raeder calls these parts the kernel of the dialogue while the previous parts are only the shell (*Platons philosophische Entwicklung* [Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1920], p. 319).

25. *Ep. VII* 342 B 1. The true philosopher, as Socrates says at the beginning of the *Sophist* (216 C 6), "looks down from above on the life below."

26. Nonbeing is *ἀδιανόητόν τε καὶ ἀρρητόν καὶ ἀόρατόν καὶ ἀλογόν* (238 B 10). Cornford (*op. cit.*, p. 206, n. 1) offers the tempting suggestion that *ἀρρητόν* means that there is nothing for the words to refer to." There may also be a mathematical overtone. Cf. Taylor, *Mind*, p. 349.

27. *τὸ δ' ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐρωτήσῃ σε μόνον* (240 A 1).

28. There are some interesting parallels to this position of the sophist in some of the present Logical Positivists. See B. Russell's account of the position of Neurath and Hempel (*An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* [London: George Allen and Unwin, 1940], pp. 140 ff.). It is true that "semblance" (*phantasia*) is opinion or discourse mixed with sensation (264 B 2), but sensation is not the warrant of truth for the sophist.

29. *μυθος* (242 C 8). The term is put at the emphatic place at the beginning of the sentence. The Eleatics no less than the pluralists deal in myths (242 D 6).

30. Cf. this use of the term in the *Timaeus* 29 D 2, 59 C 6, 68 D 2, 69 B 1. The digression in the *Seventh Epistle* is also a myth (344 D 3). The Platonist will readily find such "myths" in hosts of the present day theories in all fields of study. The richness of thought of the *Sophist* has often been remarked upon. By extension, the position of the sophist in the dialogue is little different from the position of many modern propagandists who, of course, seldom reason out the basis of their thought. So too the various theories of physicists, sociologists, or philosophers can, indeed, be studied as a series of "myths" professing to state the "facts."

31. It would be difficult to see why the "friends of the ideas" have occasioned so much controversy if it were not all too evident that some Platonists are so literal-minded. Why should not Plato point out that the theory of ideas, stated literally and baldly by means of "discourse," is as indefensible as any other "myth"? Most compendiums of the history of philosophy, wherein all philosophies become myths, state the theory in some such manner as it is stated in this passage. At this late date, at any rate, we do not know whether any of the disciples of Plato thought of the theory in the way it is stated here. To judge from Aristotle's criticism of the theory, that is not at all unlikely. But if there were such disciples it is difficult to see why Plato had to expose them to ridicule in a dialogue. He could have taken them in a corner and whispered the truth in their respective ears.

32. It is unfortunate that we cannot be sure of the interpretation of the sentence at 251 A 1. It is not so much the difficulty of *ἀμφὶν ἄμα* but the correct meaning in this context of *ἑωσόμεθα* that is vexing. Campbell's translation "We shall fend off our argument from both" or "We shall push our argument (vessel) through between them both . . . with such appearance as we may" is unsatisfactory (*The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato* [Oxford, 1867], p. 136); cf. Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 251, n. 1.

33. Plato disclaims in the *Seventh Epistle* that he ever wrote his philosophy and here in the *Sophist* he disclaims any completeness of exposition. We will discuss these forms in order that even . . . if we are not able to grasp with complete clarity both being and nonbeing, yet we may not be found deficient in our discussion of them in so far as the manner of the present investigation permits" (254 C 5). The last clause is significant. It means that we are not bound to give a full account of the ideas but only that which will suffice for our immediate purposes. The present investigation is limited to the recognition that the position of the sophist must be understood from some higher ground

from which we may descend to entrap the fellow. The whole orientation of the dialogue is directed not to the forms but to the question as to how we can understand "things" by their connection with the forms.

34. Plato tries to prevent the reader from entertaining a literal notion of this intercourse by constantly changing his metaphors. Cornford (*op. cit.*, pp. 268-73) has some good remarks at this point in his summary, but, I suspect, he gave his "eidolon" of crosshatched circles colored blue and red with no great expectation that it would help anyone who did not already understand the matter. Perhaps such "images" and "examples" do more harm than good.

35. "This is what we have said nonbeing is. Either let some one persuade us by a refutation that we do not speak well or as long as he is not able to do so, he must agree with us" (259 A 2-4). Nothing is ever settled once for all in philosophy. If that were not so, the word itself would lose its real meaning for Plato.

36. It is best, perhaps, to avoid here such controversies as to whether the sophist can be a form or only in some way connected with the forms. At any rate, the passage at *Ep. VII* 342 D 3-E 2 is very much to the point: "Now the same applies to straight as well as to circular figures, and colors, good and beautiful and just, all body fabricated or becoming by nature, fire, water, and all such things and every animal and the soul's character and all passions and actions. For in the case of all these no one ever will completely partake of the science of the fifth if he has not in some way or other grasped the four."

37. Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 311; cf. also "We must fill out Plato's scheme with elements he has furnished elsewhere and here takes for granted" (*ibid.*, p. 314); "It is certainly surprising that Plato should be content with a statement of his solution so brief and ambiguous" (*ibid.*, p. 317).

38. The interpreter who attempts to understand Plato's writings in their own terms exposes himself to the criticism that he is not keen sighted enough to see the difficulties involved. Yet critics of Plato's thought are constantly raising pseudo-problems. This practice, in good part, is due to the fact that Aristotelean distinctions are brought into the Platonic dialectic. Although some passages which make distinctions between things and words (257 B 9-C 3, 268 D 8-E 1) appear to give some support for a separation of Plato's thought into metaphysics and logic, confusion is the only result of such a procedure. Cornford (*op. cit.*, pp. 268-69, 274-78) has declaimed as eloquently as anyone on the error of importing Aristotelean distinctions into Plato, yet he himself constantly resorts to it in his various distinctions between metaphysics, logic, and psychology (*ibid.*, pp. 201-3).

39. 261 E 5, τῶν τῇ φύσει περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὁρισμάτων.

THE ORGANIZATION OF NAUKRATIS

CARL ROEBUCK

IN A previous article concerning the grain trade between Greece and Egypt in the archaic period it was observed that the pottery dedicated in the earliest sanctuaries at Naukratis, those of Apollo and Aphrodite, showed that the sanctuaries were in common use by Greeks of various origins.¹ The suggestion was made that at an early date in the history of the settlement the sanctuaries lost their character as the peculiar possession of special deities of various other city states and came to be regarded as the sanctuaries of the city of Naukratis, a unified community in its own right. These considerations raise doubts about the familiar reconstruction of the settlement as a group of trading factories existing side by side with one another and with a community of Naukratite citizens. In order to see whether this picture can be revised it is necessary to consider carefully the remarks of Herodotus, our chief literary source:²

Moreover Amasis became a lover of the Hellenes; and besides other proofs of friendship which he gave to several among them, he also granted the city of Naukratis for those of them who came to Egypt to dwell in; and to those who did not desire to stay, but who made voyages thither, he granted portions of land to set up altars and make sacred enclosures [*temene*] for their gods. Their greatest enclosure and that one which has most name and is most frequented is called the Hellenion, and this was established by the following cities in common: —of the Ionians Chios, Teos, Phocaia, Clazomenai, of the Dorians Rhodes, Cnidos, Halicarnassos, Phaselis, and of the Aiolians Mytilene alone. To these belongs this enclosure and these are the cities which appoint su-

perintendents of the port [*prostatai* of the *emporion*]; and all other cities which claim a share in it, are making a claim without any right. Besides this the Eginetans established on their own account a sacred enclosure dedicated to Zeus, the Samians one to Hera, and the Milesians one to Apollo. Now in old times Naukratis alone was an open trading place [*emporion*], and no other place in Egypt; and if any one came to other of the Nile mouths, he was compelled to swear that he came not thither of his own will, and when he had thus sworn his own innocence he had to sail with his ship to the Canobic mouth, or if it were not possible to sail by reason of contrary winds, then he had to carry his cargo round the head of the Delta in boats to Naukratis; thus highly was Naukratis privileged.

In their interpretations of this passage Prinz and other scholars³ have assumed that a very close relationship existed between the individual sanctuaries and trading factories and that such units were separated administratively from the city of Naukratis. The whole settlement was a composite community: each sanctuary had its own *emporion*, an establishment with docks, warehouses and the like, while, in addition, the city of Naukratis possessed one for its own uses. Each separate trading factory was under the direction of some type of trade official (the *prostatai*) appointed by the "mother-city." The city of Naukratis formed a separate area of administration with its own magistrates and institutions, of which there may be a survival in the *timouchoi* mentioned by Hermeias.⁴ Hasebroek has suggested some modification in this picture, in accordance with his general view that trade in Greek cities was largely in

the hands of noncitizens.⁵ He has argued that the community was divided into two parts: citizens and traders (noncitizens), suggesting that Amasis placed the jurisdiction of the port in the hands of the latter, but that these had no separate *emporion*. The officials in charge of the port (the *prostatai*) had functions of policing and jurisdiction such as were possessed by the later Athenian overseers of the port of Peiraeus.

Before discussing the details of these reconstructions there are certain general points in Herodotus' description to be emphasized. In the first place Herodotus' focus of interest is the philhellenism of Amasis and the manner in which it is shown. It is not so much Naukratis *per se* in which he is interested, but Naukratis as an example of privilege granted to Greeks. Thus, the remarks on the organization of the community and on the concentration of trade through Naukratis are incidental. Secondly, Herodotus' observations on Naukratis do not all refer to the period of Amasis, although the general impression created is that Amasis was the architect of Naukratis. Amasis, having become a philhellene, gave Naukratis as a city to those Greeks who came to Egypt for permanent residence; he also gave land to traders, who came intermittently, for the purpose of founding sanctuaries to their own deities. Herodotus' remarks about the Hellenion, however, refer to his own period: it is the most important sanctuary and its founding states furnish the *prostatai* of the *emporion*; other cities claim this right but do so improperly. This relationship between the Hellenion and the administration of the port must have dated from the foundation of the Hellenion, but Herodotus does not tell us specifically when it was founded. There is, perhaps, an implication that it was founded in the time of Amasis. We are

next given the information that three cities, Miletus, Aegina, and Samos, founded their own sanctuaries, perhaps in the period of Amasis, but it is not so stated. We might infer that these are excluded from a share in the administration of the port, since they did not participate in the founding of the Hellenion. They, as well as late comers to Naukratis such as Athens, may be among those mentioned by Herodotus who claim a share without justification. Finally we are told that "of old" Naukratis alone in Egypt was an *emporion* and that overseas trade was concentrated in it. Herodotus was presumably looking back from the vantage point of his own period, when conditions were otherwise, but he does not tell us whether this condition was established by Amasis or was that of some other king.

Two difficult problems are raised by a consideration of the passage in connection with the archeological evidence: in the first place, the position of Naukratis with respect to the Egyptian government, and, secondly, the communal organization of Naukratis itself. They are presumably connected, for Naukratis, whatever the exact date of its foundation, was established in an organized, civilized state which had the power to settle the conditions on which foreigners might reside in it; the conditions might be such as to strongly influence the form of the foreign community.

Herodotus certainly had the impression that Amasis II (ca. 569-528 B.C.) either was the founder or was responsible for a thorough-going organization of the community. As Cook has cogently argued, the archeological evidence does not accord with either of these views.⁶ The date of the pottery found on the site indicates that Naukratis was settled by Greeks in the last quarter of the seventh century; and its uniform quantity throughout the sixth

century, that there was no marked increase of population in Amasis' reign. Cook has also pointed out that there is no justification for the modern view that Amasis concentrated the Greeks residing elsewhere in Egypt into Naukratis by recalling the mercenaries from the eastern frontier.⁷ Herodotus tells us that Amasis did move the soldiers from Stratopeda to Memphis,⁸ but Daphnae, also a garrison town, and seemingly not to be identified as a civilian town near Stratopeda, was apparently left untouched.⁹ The greater part of the Greek archaic pottery found at scattered points in Egypt dates from the period of Amasis.¹⁰ Thus, there may have been a rather freer intercourse of Greeks and Egyptians at that time than previously. This supposed concentration of the Greeks already in Egypt to Naukratis might, of course, be considered another facet of the policy of channeling trade through Naukratis. It would enable an easier control to be exercised over the foreign residents and, in the case of the trade, permit import duties to be collected more easily and smuggling to be checked.¹¹ Herodotus, however, does not specifically connect this regulation with Amasis and there does not seem to be any evidence for the collection of import duties by the Egyptian government before the regulations of the Naukratite stele in the fourth century B.C.¹² Thus, while we may accept the fact of the concentration of trade, another explanation of it is needed. Further, it is apparent that the activity of Amasis in connection with Naukratis has been greatly exaggerated, however firmly such a tradition was fixed by Herodotus' period.

The explanation of this exaggeration is probably to be sought in a combination of the undoubted philhellenism of the latter part of Amasis' reign, when the threat of

Persia made overtures to the Greeks a matter of political expediency, and in the usual practice of a Pharaoh of confirming a predecessor's regulations in such terms that they appeared to be of his own making. Thus, it is likely that a predecessor of Amasis—probably Psammetichus I (*ca.* 663–610 B.C.), to judge from the tradition preserved by Strabo¹³—granted lands for settlement to the Greeks at Naukratis and concentrated the general trading activity of the Greeks to that point. He was apparently the first of the Saite kings to make use of Greek mercenaries in some numbers¹⁴ and, if Diodorus is to be credited, encouraged trading with the Greeks.¹⁵ Since Naukratis was in the neighborhood of Sais it would have been desirable to regulate and keep an eye on his new associates. Probably, too, seventh century Greek trade was so nearly akin to piracy¹⁶ that the regulations were designed to prevent pillaging in the Delta rather than to enable the collection of import duties.

Amasis probably came to the throne on a wave of Egyptian nationalist feeling against his predecessor Apries,¹⁷ but found that Egypt's overseas trade was in the hands of Greeks and that continued use of Greek mercenaries was necessary. He evidently did move some of them to Memphis, possibly very soon after his defeat of Apries. So far as Naukratis was concerned, he probably reconfirmed, in his own name, the original conditions on which settlement had been allowed, but apparently did not try to enforce the regulations for the concentration of trade. The growth of Persian power after the middle of the century made it necessary to cultivate rather than constrain the Greeks. It is significant that the acts of goodwill towards various Greek communities which can be dated were performed in the latter part of his reign¹⁸ so that their tradition

was still strong in the fifth century: Amasis appeared the most prominent and most philhellene of the Saite kings in Greek eyes.

If the reconstruction proposed above is correct, Naukratis' history as a Greek town began in the reign of Psammetichus I,¹⁹ to judge from the archeological evidence, in its latter part. At that time some Greeks would have settled for permanent residence on the lands granted by the king; others, from time to time, as their interest grew, would have taken advantage of the privilege of founding their sanctuaries. The pottery dedicated in the sanctuaries indicates that a common use was very soon made of them for purposes of worship. Did the community coalesce in similar fashion, creating an organization for itself and controlling its economic life, or did various Greek cities control it by sending representatives as Herodotus states?

Herodotus remarks that the nine founding states of the Hellenion furnished the *prostatai* of the *emporion*. As we have noticed, these *prostatai* are usually considered to have been some type of official in charge of trade. Prinz, by analogy, suggests that the three states with separate sanctuaries, Samos, Miletus, and Aegina, had separate trading factories for which each supplied its own *prostatai*.²⁰ In short, the administration of the main activity of Naukratis and the jurisdiction of the numerous questions which would arise from it are considered to have been in the hands of noncitizens appointed by various Greek states. This does not, on the face of it, seem a very happy arrangement either for adjusting relations between the various concessions, between concessions and the Greek city of Naukratis, or between these units and Egypt. On examination, in fact, this interpretation of Herodotus does not seem justified.

Herodotus does not state or imply that there were *emporion* attached to the separate *temene* for purposes of trade. While it is difficult to restore the physical features of archaic Naukratis from the scanty topographical traces discovered in the excavation, the sanctuaries appear to have been only religious establishments with small temples, altars, and open precincts. The Hellenion had various groups of chambers, but these were apparently shrines dedicated to separate deities. There was probably a single dock and warehouse area along the river bank, but its very existence implies the need for a common regulating authority.²¹ If the *prostatai* were officials in general charge of the port and responsible to Amasis, as Hasebroek has suggested, there was such an authority. But the meaning of the terms used by Herodotus is open to question. Herodotus uses *emporion* in chapter 179 unmistakably of Naukratis as a whole, not of the *emporion* of a separate sanctuary, or even of the *emporion* of the whole city. Thus, the word is hardly likely to have the more restricted sense assigned to it in chapter 178. In fact, Herodotus normally uses *emporion* to designate whole and independent communities which had an essentially trading and mercantile existence.²² It would seem reasonable, then, that in chapter 178 he means the whole community of Naukratis by *emporion*. The interpretation of *prostatai* as some type of trade-consul or official in charge of trade is not supported by its other occurrences in Herodotus. Elsewhere, it is used in the sense of political leader of a state or people.²³ It is such a general word, however, that it might include a technical and limited meaning or be rendered by "representative," but it does seem significant that the word, in fifth century usage, does not have either of the sug-

gested connotations.²⁴ Thus, it is preferable to understand Herodotus in general terms only: he means the chief magistrates or leaders of the whole community of Naukratis. This solution, however, might seem to raise a more difficult question. Was the whole community of Naukratis administered by officials appointed by those Greek states which had founded the Hellenion?

An analogy for such an institution may be found in the *epidemiourgoi* which Corinth appointed for its colony of Potidaea even when Potidaea was a member of the Athenian empire.²⁵ In that case, however, only one city state, Corinth, was concerned with the administration of its own colony; in Naukratis nine states and possibly twelve, if we include Samos, Miletus, and Aegina, were involved. It would necessitate a most unusual degree of co-operation between states which were, on different occasions, at variance elsewhere in the Aegean. Further, some of them, namely Phocaea, Teos, and Miletus, ceased to exist as important and independent communities in the archaic period. More important than these general objections, however, is the evidence that Lindos, and later Rhodes, when the synoecism of the island had taken place, appointed Naukratite citizens as *proxenoi*.²⁶ Rhodes, of course, was one of the founders of the Hellenion. It is significant that Rhodes conceived its relationship with Naukratis in the same terms as its relationship with other Greek cities—the interests of Rhodes in Naukratis were looked after by a Naukratite citizen, not by a Rhodian representative from its own citizen body. Athens, too, appointed a Naukratite, Theogenes, as its *proxenos* in the fourth century.²⁷ The evidence for the Rhodian *proxenoi* is little more than a generation later than Herodotus and we have no reason to believe that the organi-

zation of Naukratis was fundamentally changed in the interval. Further, it is apparent that, while Herodotus speaks of the founders of the Hellenion furnishing *prostatai* in his own period, the institution is conceived by him as dating from the foundation of the Hellenion. Herodotus, then, seems to have misunderstood, or expressed awkwardly, the nature of the situation. Before considering that problem it would be advisable to see if there is other evidence supporting the view that Naukratis had developed into a unified Greek state at an early date with a consequent growth of its own institutions and traditions.

While the evidence is very scanty, it does confirm the impression that Naukratis acted and was recognized by other Greek cities as a normal city state. Literary references are to Naukratis and Naukratites.²⁸ The latter contributed to the funds of Delphi and are mentioned in the inscriptions recording contributions in the same manner as the citizens from other states.²⁹ As soon as the city had an opportunity, in the interval between the conquest of Egypt by Alexander and the proclamation of his own kingdom by Ptolemy I, it issued an independent coinage.³⁰ It seems established that the city retained its Greek character and institutions as a self-governing city under the Ptolemies.³¹ Its laws served as a model for those of Antinoupolis when that city was founded, with the significant exception that the citizens of Antinoupolis were allowed to intermarry with Egyptians whereas those of Naukratis were not.³² It is to be noticed that there is little evidence of intermarriage in the archaic period.³³ What evidence we have is unanimous that Naukratis was a normal Greek community and desired to remain so.

Why, then, if Naukratis was regarded by the Greeks as an independent city

state, did Herodotus state that certain Greek cities sent representatives to govern it? He plainly connected the system of administration with the foundation of the Hellenion. Unfortunately there is no very precise indication of that event. Herodotus does not attribute the foundation specifically to Amasis, but probably implies such an act by the statements about the grants of land and the subsequent foundation of the sanctuaries. Yet there is reason to believe that Amasis only reconfirmed the grants of a predecessor, probably Psammetichus I. Thus, the Hellenion may have been founded before the time of Amasis. The archeological evidence is inconclusive. While the larger part of the material from the Hellenion is later in date than that from the sanctuaries of Apollo and Aphrodite, the material is from its period of use; it is not evidence of construction.³⁴ Probably, however, it was built later than the other two sanctuaries.

One fact of some significance in this connection is that there appears to be a duplication of cult among its shrines. Aphrodite Pandemos was worshipped in both the Aphrodite sanctuary in the southern part of Naukratis and in the Hellenion.³⁵ It was suggested in a previous article that the Aphrodite sanctuary was probably a Chian foundation, indicative of the prominent part which Chios played in the growth of Naukratis.³⁶ Chios, too, was one of the founding states of the Hellenion. Thus, it seems probable that we have in this duplication evidence of a reorganization of the early community for the purpose of creating a unified Naukratis. The residents from Chios and other states joined together to pool their interests and administer the community. The Hellenion was founded to accommodate their small shrines in a common sanctuary, possibly incorporating a certain number of pre-existent shrines. As Herodotus tells us the

move was effective; the Hellenion became the center of the city. The above mentioned Lindian proxeny decree was set up there. Those individuals who participated in this foundation became the citizens of Naukratis, and it served as the core for the political organization of the state. It is of some significance that in the Ptolemaic period no evidence of an organization by demes or tribes has been found.³⁷

The separate sanctuaries of Miletus, Samos, and Aegina presumably remained outside this civic organization—they remained simply religious sanctuaries. Their citizens came to Naukratis to trade, but they had no share in the administration of the city; if they wished to become citizens and reside there, they were confronted with a problem similar to that existing in other Greek states. They had to be accepted by the organization centering in the Hellenion. Presumably they were admitted by some means as individuals and helped to increase the citizen body, but the nucleus of the Greeks of Naukratis must have been the citizens originally from the states mentioned as founding the Hellenion and their descendants. This reconstruction presumes two stages in the early growth of Naukratis: first a group of traders and residents who had taken advantage of the land grants made by the Egyptian king to found their own sanctuaries in filial fashion. They were probably administered by representatives sent out by the "mother-cities," but, as might have been expected in a community isolated in a foreign land which discouraged assimilation with its own citizens, a desire for a unified community of their own soon asserted itself. In creating such a community the citizens of those states most interested in the trade with Naukratis, who were already in residence in the settlement, took the lead. Probably the moving spirits were the citizens from Chios.

The result was the creation of Naukratis as a unified political community through and around the Hellenion. When Herodotus speaks of its founding states as furnishing the magistrates of Naukratis, he is speaking inexactly; it is rather the citizens originally from those states and their descendants, who were still aware of their origin through the continuance of their cults, who furnished the magistrates. It might be objected that Miletus should have had some share in this move, if not taken the lead, by virtue of its claims as the original founder of the settlement at Naukratis. These original Milesians, however, may have been a group of mercenaries, in a somewhat different relation to the Egyptian state from that of the Greeks

who came to trade and settle. The trading interests of Miletus do not seem to have been as strong in Egypt as usually supposed. As argued in the previous article the important trading cities, whose business interests might have led their citizens to settle in Naukratis, were the eastern Greeks of the northern Aegean area, particularly Chios, and of the southeastern Aegean, centered around Rhodes.³⁸ They were the founders of the Hellenion: Chios, Teos, Phocaea, Clazomenae, Mytilene, Rhodes, Cnidus, Halicarnassus, and Phaselis. They were also the political founders of Naukratis and their descendants formed the main element of its population.

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NOTES

1. C. Roebuck, "The Grain Trade Between Greece and Egypt," *CP*, XLV (1950), 241-42.

2. Herodotus 2. 178-79; translated by G. C. Macaulay, I (Macmillan, 1904), 199-200.

3. H. Prinz, "Funde aus Naukratis," *Klio*, Beiheft VII (1908), 5-6, 115-16; see also G. Glotz, *Ancient Greece at Work*, pp. 107, 113, 119-20; Glotz-Cohen, *Histoire grecque*, I, 204-7; Hall, *CAH*, III, 292.

4. *PHG*, II, 80-81; quoted by Athenaeus 4. 149 F. This Hermelas was the author of a book on the Gryneion Apollo; the *timouchoi* of Naukratis are mentioned as possessing the right to levy fines for certain violations of festivals held in the prytaneion. Müller identified the author with Hermelas of Methymna, of the fourth century B.C., but only on the grounds that it is probable a Methymnaean would be writing of the Gryneion Apollo, since the sanctuary was in that region; the identification was rejected by F. Jacoby in *P.-W.*, VIII, 731. 6, and Müller's reason is certainly not convincing. If Hermelas does belong to the fourth century B.C. it would, of course, be very likely that the *timouchoi* were an early Naukratite institution. It would, however, be difficult to determine from which city it was originally borrowed, for *timouchoi* are known for several cities which were active at Naukratis in the archaic period: Teos, Miletus, and at Massilia, the Phocaean colony (attested at least for the second century B.C.: *Syll.*³, 591; Strabo 4. 1. 5, 179) as well as in other Ionian and Aeolic cities (Busolt-Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde*, I, 357; Schulthess, *P.-W.*, VI¹, 1366-68; Wilhelm, *Jahreshefte*, XII [1909], 137-38; Robert, *BCH*, LII [1928], 167-68). The earliest example is from Teos in the well known inscription in which the *timoucheontes* are required to protect the state from various dangers (Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, No. 23). Wilcken also identifies *timouchoi* as an institution among the Hellenomemphites (ca. 200 B.C.; *Papyruskunde*, I, 2, pp. 48-50, No. 30. 16).

5. Hasebroek, *Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece* (translated by L. M. Fraser and D. C. MacGregor [London, 1933]), pp. 60 ff.; *idem*, *Griechische Wirtschafts- und Gesellschafts-Geschichte bis zur Perserzeit*, pp. 282-83.

6. R. M. Cook, "Amasis and the Greeks in Egypt," *JHS*, LVII (1937), 227-37.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 229-30, 233-35.

8. *Her.* 2. 154.

9. Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 234. From Herodotus' general description Daphnae and Stratopeda were in the same region (2. 154; 2. 30), but, as Cook points out, Herodotus does not identify them as the same place. He does, however, state that Stratopeda was in ruins in his own time, while Daphnae was still garrisoned. It seems probable that Daphnae is to be identified with Tell-Defenneh, excavated by Petrie, but there is no reason to identify Tell-Defenneh, Daphnae and Stratopeda as Petrie did (*Tanis*, II, 48). The Greek pottery found at Tell-Defenneh is to be dated in the period of Amasis.

10. Cook, *op. cit.*, pp. 230, 236-37.

11. Kees, *P.-W.*, XVI, 1960-61.

12. Erman and Wilcken, *Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde*, XXXVIII (1900), 127-35; Gunn, *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, XXIX (1943), 55-59. The stela, found at Naukratis, indicates that a 10% tax was placed on all imports from the Aegean and on Naukratite production; the proceeds were used as an endowment for the temple of Neith. The stela bears the name of King Nbt-nb-f (Nektanebos I, ca. 380-360 B.C.), the predecessor of Teos. Kees has suggested (*loc. cit.*) that these levies probably go back to the regulations of Amasis, since they reflect the fundamentals of old Pharaonic economic practice (see also Kees, *Kulturgeschichte d. ÄO: Ägypten*, pp. 105-6). Edgerton, however, objects that there does not appear to be any evidence that import duties were collected by the Egyptian govern-

ment during the Empire ("The Nauri Decree of Seti I," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, VI [1947], 229). In a note written to me on this point Professor Edgerton has observed: "In sum: import duties may be an old Pharaonic device, but I have not yet seen any affirmative evidence which seems to me to point in that direction."

13. Strabo 17. 1. 18, 801; Strabo assigns the foundation of the Milesian fort to the days of Psammetichus, who is described as a contemporary of Cyaxares (this is usually rejected as a gloss; see Hirschfeld, *Rhein. Mus.*, XLII [1887], 211 and Ure, *Origin of Tyranny*, pp. 90-91); the Milesians are said to have later sailed up into the Saïte nome and to have founded Naukratis after defeating Inaros. Inaros is otherwise unknown in this connection. He may have been a rival of Psammetichus against whom the king used Milesian mercenaries, afterwards settling them in Naukratis, or there may be some confusion in Strabo's mind with the Inaros of the fifth century. In any case the earliest Greek pottery found at Naukratis is dated in the period of Psammetichus I or Necho II, in the last quarter of the seventh century.

14. Herodotus 2. 152; Hall, *CAH*, III, 291; Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers*, pp. 4-6.

15. Diodorus 1. 66. 8: "Psammetichus used to provide cargoes for the merchants, and particularly for Phoenicians and Greeks." See Ure, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

16. There is a tradition of a Naukratite foray up the Nile preserved in Aristagoras of Miletus (*FGH*, II, 99, Frag. 6). See also *Odyssey* 14. 257 ff.

17. The stele of the death of Apries states that Apries roused the Greeks in an attempt to recover sovereignty (*Rec. Trav.*, XXII [1900], 1-9). Amasis' policy toward the Greeks is usually interpreted as an example of double-dealing (Glotz, *Histoire grecque*, I, 204 ff.; Kees, *P.-W.*, XVI, 1959; Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 232). Whatever his motives, Amasis was scarcely in a position, after the first few years of his reign, to estrange the Greeks.

18. Cf. Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

19. This solution of the conflict between the archeological and literary evidence is not, of course, new; see, for example, Hall, *CAH*, III, 292.

20. Prinz, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

21. Prinz has printed a composite plan from those published in the successive excavation reports (*ibid.*, Pl. 1). Its indications and the reports show the difficulties of restoration. No agora was identified in Naukratis, but Hogarth suggested that it might have been in the Hellenion or in the Heraion (*BSA*, V [1898-99], 44). The former, however, was occupied by the separate shrines and the latter by a temple, like the precincts of Apollo and Aphrodite. The most plausible suggestion is that warehouses, shops, and business district were closely associated with the docks along the river bank (*ibid.*, p. 40; note the revisions made in Naukratite topography by Kees, *op. cit.*, 1955-56).

22. Herodotus (Liddell and Scott cite no examples from earlier writers; see also Buck and Petersen, *A Reverse Index of Greek Nouns and Adjectives*, p. 105, s.v. -*πόρος*) uses the word in the general sense of a community whose main activity was trade, rather than in the restricted sense of "harbor-market," an area distinct from the city which controlled it. Also there does not seem to be any necessary connotation

of control by another city as implied in the translation "trading-factory." Of the examples in Herodotus (Powell, *Lexicon to Herodotus*, s.v.) the passage referring to the Phocaeans' attempt to purchase the Oenussae Islands from Chios is particularly informative (1. 165): the Chians refused to sell for fear that the islands would develop into an *emporion* and Chios would be cut off; that is, the Chians did not wish an independent community living by trade in their immediate neighborhood. The Black Sea cities are also referred to as *emporía* (4. 17. 1; 20. 1; 24; 108) as are Tartessus (4. 152. 3) and the cities of western Sicily (7. 158. 2). The Black Sea cities (4. 24) would hardly be Milesian stations in the fifth century. The proposal of the Laconians to transplant the Ionians to the *emporía* of the Medizing Greek states after the Persian Wars (9. 106. 3) would presumably have entailed setting up independent communities supporting themselves by trade. In Herodotus the *emporion* is essentially a community living by sea trade, but it is interesting to note that Thucydides can envisage such a place arising from land traffic as in the case of Corinth (1. 13. 5). In Thucydides, however, the sense of trading-factory, with its implications of control to the advantage of another state, seems predominant (1. 100. 2; 4. 102-3; 7. 50. 2; see also Aristophanes *Birds* 1523).

23. Herodotus 1. 127. 1; 5. 23. 2. Thucydides (2. 80.5) uses it of the chief official of the Chaeonians.

24. The lexicographers have been more chary of reading a technical meaning into *prostatai* than have the commentators on Herodotus and the historians: Powell translates "magistrate" (*Lexicon to Herodotus*, s.v.) or "officers" (*Translation of Herodotus*, I, 194) and Liddell and Scott (s.v. II, 2) "rulers of Greeks in Egypt"; How and Wells, however, explain the *prostatai* as "consuls" (*Commentary on Herodotus*, I, 254) and Stein, "officials in charge of trade" (*Herodotus* [5th ed., Berlin, 1883], on 2. 178). It is regularly used, of course, to denote the leaders of the Athenian demos (Busolt-Swoboda, *op. cit.*, pp. 414 ff.) and to designate the chief civil magistrate or executive committees of the council or assembly (*ibid.*, p. 451, n. 5 and p. 478; see also Swoboda, *Die Griechischen Volksbeschlüsse*, pp. 67, 91-93, 99 ff.). The word also has a more limited technical usage in the fifth century: the representatives of metics in Athens were called *prostatai* and perhaps a similar connotation of legal representative is to be understood in the difficult passage of the law of the Eastern Locrians relative to their colony at Naupactus (ca. 460 B.C.; Tod, *op. cit.*, No. 24, VII, 34). To judge by the examples given in Liddell and Scott, *prostatai* as the administrative official of some property or institution is met with only in the Hellenistic period.

25. Thucydides 1. 56. 2.

26. *Syll.*³, 110 (ca. 410 B.C.). This inscription was used by Prinz (*op. cit.*, p. 119) as confirmation of a separate Aeginetan factory in the fifth century. That interpretation depended, of course, on the reading given in the Sylloge text: *Ἀγυῖαν τὴν ἐν Ναυπακτίῳ*. It has been revised to *Ἀγυῖαν* in the Sylloge index, which not only fits the space equally well, but seems confirmed by the Lindian inscription quoted in the commentary. Evidently Naukratite Greeks might be referred to as Egyptians or as residing in Egypt (see the form of reference in *Syll.*³, 239, B. 37). The inscription, No. 110, would pre-

sumably date from soon after the synoecism of the Rhodian cities (it is rather emphatic about representation of all the Rhodians) and the Lindian inscription from shortly before the synoecism. In this connection it is interesting to note that Herodotus (2. 178) in the middle of the fifth century can refer to Rhodes rather than to its several cities.

27. *IG*, II², 1, 206.

28. They are collected by E. M. Smith, *Naukratis* (Diss., Bryn Mawr, 1924), pp. 66 ff.

29. *Syll.*³, 239, A. 1-6; B. 37-39; C. III. 21-24.

30. Head, *HN*², p. 845; *Num. Chron.*, VI (1886), 10-11.

31. The evidence is discussed by Kees, *op. cit.*, 1964.

32. Mittels and Wilcken, *Papyruskunde*, I, 1, pp. 13, 51; I, 2, pp. 44-45, No. 27.

33. Roebuck, *op. cit.*, p. 246, n. 62 on p. 247.

34. Hogarth considered that the Hellenion was probably built at the time of Amasis' supposed reorganization (*JHS*, XXV [1905], 136; see also Price, *JHS*, XLIV [1924], 192, 204), but his description of the excavation shows that no good evidence for the date of its construction was found.

35. *BSA*, V (1898-99), 56, No. 107; *Naukratis*, II, 66, Nos. 818, 821.

36. Roebuck, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

37. Mittels and Wilcken, *op. cit.*, I, 1, pp. 13, 51.

38. Strabo's reference to the foundation by the Milesians (17. 1. 18, 801) perhaps indicates that they were originally settled there after serving as mercenaries for Psammetichus (see n. 13 above). For discussion of the Chian and other interests at Naukratis see Roebuck, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-47.

LUCAN'S CORNELIA

RICHARD T. BRUÈRE

THE women in Lucan's *Bellum civile* are, with two exceptions, unsubstantial or grotesque. In the first class belong the matron introduced at the close of the first book, whose prophecy defines the subject of the poem,¹ Julia's ghost,² and the Pythian priestess Phemonœ, whom Appius consults to little avail about the outcome of the war.³ Cato's divorced wife Marcia, represented in an astounding scene as begging her ex-husband to take her back,⁴ together with the Thessalian witch Erichtho, whom the poet describes with macabre relish⁵ but does not characterize in human terms, constitute the second or grotesque category. The first exception is Cleopatra, who comes upon the scene shortly before the narrative breaks off. Lucan's portrait of her, although brutally malevolent, is vital and credible; in the completed poem her role, as the female counterpart first of Caesar and then of Antony, would have been of the first importance. As it is, there is but one woman with whom Lucan takes more pains, and this is Pompey's last wife Cornelia.

From the passages in which Cornelia figures an exceptional quantity of information concerning Lucan's technique and method may be obtained, since for no other portions of the poem can the materials used in its construction be ascertained with comparable precision. It is the object of this paper to identify and examine these materials, historical and poetic, and in the light thereof to appraise Lucan's treatment of Cornelia and her function in the poem.

Lucan's chief if not unique historical

source was Livy's *History*,⁶ in the final chapters of Plutarch's *Life of Pompey* the Livian story of the vicissitudes of Cornelia and her husband is preserved in some detail.⁷ From the poetic point of view, Lucan's account of Cornelia contains many Virgilian reminiscences, especially of the pathetic scenes of the fourth *Aeneid*. Much more immediate, however, is the influence of Ovid. Lucan draws heavily upon the tale of Ceyx and Alcyone,⁸ which has to do with a situation similar to that in which Cornelia and Pompey find themselves, and his debt to several of the *Heroides* is more than incidental. Finally, in the few hundred lines with which we are concerned there occur themes and expressions taken from almost every part of the Ovidian corpus.

That Lucan owed much to Virgil and to Ovid has been observed by many scholars. A large number of Virgilian parallels, real or fancied, has been assembled by W. E. Heitland;⁹ F. Caspari has suggested that some of Lucan's Virgilian reminiscences may have filtered to him through the schools,¹⁰ and part of the *color Ovidianus* that characterizes Lucan's style and vocabulary is no doubt the result of his rhetorical education, but it is patent that he had firsthand and intimate knowledge of his two great predecessors.¹¹ In the article to which reference has just been made Hosius asserts that since the influence of Virgil and of Ovid upon Lucan is clear, a detailed investigation of this relation would be of small interest, inasmuch as it would merely confirm what is already known. For him who would penetrate the secrets of Lucan's workshop, says Hosius,

the search for more remote influences is more attractive, whereupon he catalogues some questionable "parallels" from Curtius Rufus.¹² A less judicious critical observation would be hard to find. Far more significant than the fact of influence is the manner in which this influence manifests itself. There is no better way to penetrate the secrets of Lucan's workshop, to observe how the poem crystallized in his mind, than to examine the passages where he borrows from, adapts, or echoes his predecessors.

Lucan first mentions Cornelia in 2. 348-49, where Marcia begs Cato to take her with him to war, asking why she should be less favored than Cornelia in this respect.¹³ Marcia's plea is strikingly similar to that of Cornelia in the scene where she first appears.¹⁴ The details of the reunion of Marcia and Cato, which Lucan, like Plutarch,¹⁵ places after the news of Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon had reached Rome, were invented by the poet. He represents Marcia as coming from the pyre of her husband, Hortensius, who had in fact died some months before. Cicero, writing from Rhodes on about 10 August 50 B.C., makes reference to his death.¹⁶ The "literary" quality of this interview is further indicated by Marcia's declaration that at Rome she would enjoy security and peace,¹⁷ which is at sharp variance with Lucan's description of the panic that seized Rome at the word of Caesar's approach.¹⁸ Although Cato now remarries Marcia he takes no notice of her wish to accompany him. Marcia's "da mihi castra sequi"¹⁹ corresponds to the "me quoque tolle simul"²⁰ of Aleyone to her husband when she realizes that she cannot prevent his departure. The mention of Cornelia together with the similarity of situation causes the poet to think of Aleyone at this point.

The next allusion to Cornelia is at the beginning of the third book. Pompey has

set sail from Brundisium across the Ionian sea, leaving Italy for the last time. He watches the receding shore as long as it is visible (characteristically Lucan magnifies the low hills which Aeneas saw as he first approached Italy²¹ into towering peaks),²² then retires for a siesta.²³ Now Pompey's fourth wife Julia appears to him in a dream. She contrasts the triumphs he enjoyed while married to her with the ill fortune Cornelia regularly brings her husbands (3. 20-34). Although Cornelia may cling to him over land and sea, she will haunt him at night until civil war brings him back to her (24-34). This vision may have been suggested by the apparition of Morpheus in the shape of Ceyx to Aleyone (*Met.* 11. 650-70); the threat of haunting echoes that of Dido;²⁴ the ill fortune motive is attested by Livy,²⁵ and later developed at length in Cornelia's speech to Pompey when he joins her after the disaster in Thessaly;²⁶ here Lucan anticipates several of the points made by Cornelia upon that occasion.²⁷ Had this vision been attested in Lucan's historical source, as is the case with Pompey's dream on the eve of Pharsalia,²⁸ Lucan would not have made the mistake of placing any of Pompey's triumphs in the period when he was married to Julia, for his last triumph was celebrated two years before she became his wife. Further, despite Julia's reproaches (3. 23), she had been dead two years when he married Cornelia.²⁹

Cornelia first appears in person at the end of the fifth book, where she is dispatched to safety at Mytilene.³⁰ Lucan places this farewell episode between the junction of Antony with the main Caesarian forces³¹ and the northward withdrawal of the Pompeians from the vicinity of the rivers Hapsus and Genusus, where they had been in contact with Caesar,³² to the strong point Petra a few miles southeast of Dyrrhachium.³³

That Lucan's historical source placed

Cornelia's departure at this time is indicated by the position of the episode in the poem; it is not clear why Cornelia should have come to Lucan's mind at this point unless he had found mention of her there.³⁴ Whether or not there is historical justification for Cornelia's presence in Epirus is a matter which cannot be determined with certainty. Save for Lucan, no ancient writer furnishes any information as to her whereabouts at this time. Admittedly, it is to Lucan's interest that she be in Epirus, for otherwise the farewell scene would not be possible. Lucan does not hesitate to take liberties with historical exactness when he can make his poem more effective by so doing.³⁵ Nevertheless it does not follow that every dramatically effective episode which is not elsewhere confirmed was invented by the poet. In this case it appears somewhat more probable that Cornelia accompanied her husband into the field in the early spring of 48 B.C. than that she remained behind at Thessalonica.

When Pompey left his winter quarters for Epirus Caesar had not yet crossed from Italy. Pompey doubtless had information that led him to expect Caesar's arrival, but he was not marching westward to immediate battle. Should Caesar land in force, it would be easy to send Cornelia back along the Via Egnatia to Thessalonica, should this seem prudent. That Cornelia should be with her husband, at least in the absence of imminent danger, is consonant with the affection Pompey felt for his young wife and in harmony with Cornelia's character as Plutarch and Lucan portray it. It would be strange that Sextus (who appears to have been with his stepmother throughout this period) be left behind. Pompey's position did not markedly deteriorate with the arrival of Caesar, for the route to the east remained open; this presumably was not cut until the combined forces of Antony

and Caesar had maneuvered so that they blocked his communications by land with eastern Greece. It was at this time that the situation of the Pompeians in the field, although not of those at Thessalonica, became sufficiently difficult to justify alarm. If Cornelia was with her husband, it is natural that she now be sent to a safe refuge. There is far more reason for Cornelia, escorted by Sextus, to sail at this time from Epirus to Mytilene than to depart thither from Thessalonica.³⁶

Whether or not this episode is based on fact, the details of Lucan's account are of literary provenience. The Ceyx and Alcyone story serves as general pattern; Lucan interweaves further Ovidian touches, with here and there a Virgilian reminiscence; the stridency and occasional incoherence are his own.

When Pompey saw Caesar's troops menacing his camp he made up his mind to send Cornelia to safety (5. 722-27).³⁷ Pompey has been made fearful and reluctant to fight by his love for his wife (728-31). This observation is introduced by the exclamation "heu, quantum mentes dominatur in aequas / iusta Venus" (727-28), which is adapted from Virgil's *improbe Amor, quid non mortalia pectora cogis* (*Aen.* 4. 412, apropos of Dido's final attempt to detain Aeneas).³⁸ Unable to bring himself to tell Cornelia of his decision, Pompey puts off the evil moment, meanwhile morosely enjoying the delay (731-33). His conduct recalls that of Aeneas when the latter hesitates to break the news to Dido after having been ordered by Mercury to proceed on his voyage.³⁹ As Cornelia, waking toward dawn, embraces Pompey, she is shocked to find his face wet with tears. Here is apparent the influence of the famous scene between Venus and Vulcan in the eighth *Aeneid*:⁴⁰ the setting is similar, and there is significant verbal reminiscence.⁴¹ Pompey, sobbing, now confesses his resolve (739-59).

Ovid does not quote Ceyx' announcement of his voyage; Alcyone's reply, however, is given in direct form.⁴² Lucan therefore has no Ovidian model for Pompey's present speech. He makes use of the motive of a quick return (745-46) which he found in Ceyx' answer to Alcyone's plea that he remain,⁴³ but for the most part he is left to his own resources, with the consequence that his Pompey shows much of the wild exuberance that characterizes the tirades of Arellius Fuscus and his fellow declaimers, from whom the elder Seneca quotes in his anthology. The incongruousness of this speech is increased by its being delivered in bed. Pompey bluntly states that the time has come; Cornelia must go. Begging is useless; his decision is irrevocable (739-45).⁴⁴ The separation will be of short duration, for catastrophe is at hand (745-47). In the *Metamorphoses* the dramatic irony is more delicate, for Ceyx simply promises to return before two months elapse;⁴⁵ the reader may or may not know that it is his corpse that will wash ashore, but Ovid, unlike Lucan, makes no explicit reference to impending disaster. It will repeatedly be observed that Lucan attributes knowledge to his characters that it is impossible that they possess at the time. Pompey continues with an enumeration of improbable and contrived reasons for sending Cornelia away (747-53), then after adjuring her to hide in a spot sufficiently remote to shield her from the effects of his *fortuna*, he concludes by wishing that she, his *pars optima*, may survive, so that there may be some refuge for him if he is overthrown (754-59).⁴⁶ Cornelia reacts to this announcement just as Alcyone does upon learning of Ceyx' plan: she faints, then makes plaintive protest (759-61).⁴⁷ Her speech begins melodramatically. This, she says in substance, is the last straw. Her marriage is being dissolved in a most plebeian manner, since she is to be "sent away" (762-

65).⁴⁸ This complaint corresponds to Alcyone's apprehension that Ceyx does not love her any more,⁴⁹ with which she commences her plea. With Ovidian metaphor, she ironically proposes that her marriage be undone to gratify Caesar, once Pompey's father-in-law (766-67).⁵⁰ Like Alcyone (*Met.* 11. 421-24), Cornelia voices her protest in five rhetorical questions (767-72).⁵¹ Rivaling Pompey in oratorical ingenuity, Cornelia complains that she will be obliged to survive her husband until the news of his death reaches her, and that, in sending her away, he is inuring her to misfortune; she dreads being able to survive the ordeal of separation (773-78).⁵² At this point Cornelia imagines herself looking out over the sea, after the fashion of one of Ovid's *Heroides*, anxiously awaiting news of her husband's fortune. Even in the event of victory she will be the last to hear; in her apprehension she will dread the sight of the ship with the good tidings (778-81).⁵³ A Pompeian victory would not conjure her peril, for abandoned in a deserted spot (Lesbos has become the uninhabited Naxos of Ariadne) she could fall prey to a Caesar routed and in flight (782-84).⁵⁴ The remainder of Cornelia's speech is more in character with the daughter of Metellus Scipio; no longer Alcyone or Ariadne, she confidently proclaims that her presence will make Lesbos known far and wide and caps Pompey's final *sententia* with one no less pointed, adjuring him to take refuge anywhere save at Lesbos, since his enemies will expect him to flee there to her (784-90).⁵⁵ Hereupon Cornelia jumps out of bed, hysterically impatient to have done with the parting that has become inevitable. She cannot bear to embrace her husband (790-94).⁵⁶ Here the scene becomes indistinct. The next four lines ring changes on the theme of grief, but give no coherent picture of the sorrowing pair (795-98).⁵⁷ Clarity returns with vs. 799. The separa-

tion has, it would seem, taken place. Cornelia swoons, and is carried by her attendants to the beach, where after a desperate effort to cling to the shore she is placed on board ship (799-801). Alcione had collapsed upon saying farewell;⁵⁸ Cornelia follows suit. The detail of being lifted up by attendants is from the fourth *Aeneid*, where, after breaking off her interview with Aeneas, Dido is carried in a faint to her chamber.⁵⁹ The reluctance of Ceyx to set sail⁶⁰ has been transferred to Cornelia, here the one departing, and dramatized by her efforts to hold fast to the beach.

The poet now compares the present departure of Cornelia, sailing away from her husband, to the flight from Italy before Caesar (802-5).⁶¹ Nothing is said of the fading out of the ship carrying Cornelia. In Lucan's model, Alcione had watched from the shore as Ceyx' vessel disappeared. Cornelia, Lucan's Alcione, is however on shipboard, which makes adaptation of this motive awkward. When nothing more could be seen, Alcione went home to bed, where she wept in loneliness and despair. Lucan has taken this last scene, together with some details from the subsequent appearance of Morpheus in the guise of Ceyx to Alcione as she sleeps, as the basis for the verses in which he describes Cornelia tossing in bed her first night at sea (805-13).⁶² In her slumber she forgets where she is and keeps reaching for her husband (808-10). In just this way the sleeping Alcione had reached to grasp the vision of Ceyx that appeared to her in her dream.⁶³ The insertion of this Ovidian touch gives rise to a curious inconsistency. It has just been said that Cornelia was unable to sleep (806); directly hereafter it is reiterated that she was restless and wakeful (811-12); here, however, the poet speaks as if she has been asleep for a long time, for he represents her as reaching for Pompey again and again.⁶⁴ Despite the

flame of love that torments her, Cornelia does not toss throughout the bed, but remains on her own side (811-13).⁶⁵ The episode and book conclude with the paradox that Cornelia's fears of long separation were not, unfortunately, to be realized, for Pompey would soon be restored to her (813-15). This *sententia* has its origin in Ovid's hint of Ceyx' return,⁶⁶ of which Lucan has already made use in this scene.⁶⁷

The extent of Lucan's dependence on the Alcione-Ceyx story in this portion of the poem makes it improbable that Livy described this farewell, although he may have attested it.⁶⁸ Consequently Lucan did not here encounter the problem of what to do with historical detail that might or might not be artistically apposite. In the course of the foregoing dissection the incongruities that occurred in the process of adaptation have necessarily been emphasized rather than the total effect of this scene, which is not only moving in itself but of organic significance to the poem. It is true that its emotion is marred by extravagance and its relevance to the poem in its wider aspect is not brought into sufficient relief, but nevertheless Lucan's reworking of the Ovidian tale is neither absurd nor episodic.⁶⁹ It is not absurd because behind the rhetorical grease-paint the deep affection and solicitude of Pompey for Cornelia can be discerned, and similarly the Ovidian make-up does not always hide the love and resolute courage of Cornelia. It is not episodic because the love here given dramatic expression contributes to Pompey's ruin. It has already postponed his coming to grips with the enemy;⁷⁰ since it is responsible for Cornelia's being sent to Lesbos and for the detour Pompey makes thither after Pharsalia,⁷¹ thereby delaying his arrival in Egypt sufficiently to allow the news of Caesar's victory to get there first, it is not unrelated to Pompey's murder. This is a

far cry from the Ovidian story which, despite touches of poignancy, is for the most part superficial and contrived. Alcyone and Ceyx are puppets; their characters and actions are irrelevant to what befalls them. Lucan, on the other hand, is not always forgetful of his duty as poet to correlate his personages with their experiences, and here does this with some success.⁷²

Cornelia does not reappear until after Pharsalia. In his flight from the scene of the debacle Pompey, unmindful of Cornelia's adjuration,⁷³ makes Lesbos his first destination. Here Cornelia had been hiding, tormented by forebodings and nightmares. She watches anxiously for the sails of incoming ships, but dreads to ask news of her husband (8. 40-49). The nightmares recall the apparition of Morpheus in the form of Ceyx to the sleeping Alcyone.⁷⁴ Plutarch attests that Cornelia had no reason for alarm at this time, since she had been informed in exaggerated terms of the Pompeian success at Dyrrhachium,⁷⁵ and Lucan could not have been unaware of this. It may be questioned if he did well to abandon his historical source in this instance, for it would have been most effective to have the news of disaster come to Cornelia as she expected final victory with confidence. The influence of Ovid's Ariadne together with that of Alcyone is strong in Lucan's account of the reunion of the unhappy pair, and it is the reminiscences of these figures that give the scene a tone of almost unrelieved hopelessness.⁷⁶ A ship comes into view. Cornelia in her ignorance fears nothing worse than word of her husband's defeat (50-52).⁷⁷ But Pompey has arrived in person; as he leaps ashore Cornelia can tell from his haggard and unkempt mien that he has suffered a great disaster (53-57).⁷⁸ At this sight Cornelia faints away. Lucan's account, save for the circumstance

of Pompey's flight to Lesbos, is here poetic rather than historical. Plutarch's version is less dramatic. Cornelia is informed of Pompey's arrival by messenger sent from Mytilene harbor to her house in the town. Plutarch attests, however, that she fainted upon hearing the news. Without this evidence there would be every reason to ascribe this seizure to the imagination of the poet, for Lucan's Cornelia swoons in crises as regularly as Ovid uses the device of metamorphosis to solve the impasses into which he brings his characters.⁷⁹ Since Lucan, unlike Plutarch, has represented Cornelia as expecting bad news, having this confirmed by messenger would not produce the requisite surprise. To achieve this he brings Pompey himself upon the scene, and thus motivates Cornelia's collapse (58-61).⁸⁰ Pompey is now on the shore, scanning the empty sands. Cornelia's maidservants lament as they observe him at close quarters, meanwhile attempting in vain to raise up their unconscious mistress. Pompey embraces his wife and tries to revive her (61-67).⁸¹ It is not made clear how it was possible for Cornelia to see the signs of defeat on Pompey's person so distinctly without being visible herself, nor why her attendants do not observe Pompey's condition when she does. In Lucan's reference to the beach as empty, despite the presence of Cornelia and her handmaids, the influence of Ariadne's Naxos is again evident.⁸² When Cornelia regains her senses, Pompey reproaches her for giving way to despair (68-71).⁸³ This staunchness is in contrast to the defeatism Pompey had shown before Pharsalia and to the fearful attitude he had taken immediately after the defeat.⁸⁴ Pompey's timidity as he fled from Thessaly may be a reflection of the alarm of Aeneas (as opposed to his earlier intrepidity) as he made his escape from Troy toward the end of the night of its

sack;⁸⁵ in now representing him as sufficiently sanguine to console his downcast wife Lucan reverts to Livy, whose account Plutarch here preserves in some detail. According to Plutarch, when Cornelia recovered from the shock the messenger had given her, she hastened to the shore, where she met Pompey. Cornelia speaks first, declaring that she is to blame for what happened, and alludes to the catastrophe that had befallen her first husband at Carrhae, whereupon Pompey assured her that all is not lost.⁸⁶ Lucan, however, reverses this order and, as he had done in the farewell scene, places Cornelia's speech, climactically, after Pompey's. Pompey begins by expressing astonishment that a woman of such steadfastness and with such illustrious forebears should give in to the first blow of fortune (70-74). This contains the gist of Pompey's speech as reported by Plutarch. Instead of stopping, Lucan's Pompey now delivers a *consolatio*, composed in great part of reminiscences of letters written by Ovid from his place of exile to his wife. The similarities are too numerous and too precise to be explained as commonplaces of the genre, and show that the *Tristia* were fresh in the poet's memory. Pompey proclaims that Cornelia now has an opportunity of achieving eternal fame; only when catastrophe has come upon her husband can a wife attain renown (74-76).⁸⁷ In the next breath he exhorts her to love him because he has been beaten, and to pit her wifely devotion against fate; she can gain more glory by supporting him now than when he was surrounded by senators and vassal kings (76-80).⁸⁸ He goes on to say that it is not seemly that she plunge to the nadir of grief while her husband is still living (a distressing remark that Ovid does not make to his wife) and concludes with the ungallant *sententia* that really she has lost nothing; her weeping shows that her love

has been for her husband's lost position and power rather than for himself (80-85).⁸⁹ In addition to being of questionable appropriateness this speech is not in character with Pompey as he has hitherto been portrayed. The motives from Ovid's letters to his wife ring hollow in their new context; what a man may write from exile is often less becoming in direct conversation. Furthermore the tone of affectionate concern which Ovid employs in writing to his wife has not been borrowed by Lucan to temper Pompey's bumbling Stoicism.

Cornelia replies that she, ever destined to bring disaster upon her husbands, is responsible for Pompey's plight. This forms the theme of Cornelia's speech as given by Livy and Plutarch;⁹⁰ Lucan embroiders upon his historical source but makes no significant innovation. As when she had begged not to be sent to Lesbos, Cornelia laments and moans as she makes her reply (86-87).⁹¹ At the outset she expresses the strange wish that she might have married Caesar, so that her ill fortune would have fallen upon him (88-89).⁹² Her marriage to Pompey took place under bad auspices and was cursed by the shades of the Crassi; she has brought Pompey nothing but misfortune (90-97).⁹³ Cornelia now offers to expiate her guilt with her life. This appears to have been suggested by the wish that she had died before Carrhae or had persevered in her intention of suicide after that event, which Lucan presumably found in Livy.⁹⁴ She would have preferred to assure victory by this sacrifice; as it is, Pompey may avenge the misfortune she has brought upon him by slaying her (97-102). She ends with a plea to Julia, wherever she may lie,⁹⁵ to take revenge upon her and to have mercy upon Pompey (102-5). Lucan had introduced the motive of Julia's vindictiveness, expressed in similar terms, in the account of her apparition in the third book;⁹⁶ he does

not explain how Cornelia learned of Julia's threat to haunt her onetime husband. The recurrence of the motive at this point is perhaps an incidental result of Lucan's increasing preoccupation with the story of Tereus and Philomela.⁹⁷ Upon concluding this speech, Cornelia falls back into her husband's embrace. The bystanders weep, and the eyes of Pompey, dry at Pharsalia, now brim with tears (105-8). This tableau, of which Plutarch gives no hint, is surely Lucan's own.⁹⁸

The Mytileneans now invite Pompey to remain with them, but Pompey refuses. At the end of his speech he places his wife on board ship (109-47).⁹⁹ The Mytileneans regret the departure of Cornelia even more than that of Pompey. Her modesty, uprightness, and tact have endeared her to them all (147-58).¹⁰⁰ Lucan probably had authority for the affection he has the islanders demonstrate for Cornelia. It is understandable that they should feel thus toward the historical Cornelia, whom Plutarch characterizes as both attractive and agreeable, noting that although she had studied music, literature, geometry, and philosophy, she had escaped the unlovely officiousness such pursuits, he says, commonly breed in young females;¹⁰¹ in representing this affection as inspired by Cornelia's matronly virtues Lucan is not over-exercising his epic prerogative. Lucan's Cornelia, despite the incongruities occasioned by her composite poetic antecedents, is essentially a figure of Roman courage and dignity, and it is thus that she appears here.

After sailing southward from Mytilene, Pompey and his companions hold a council of war at the Cilician port Syhedra. In opposing the plan advocated by Pompey of seeking the support of the Parthians, Lentulus Crus makes the point that it would be inadvisable to expose Cornelia to a nation of such barbarous and un-

bridled customs; even if she suffered no outrage it would be noised about that she had. Plutarch says that it was this consideration that decided Pompey to go to Egypt instead.¹⁰² Lucan makes this an important although not the determining argument of the speech he has Lentulus deliver upon this occasion. Lentulus is grimly specific; he pictures the fate that would await Cornelia as the thousandth wife of the Parthian king; the circumstance that she had been married to the younger Crassus and to Pompey would goad the cruel passion of the barbarian. In his version of Lentulus' argument, Lucan owes much to Ovid's story of Tereus and Philomela, a classic example of barbarian brutality and lust. Ovid tells the stark tale almost lightheartedly, although with a good deal of realism; Lucan uses his borrowed material to create a lurid and bestial effect (396-416).¹⁰³

As Pompey climbs down into a small boat to be rowed in to the Egyptian shore Cornelia, according to Lucan, attempts to follow him, all the more eager to be by his side since she suspects foul play (577-79). Plutarch says that Cornelia lamented in anticipation of Pompey's death as he left the ship, but mentions no attempt upon her part to go ashore with him;¹⁰⁴ Cornelia here expresses her desire to share her husband's perils with greater explicitness than in the farewell scene, and more closely parallels the plea of Alcyone not to be left behind.¹⁰⁵ Pompey, in words revealing his grave misgivings, orders Cornelia to remain on board the ship (579-82).¹⁰⁶ Cornelia stretches out her hands in supplication and asks if she is to be abandoned a second time; it were better had he not interrupted his flight to seek her (582-89).¹⁰⁷ After this fruitless complaint, Cornelia leans over the stern of her ship, watching the withdrawal of Pompey's boat with terrified fascination. The fleet

("classis," 592) was alarmed, says Lucan, not from fear of violence but lest Pompey show unseemly obsequiousness to the Egyptian monarch. Unless, as is by no means clear, Lucan is here referring to the onlookers apart from Cornelia, he changes the emotional atmosphere in a brusque and indefensible manner. The origin of this inconsistency may be a recollection of having read in his historical source of the feeling of relief that came over the watchers afloat upon the approach of members of the royal suite, seemingly with friendly intent, to where Pompey's boat was about to land.¹⁰⁸ The poet has carried this reaction one step farther; instead of experiencing relief at Pompey's fancied safety, the spectators take this safety for granted and proceed to worry about the dignity of his bearing (592-95).¹⁰⁹

The thought of Cornelia fortifies Pompey as he composes himself to die. He suppresses his groans, reflecting that if his wife and son marvel at his fortitude they will at the same time be obliged to love him (632-35). When Cornelia sees her husband is being murdered she bursts into piteous wails (637-39).¹¹⁰ She cries that the blame for Pompey's death is hers, since the delay occasioned by the detour to Lesbos has permitted Caesar to reach Egypt before him. Then, after reproaching her husband for cheating her of the opportunity to confront death by his side, she declares that she shall die none the less, by leaping headlong, hanging, or being stabbed, and with a protest that she is being restrained from suicide and preserved for the victor, she collapses into the arms of her companions as the ship makes swiftly for the open sea (639-62).¹¹¹ According to Plutarch, upon Pompey's murder Cornelia's ship had at once weighed anchor and put to sea. A fresh breeze sprang up which made successful pursuit impossible.¹¹² The account of Cornelia's

escape here given by Lucan is thus in essential agreement with that of his historical source.

Cornelia's Egyptian ordeal would seem to have ended, and it is therefore with astonishment that several hundred verses later we find Lucan representing her ship still near the scene of the assassination (although it is now many hours after the act took place) and Cornelia herself as delivering a second and amplified threnody, upon the termination of which the ship once more speeds away.¹¹³

In the interval the poet has described the burning of Pompey's headless corpse by one Cordus on the beach the night of the murder; as he is making ready to do this, Cordus (who supposes that Cornelia is not yet far distant) laments that she is not present to render her husband due funeral rites, and resolves to deliver Pompey's ashes to her if he ever returns to Italy.¹¹⁴ Lucan then relates the voyage of Cato from Epirus to Cyrenaica, where the vessels of Cornelia and Sextus now join him.¹¹⁵ At this juncture the poet reverts to Cornelia's flight from Egypt. He now describes her as halting her ship at no great distance from the shore and waiting in the hope that Pompey's corpse might drift within reach; finally she sees the flame of the improvised pyre, whereupon she laments she cannot perform the proper funerary rites for her husband (51-68).¹¹⁶ When this theme is exhausted she reflects that there is no need, after all, for funeral ceremonies, since she carries Pompey's image in her breast, and hints at suicide with the cry that it is for a wife who will survive her husband to be concerned about his ashes, not for herself. The light that has been visible on the shore where Cordus has been burning the corpse now dies down, and as dawn appears the ship's sails fill and Cornelia is carried away once more from the shore of Egypt, which she

cries she cannot bear to leave, since her husband is being left behind there (69-83).¹¹⁷ Suddenly she turns to Sextus and urges him to carry on his father's struggle (84-86), then repeats a message purportedly left by her husband to be passed on to his sons after his demise. They are to continue fighting; as long as any of Pompey's stock survive no Caesar shall play the despot unchallenged. The young men are to take orders from one man alone, Cato, if he pursues the war on behalf of liberty (87-97). She declares that she has survived Pompey only to deliver this testament; now she is free to follow her husband; it will never be necessary for her to leap to death, to hang herself, or to be stabbed, for she will beat herself to death as she mourns (98-108). With this she goes below, where she covers her head and laments, unaffected by the gale that is blowing. She lies prepared for death and urges on the storm (109-16).¹¹⁸

This episode is not only historically impossible, but inconsistent with the previous account of Cornelia's conduct upon Pompey's murder and of the flight of her ship; finally considered in itself it will not bear analysis. It is inconceivable that the ship should stop almost at once after putting to sea (no great progress has been made, since it is hoped that Pompey's corpse will drift out from the water's edge); that it lie close offshore the remainder of the day of the murder and all the subsequent night is fantastic. In the eighth book Cornelia had attempted suicide, which conflicts with the story of Pompey's testament to his sons by which she explains her survival in the second version. Why had she not communicated this message in the earlier scene? There is no way that Cornelia could have recognized the fire she saw as her husband's pyre;¹¹⁹ finally there is no apparent lapse of time between the rising up of the flame

and its disappearance toward dawn, although it must have consumed Pompey's corpse during the interval. It is impossible to believe that such a hodge-podge as this is more than an initial draught, which the poet had neither reviewed nor attempted to accommodate to the portion of the poem already completed.¹²⁰

As a general rule, Lucan goes to some pains to get his history right; he is especially careful not to contradict himself. Had he reviewed the latter part of the poem he would not have left these verses as they stand, but would have essayed to bring them and the first account of Cornelia's departure into harmony. This would present no insuperable difficulty. By cutting out the earlier reference to Cornelia's attempt at suicide he could render acceptable her subsequent statement that she lived so that she might deliver the message; with the exception of topographical and chronological adjustments the scene in Book nine would call for little alteration. The principal difficulty is the impossible waiting close to the Egyptian shore, for which an unseasonable desire to include the motive of the floating corpse from the Ceyx and Aleyone tale is probably to blame.¹²¹ One may wonder upon reflection why Pompey had not given his instructions to Sextus in person, since the pair had been in contact since leaving Mytilene, how it was that Pompey had so clear a presentiment of his death, and why Cato, who had not been mentioned in the council of war at Syhedra, now comes so prominently to the fore, but these matters arouse no immediate concern. In any event, a historical poet must be conceded some liberties, and this testament serves a useful constructional function, in that it links the past phases of the civil struggle with those yet to come, and foreshadows the long opposition of Sextus to the second of the Caesars.

The second version of Cornelia's departure must have occurred to the poet as he described Cordus' burning of Pompey's body. Cordus had regretted that Cornelia was not on hand to accomplish the customary rites; this regret is an important motive of Cornelia's second lamentation.¹²² Cordus imagines Cornelia as still not far away; Lucan comes to think of her as being in fact nearby at this time.¹²³ Furthermore, Pompey's testament complements the idea of the spiritual succession of the dead leader which Lucan had expressed in the verses at the beginning of Book nine describing the entrance of Pompey's spirit into the breasts of Brutus and of Cato,¹²⁴ and thus prepares the way for the *maius opus* which the poet planned now to commence.

Cornelia makes one more appearance. From Egypt she sailed by way of Cyprus to Cato's encampment in Cyrenaica. When she disembarks there, dishevelled and wasted with weeping, the lamentation caused by the news of Pompey's death (already reported by Sextus) surges up with renewed force. Her first act is to assemble what arms and garments of her husband she has preserved, and to burn them on the shore in a symbolic pyre; the Pompeian troops follow her example, and soon countless fires spring up along the shore (171-81).¹²⁵

Save for an allusion in a speech made by Cato restraining the barbarian Tarcondimotus,¹²⁶ who could not understand why the civil struggle should continue beyond Pompey's death, nothing more is heard of Cornelia in the poem and very little elsewhere. At the close of his *Life of Pompey* Plutarch says that Cornelia received her husband's remains and buried them on his estate at Alba;¹²⁷ Dio tells of her pardon by Caesar and her return to Rome shortly after his account of the *bellum Africum* of 46 B.C.;¹²⁸ since Dio and

Plutarch here represent the Livian tradition it may be assumed that Livy told of Cornelia's pardon and return to Italy in his one hundred and fourteenth book, where the aftermath of Thapsus is related.¹²⁹ It is probable that Livy also reported Cornelia's burial of Pompey's remains at this point; it is as natural for the biographer Plutarch to copy a picturesque detail of this sort as it is for the historian Dio to disregard it. Lucan on the other hand states emphatically that in his day Pompey's ashes still remained on the Egyptian shore,¹³⁰ and Strabo says that Pompey's body lay buried at Mount Casius,¹³¹ which is where he was killed. Postgate, after surveying the evidence and acknowledging the possibility that there existed two sets of ashes, those of Pompey's head and those of his body, nevertheless concludes that Lucan's is "the current and probably the true account of his hero's sepulture."¹³² If, as has just been suggested, it is not the Livian one, it may be asked why Lucan, normally dependent for his historical material upon Livy, is in disagreement with him here. The answer is simple: Lucan had not studied Livy 114, which dealt with events several years beyond the point where his narrative breaks off, as carefully as he had the books of the historian he had actually used in composing his poem; at the time he wrote the bravura ending of the eighth book, where he proclaimed that he would consider himself blessed if his verse effects the return of Pompey's dust to Rome,¹³³ he did not recall Livy's story of the last act of wifely devotion performed by Cornelia.¹³⁴

Lucan was acutely aware of the irony and pathos of the story of Cornelia and Pompey, in which the love of the pair for one another not only brings disaster to them both but determines the catastrophic outcome of the first and crucial phase of the civil war. Pompey's affectionate solici-

tude for his wife makes him renounce seeking help from Parthia, and as a result of his stopping at Mytilene to take her with him, the news of Pharsalia reaches Egypt before he does. Cornelia's love and courage do not prevent her from being a helpless instrument of her husband's ruin; all her efforts end in failure and despair. In his dramatization of this woeful struggle Lucan continually identifies Cornelia with various of Ovid's heroines; often she is assimilated in his imagination to Alcyone and to Ariadne to a degree that blurs and distorts the character that properly is hers in the poem, and which Lucan, when not carried away by literary reminiscence, delineates with vivid force. Lucan's portrait of Cornelia owes most to Ovid (the echoes of Virgil's Dido are fleeting and superficial); the literary material and artifice that contribute to his characterization,

and this could be said of the "poetic" grist of the entire epic, are in great part drawn from the Ovidian storehouse of situation, phrase, and image. Some of this material Lucan has happily transformed; a good deal remains unassimilated. Yet neither the merits nor the defects of Lucan's treatment are Ovidian. The wild extravagance is his own, as is the emotional intensity with which Cornelia is infused. Undaunted by ill fortune, she valiantly attempts to rise above the role of bystander and victim; by having her convey Pompey's political testament to his sons Lucan finally elevates her to the dignity of participation. She is a figure neither shadowy nor ephemeral. Her reincarnation as the heroine of Corneille's *Pompée*, more serene but no less resolute, is illustrious evidence of her vitality.

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NOTES

1. Cf. R. Pichon, *Les Sources de Lucain* (Paris, 1912), p. 187: "La matrone ... trace à l'avance le résumé de la guerre civile." Pichon cites no event later than Philippi, but the matron alludes to the warfare against Sextus Pompeius and to Actium (*BC* 1. 692-94). See R. J. Getty's note to 693 in his edition of Lucan's first book (Cambridge, 1940), and R. T. Bruère, "The Scope of Lucan's Historical Epic," *CP*, XLV (1950), 217-35.

2. 3. 9-34.

3. 5. 123-97. Even less distinct is the matron who voices the dismay at Rome upon the outbreak of civil war (2. 36-63); Arsinoë, Cleopatra's younger sister, is mentioned (10. 521) but not brought upon the scene.

4. 2. 326-49; cf. D. Nisard, *Poètes Latins de la Décadence* (5th ed.; Paris, 1888), II, 139: "A quel pays, à quel temps appartient cette femme qui vient prier son ancien mari de lui donner de nouveau son nom, par la raison qu'ayant fait tous les enfants qu'elle pouvait faire et n'étant plus bonne à propager l'espèce, elle n'a d'autre ambition que d'inscrire sur sa tombe le nom de Caton?"

5. 6. 507-88.

6. Pichon, *op. cit.*, p. 265 (Livy sole historical source); J. P. Postgate's edition of Lucan viii (Cambridge, 1917), p. xi and n. 3 (no evidence that Lucan employed a historical source other than Livy); W. B. Anderson in *OCD* (Oxford, 1949), p. 514: "His principal historical authority was undoubtedly Livy, but he probably consulted others, including Caesar." In his *Storia della letteratura latina* (Florence, 1950), p. 601, E. Paratore holds for a multiplicity of sources, but merely states his view without amplification.

7. The close relation between this section of Plutarch's *Pompey* and Livy is shown by the comparison of the note of the *Commenta Bernensia* on Lucan 8. 91 (ed. H. Usener [Leipzig, 1869]): "Hunc locum poeta de Livio tulit, qui Corneliā dicit dixisse Pompeio: 'vicit, Magne, felicitatem tuam mea fortuna, quid enim ex funesta Crassorum domo recipiebas nisi ut minueretur magnitudo tua?' " with Plutarch's version of Cornelia's words upon the same occasion: *ὁρῶ σε . . . ὅ τῆς σῆς τύχης ἔργον, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐμῆς . . . σωζέμεν* (after resolving to kill herself upon the death of her former husband, P. Crassus the Younger) *δ' ἄρα καὶ Πτολεμαῖος Μάγῳ συμβορὰ γενέσθαι* (*Pomp.* 74).

8. *Met.* 11. 410-748.

9. See his *Introduction* to C. E. Haskins' *Lucan* (London, 1887), pp. cx-cxxvi. Heitland cites no parallels for the Cornelia passages, although such are by no means wanting.

10. *De ratione, quae inter Vergilium et Lucanum intercedat* (Leipzig, 1908), pp. 19-20.

11. C. Hosius, "Lucan und seine Quellen," *Rh. Mus.*, N. F. XLVIII (1893), 380: "Seine Abhängigkeit von seinen Vorgängern, bes. Vergil und Ovid, lehrt jede Seite seines Gedichtes"; Getty, *op. cit.*, p. xli: "To no earlier poet . . . is Lucan more akin than to Ovid . . . Ovid's influence is so great that no criticism of the *De Bello Civili* is possible without painstaking attention to him."

12. Hosius, *op. cit.*, pp. 383 f.

13. The phrase "castra sequi" (348) is Ovidian. Cf. *Am.* 3. 8. 26; *Met.* 5. 128; *Pont.* 2. 2. 11. It does not occur in Virgil.

14. 5. 762-78, where Cornelia protests against being left in safety at Mytilene. Cf. Marcia's "cur tuta in pace relinquar?" (348).

15. *Cat. Min.* 52.

16. *Att.* 6. 6. 2.

17. 2. 348.

18. 1. 486-98; 2. 16-42.

19. 2. 348.

20. *Met.* 11. 441.

21. Verg. *Aen.* 3. 522-23: *procul obscuro collis humilemque videmus / Italiam.*

22. 3. 6-7.

23. Lucan's description of Pompey's departure (3. 4-9) recalls in several respects that of Ceyx from Alcyone (*Met.* 11. 461-73). Like Alcyone gazing after her husband's vessel, Pompey watches the land disappear. When the sails of Ceyx' ship can no longer be seen, Alcyone goes sadly home to bed; after the coastline vanishes Pompey goes below to sleep.

24. Verg. *Aen.* 4. 384.

25. See n. 7 above.

26. 8. 88-105.

27. Julia applies the invidious epithet *paulex* to Cornelia in 3. 23; Cornelia later accepts this in her distraught apostrophe: "ades huc atque exige poenas, / Julia crudelis, placataque paelice caesa / Magno parce tuo" (8. 103-5). This term is used repeatedly by Ovid, but never by Virgil.

28. 7. 7-25; Plut. *Pomp.* 68.

29. In a note in his *Lucan* (Leyden, 1740), to 8. 104, Burman remarks upon this error. He also objects to the use of *paulex* in connection with Cornelia, since there can be no question of a liaison between Pompey and her during Julia's lifetime (cf. Plut. *Pomp.* 53). Lucan however is not using the word in its precise sense.

30. 722-815.

31. 720-23.

32. 5. 461-63.

33. 6. 8-17.

34. M. Hadas (*Sextus Pompey* [New York, 1930], p. 35) considers, on the basis of general probability, that Lucan is right in placing Pompey's decision to dispatch Cornelia to Lesbos after Antony had joined Caesar, but thinks that Cornelia and Sextus had remained at Thessalonica, and that the farewell scene as Lucan describes it is a poetic fiction.

35. This is illustrated by his placing Sextus Pompeius in Thessaly just before Pharsalia (6. 419 f.). All evidence points toward Sextus' presence in Lesbos at this time (Plut. *Pomp.* 74 and Dio 42. 2. 3).

36. The voyage from Dyrrhachium to Mytilene presented no difficulties at this period. Plutarch reports that after the Pompeian success at Dyrrhachium many Pompeians sailed to Lesbos to tell Cornelia the good news (*Pomp.* 66).

37. "seponere" (724) is not Virgilian; it is found thrice in Ovid, but not in the administrative sense of banishment to an island (cf. Suet. *Aug.* 65) which it here approaches. "saevi . . . belli" (726) is not a Virgilian phrase; it occurs Ov. *Ars Am.* 2. 146, *Met.* 6. 464, *Tr.* 2. 176.

38. "sub icu / Fortunae" (729-30); cf. Ov. *Pont.*

2. 7. 41: *Fortunae vulneror ictu.*

39. Verg. *Aen.* 4. 283-86. "destituunt" (732) is a favorite word of Ovid. Cf. *Pont.* 3. 9. 18: *iudicium vires destituuntque meum* for a similar use of the word. Virgil uses it but once (*Ecl.* 1. 60) and then not figuratively.

40. 370-93.

41. "dum fovet amplexu" (735) echoes *Aen.* 8. 388: *amplexu molli fovet*. The phrase is not Ovidian. "gravidum . . . curis / pectus" (735-36) parallels *Aen.* 6. 520: *tum me confectum curis somnoque gravatum*.

42. *Met.* 11. 421-43.

43. *Met.* 11. 451-53.

44. Cornelia has thus far said nothing, so "desiste preces temptare" (744) is not appropriate. This injunction probably stems from the plea of Alcyone which precedes Ceyx' words in Lucan's model.

45. 11. 453.

46. "pars optima Magni" (757) for Pompey's wife is paralleled by Ovid's: *perfide, pars nostri, lectule, maior ubiast* (Ariadne, with reference to Theseus in *Her.* 10. 58).

47. "vix tantum . . . dolorem / cepit, et attonito cesserunt pectore sensus, / tandem vox maestus potuit proferre querellas" (759-61) echo, with some compression, *Met.* 11. 416-20: *cui protinus intima frigus / ossa receperunt, buzoque similimus ora / pallor obit, lacrimisque genas maduere profusis. / ter conata loqui ter fletibus ora rigavit, / singultuque pias interrumpente querellas*. It is possible that there is direct reminiscence of *Cat.* 64. 130-31: *atque haec extremis maestam dixisse querelis, / frigidulos udo singultus ore cientem*, as well as indirect, via Ovid.

48. "dimissa" is a common term for the repudiation of a fiancée or wife (Suet. *Iul.* 1; *Aug.* 62). Lucan employs it designedly.

49. *Met.* 11. 421-23.

50. "rumpamus foedera taedae" (766): cf. Ov. *Her.* 4. 17: *non ego nequitia socialia foedera rumpam*; *Ars Am.* 3. 593; *Met.* 7. 710, 852.

51. "tantaeque ruinae / absentem praestare caput? secura videtur / sors tibi" (770-72) shows the influence of *Met.* 11. 423-24: *iam potes Alcyone securus abesse relicta? / . . . iam sum tibi carior absens? "casu pendemus ab uno"* (769): cf. *Met.* 14. 809: *res Romana . . . praeside pendet ab uno*.

52. "adde quod" (776), which is not in Virgil, is a favorite rhetorical tag of Ovid (*Met.* 2. 70, 13. 117, 854). The exclamation "ignosce fatenti" has no Virgilian parallel; cf. however Ov. *Am.* 3. 9. 35: *ignoscite fasso*; *Met.* 13. 189: *fateor fassoque ignoscat Atrides*. The notion of becoming accustomed to suffering has been adapted from Ovid's epistle from Dido to Aeneas; it has been given a new twist in the process; cf. "adsuescis fatis tantumque dolorem, / crudelis, me ferre doces. ignosce fatenti, / posse pati timeo" (776-78) with the similarly worded *tempora parva peto, / . . . dum tempore et usu / fortiter edisco tristitia posse pati* (*Her.* 7. 178-80). These verses in turn derive from Virgil (*Aen.* 4. 433-34). "posse pati timeo" (778) may also echo *Met.* 10. 25: *posse pati volui* (Orpheus telling of his attempt to endure the loss of Eurydice).

53. "sollicitam rupes iam te victore tenebunt" (780): cf. Ov. *Her.* 17. 29: *rupe sedens aliqua spectro tua litora tristitia* (Leander). Cornelia's fancied plight is that of Ovid's Ariadne: cf. *Her.* 10. 49: *aut mare prospiciens in saxo frigida sedi*.

54. "vacuis proiecta locis" (783): cf. Ov. *Her.* 10. 59: *vacat insula cultu* and *Tr.* 5. 1. 13: *sic ego Sarmaticas longe proiectus in oras*.

55. "clari / nominis" (784-85): cf. Ov. *Met.* 11. 285-86, *Fast.* 2. 733.

56. "non maesti pectora Magni / sustinet amplexu . . . tenere" (792-93). The sense in which *sustinere* is used here and in 796 is Ovidian. The passage echoes

Met. 6. 605-6: *amplexumque petit; sed non attollere contra / sustinet haec oculos* (a pathetic incident of the Tereus story, a grisly tale which, as will appear, comes into Lucan's mind repeatedly). In the verse "extremusque perit tam longi fructus amoris" (794) both the cadence and the tone of melancholy finality suggest strikingly *Met.* 1. 272-73: *sternuntur segetes et deplorata coloni / vota iacent longique perit labor inritus anni*. "fructus amoris" may be compared with *Rem. Am.* 103: *Veneris decerpere fructum*.

57. "neuterque recedens / sustinuit dixisse vale" (795-96) is almost *Ov. Her.* 5. 52: *quam viz sustinuit dicere lingua vale*; cf. *ibid.*, 13. 14: *vix illud potui dicere triste vale*.

58. *Met.* 11. 460.

59. "labitur infelix manibusque excepta suorum / fertur ad aequoreas . . . harenas" (799-800) is an adaptation of *Aen.* 4. 391-92: *suscipiunt famulae conlapsaque membra / marmoreo refrunt thalamo*.

60. *Met.* 11. 461.

61. The implication is plain that Cornelia was with Pompey when he withdrew from Italy. This may be true. No information concerning the date of Cornelia's passage to Greece exists, save what may be inferred from Lucan. Hadas (*op. cit.*, p. 29 and n. 59) supposes that, at the latest, she sailed on the convoy carrying many Pompeian wives and children which put to sea 4 March, 49. Pompey himself left Brundisium on the seventeenth. In thinking of Cornelia as accompanying her husband Lucan may be influenced by his historical source; he does not, however, refer to Cornelia's presence in the verses earlier in the poem describing Pompey's departure (2. 687-3. 9).

62. "viduo . . . frigida lecto" (806): cf. *Ov. Her.* 1. 7: *non ego deserto iacuisse frigida lecto* and 81-82: *me pater Icarius viduo discedere lecto / cogit, ibid.*, 10. 14: *membraque sunt viduo praecipitata toro*; also 5. 106 and 15. 315-16. The conceit "widowed couch" is not Virgilian. "nudumque marito / non haerent latus" (807-8): cf. *Ov. Am.* 1. 13. 6: *si quando, lateri, nunc bene iuncta meos, Ars Am.* 1. 140: *iunget tuum lateri, qua potes usque latus*.

63. *Met.* 11. 686-87.

64. "somo . . . gravata" (808) echoes *Verg. Aen.* 6. 520: *somnoque gravatum*. Cf. n. 41 above. The verses "deceptis vacuum manibus complexa cubile est / atque oblita fugae quaesivit nocte maritum" (809-10) are a conflation of *Met.* 11. 471-72: *vacuum petit anxia lectum / seque toro ponet* and 11. 674-75: *ingemit Alcione; lacrimas movet atque lacertos / per somnum corpusque petens amplectitur auras*. Cornelia's embracing the couch may have been suggested by Dido's similar act (*Aen.* 4. 659). The context of the two instances of couch-kissing in Ovid (cited in a note to this line in A. S. Pease's edition of the fourth *Aeneid* [Cambridge, 1935]), viz. *Met.* 8. 538 and 10. 410-12, makes it improbable that they influenced Lucan here.

65. "flamma tacitas urente medullas" (811) echoes *Verg. Aen.* 4. 66-68: *est mollis flamma medullas / . . . tacitum vivit sub pectore vulnus / uritur infelix Dido*. There are several Ovidian reminiscences of these lines (*Am.* 3. 10. 27, *Her.* 4. 15, 19-20 and 52, *Met.* 7. 803) but the close verbal correspondence shows that Lucan's debt to Virgil is here direct. The combination of this erotic motive with "servatur pars illa tori" (813) where Lucan has adapted *Met.* 11. 472-73: *renovat lectusque locusque / Alcione lacrimas et quae pars admovent abicit* in a manner to suggest not only loneliness intensified by familiar surroundings but the deference

of a Roman matron to the *paterfamilias* results in disconcerting emotional incoherence.

66. *Met.* 11. 452-54.

67. See p. 224 above.

68. Plutarch (*Pomp.* 66) merely states that Cornelia was sent to Lesbos, without specifying under what circumstances.

69. To form an opinion on this point verses 5. 722-815 should be read as they stand in the text of Lucan; the summaries in this paper are given merely for purposes of orientation; they have no pretention to completeness.

70. 5. 728-31.

71. Cornelia anticipates this and warns against it (5. 787-90).

72. The pathos is real. Tastes in rhetoric change, and Martyn-Laguna's eulogy of this passage, "Si verum est me Lucanum amare, ex hoc imprimis loco, quem vices amplius legens sine lacrimis legere non potui, amorem mihi instillatum fateor" (In a note in *Curtius' Lucan* to 5. 722), would receive less critical approval today than two centuries ago; it nevertheless attests the power of these verses on those not dismayed by their floridity and emphasis. The extent of Lucan's merit becomes clear when Silius' jejune imitation is compared with his model. Cf. *Punica* 3. 62-133. Silius here describes Hannibal's sending his wife Himilce and infant son to Carthage from Spain as he makes ready to invade Italy. The verses are a farrago of echoes of *Lucan* 5. 722-815, put together with characteristic Silian facility, but which lack emotion and serve no function in the economy of his epic.

73. 5. 789-90.

74. Cf. 43-44 with *Ov. Met.* 11. 651-70.

75. *Pomp.* 66.

76. "qua tunc tellure latebas" (41): cf. *Ov. Her.* 1. 58: *aut in quo lateas, ferreus, orbe*. "trepida quatitur formidine somnus" (44): cf. *Met.* 2. 66: *pavida trepidet formidine pectus* and *Tr.* 3. 1. 54: *quatitur trepido littera nostra metu*. "prospiciens fluctus" (47): cf. *Her.* 10. 49: *aut mare prospiciens in sazo frigida sedi* (see discussion of 5. 780, p. 224 above). "nutantia . . . / . . . prima vides venientis vela carinae" (47-48) parallels *Her.* 5. 63: *hinc ego vela tuae cognovi prima carinae*.

77. "ad vestros quae tendit carbasa portus" (50): cf. *Her.* 10. 30: *vidi praecipiti carbasa tenta Noto* (Ariadne, of Theseus' departing vessel), *ibid.*, 13. 15: "nuntius armorum tristis" (52): cf. *Met.* 11. 349-50: *maerens tibi nuntius adsum / cladis*.

78. "victus adest coniunx" (53): in a note to this verse in his edition of *Lucan* viii (Cambridge, 1917) Postgate observes: "In these lines Lucan is closely following Ovid *M.* 11. 666 sqq. 'non haec tibi nuntiat auctor / ambiguus, non ista vagis rumoribus audis; / ipse ego fata tibi praesens mea naufragus edo.'" (Ceyx-Morpheus to Alcione). "prosiluit" (55): cf. *Ov. Met.* 11. 384-85: *Alcione . . . prosiluit*. The description of Pompey "deformem pallore ducent volutisque prementem / canitum atque atro squalentis pulvere vestes" (56-57) is almost that of Hector's ghost in the second *Aeneid* (272-73): *atque cruento / pulvere* and (277) *squalentem barbam et concretos sanguine crinis*.

79. Cf. B. Otis, "Ovid and the Augustans," *TAPA*, LXIX (1938), 221.

80. "animam clausit dolor" (59): cf. *Ov. Met.* 7. 604: *pars animam laqueo claudunt*, and *Ib.* 550.

81. "lustrat vacuas Pompeius harenas" (62): cf. *Verg. Aen.* 2. 528: *vacua atria lustrat* (Polites) which Lucan has fused with *Aen.* 5. 611: *conspicit ingentem*

concursum et litora lustrat (Iris). "incessere fatum" (64): this figurative use of *incesso* seems to have been introduced by Ovid (e.g., *Met.* 13. 232). A surprising adaptation of an Ovidian passage occurs in "frustra que attollere terra / semianimem conantur eram; quam pectore Magnus / ambit et astrictos refovet complexibus artus" (65-67): Lucan has taken over *Met.* 12. 327-28: *vidi ego Petraeum conantem tollere terra / glandiferam quercum; quam dum complexibus ambit* (the centaur Petraeus embraces an oak to uproot it for use as a weapon in the drunken brawl with the Lapiths) with only the necessary alteration. In a note to "pectore . . . ambit" (66-67) Postgate refers to this passage thus: "amplexibus [sic] ambit" *Ov. M.* 12. 328"; he did not observe the larger parallel. With "semianimem . . . eram" (66) cf. *Her. 10. 32: semianimisque fui* (Ariadne). Lucan has also been influenced by Verg. *Aen.* 4. 686: *semianimemque sinu germanam amplexa fovebat* and there is reminiscence of *Met.* 10. 186-87: *conlapsosque excipit artus / et modo te refovet* (Apollo of the wounded Hyacinthus). Finally "astrictos . . . artus" (67) recalls *Ov. Ep. Sapp.* 112: *adstric-tum gelido frigore pectus erat*.

82. See the comment on 5. 783, p. 224 above. For the desolation of Naxos also cf. *Cat.* 64. 57, 133, 168.

83. "posse pati" (70): cf. 5. 778 and n. 52 above.

84. 7. 85-86 and 8. 5 f.

85. Verg. *Aen.* 2. 728: *nunc omnes terrent aurae*.

86. *Pomp.* 74-75.

87. "laudis in hoc sexu . . . / unica materia est conlunx miser" (75-76). Implicit here is the Stoic notion of *exercitatio* (discussed by R. Heinze in *Virgils epische Technik* [Leipzig and Berlin, 1908], p. 276, n. 2 and by B. Marti in "The Meaning of the *Pharsalia*" [*AJP*, LXVI (1945), 355 ff.]). Closely parallel are *Ovid Tr.* 5. 5 (6). 50: (all citations from the *Tristia* in this and the two following notes have reference to Ovid's wife) (*probitas*) *tristi materiam tempore laudis habet*, and *ibid.*, 5. 14 (15). 23-25: *area de nostra nunc est tibi facta ruina / conspicuum virtus hic tua ponat opus / esse bonum facile est, ubi quod vetet esse remotum est*.

88. "erige mentem / et tua cum fatis pietas decertet" (76-77): cf. *Ov. Tr.* 4. 3. 71-84, and in particular 81-82: *dat tibi nostra locum tituli fortuna, caputque / conspicuum pietas qua tua tollat, habet*. "gloria maior" (78): for this phrase cf. *Her.* 12. 76 and *Fast.* 1. 714.

89. "tu nulla tulisti / bello damna meo" (83-84) is an antiphrasis of Ovid's words in *Tr.* 4. 3. 35: *tu vero tua damna dole, mitissima coniunx*. Ovid considers that he has in fact lost his wife, whereas Pompey's point is that Cornelia has not lost him.

90. See p. 221 and n. 7 above.

91. "corrupta" (86): cf. *Ov. Met.* 6. 610-11: *fletumque sororis / corripiens*. This is the first indication that Ovid's story of Tereus and Philomela, of which a series of echoes culminating in 8. 397 ff. will presently be noted, is rising into Lucan's consciousness. "gemitu rumpente querellas" (87) like the similar phrase in 5. 761 derives from *Met.* 11. 420 (Alcyone's weeping).

92. "o utinam in thalamis invisii Caesaris issem" (88): cf. *Ov. Met.* 6. 540-41: *utinam fecisses ante nefandos / concubitus* (Philomela to Tereus, wishing he had killed her before attacking her).

93. "me pronuba ducit Erinys" (90): cf. *Ov. Met.* 6. 428: *non pronuba Iuno / non Hymenaeus adest, non illi Gratia lecto* (of the wedding of Tereus and Procne). The *Commenta Bernensia* here cite Verg. *Aen.* 7. 319: *et Bellona manet te pronuba*. Apropos of "Crasso-

rumque umbrae" (91) the same scholia comment "quasi irascantur quod fuerit nupta Pompelo. hunc locum poeta de Livio tulit: 'vicit, Magne, felicitatem tuam mea (Cornelia is speaking) fortuna, quid enim ex funesta Crassorum domo recipias nisi ut minueretur magnitudo tua?' " (See n. 7 above, where part of this quotation is cited to demonstrate the close adherence of Plutarch in this part of his biography of Pompey to the Livian tradition.) Every idea in verses 90-97 of the speech Lucan here ascribes to Cornelia is contained in this fragment of Livy.

94. Cf. *Plut. Pomp.* 74.

95. "ubicumque laces" (102): it is noteworthy that Lucan is apparently not aware that Livy (cf. *Periocha* 106) had stated that Julia was buried in the Campus Martius; this would indicate that he was not intimately familiar with those books of Livy which he had not had occasion to study for the historical framework of his poem.

96. 27-33. See p. 222 above.

97. "exige poenas / Iulia crudelis, placataque paelice caesa" (103-4): cf. the cry of Philomela in *Ov. Met.* 6. 537-38: *paelex ego facta sororis / . . . hostis mihi debita poena* (hostis which H. Magnus in his recension of the *Metamorphoses* [Berlin, 1914] accepts, construing it as a gentile, although almost certainly the reading of the archetype of our MSS is intolerably harsh. The emendations proposed by Heinisius and subsequent scholars fall short of the mark. Perhaps *hostis* is a corruption of *tristis*. Cf. *Ov. Tr.* 2. 494: *sed tristis nostros poena secuta iocos*. The reading *tristis* would support Bentley's construction of *crudelis* with *poenas*, rather than with *Iulia* as Housman understands it). Cf. also *Met.* 6. 605-6: (Procne's attempt to embrace Philomela) *amplexumque petit; sed non attollere contra / sustinet haec oculos, paelex sibi visa sororis*. The phrase "placataque paelice caesa" (104) curiously echoes *Ov. Ars Am.* 1. 321-22: *paelicibus quotiens placavit numina caesis / atque ait exta tenens 'ite, placete meo'* where the *paelices* are the heifers slaughtered by Pasiphae in her jealousy.

98. "duri flectuntur pectora Magni" (107): cf. *Ov. Met.* 11. 439: *quod tua si flecti precibus sententia nullis* (Alcyone, at the end of her plea begging Ceyx to change his decision). "confudit" (108): Postgate (*op. cit.*, ad loc.) compares *Ov. Tr.* 3. 5. 11.

99. "maestamque carinae / inposuit comitem (146-47): cf. *Ov. Met.* 6. 511: *ut semel inposita est pictae Philomela carinae* (Tereus' return from Athens with his sister-in-law).

100. "tanto devinxit amore" (155): cf. Verg. *Aen.* 8. 394: *tum pater aeterno satur devinctus amore*. "casti . . . modestia voltus" (158): cf. *Ov. Am.* 1. 4. 15: *cum premet ille torum, cultu comes ipsa modesto*.

101. *Pomp.* 55.

102. *Pomp.* 76.

103. "num barbara nobis / est ignota Venus" (397-98): cf. *Ov. Met.* 6. 458-60: *sed et hunc innata libido / exstimulat, pronumque genus regionibus illis / in Venerem est* (of the Thracian king Tereus); cf. in this connection 403-4 and *Met.* 6. 561-62. "polluit . . . leges et foedera taedae" (399): cf. *Met.* 10. 353: (*neve*) *conubitu vetito naturae polluit foedus* (Myrrha to herself). "non ullis exceptos legibus . . . / concubitus" (402-3): cf. *Met.* 6. 540-41: *nefandos / concubitus*. "Oedipodionias infelix fabula Thebas" (407): cf. *Met.* 15. 429: *Oedipodionias quid sunt, nisi nomina, Thebae*. "cul fas implere parentem" (409): this genetic use of *implere* is not found in Virgil, but is used by Ovid with

reference to human beings as well as to animals: cf. *Met.* 6. 111, 11. 265, "saevitia stimulata Venus" (413): cf. *Met.* 6. 561-62 (Tereus' sadism).

104. *Pomp.* 78.

105. *Ov. Met.* 11. 441-43. Cf. p. 224 above for the reminiscence of these verses in 5. 767-69.

106. "remane, temeraria coniunx" (579): cf. *Ov. Met.* 1. 514-15: *nescis, temeraria, nescis / quem fugias* (Apollo's plea to Daphne, which begins [504-5] with the reiterated adjuration *Nympha manes*). "casus / ... meos" (580-81): cf. *Am.* 1. 12. 1: *flete meos casus, Met.* 11. 588: *veros narrantia casus* (the drowning of Ceyx).

107. "surda vetanti" (582): cf. *Ov. Am.* 1. 8. 77: *surda sit oranti tua ianua*, and *Pont.* 2. 9. 25, "tendebat ... amens Cornelia palmas" (583): cf. *Her.* 10. 148: *infeliz tendo ... manus* (Ariadne), *Met.* 11. 726-27: *tendenque tremantes / ad Ceyx manus* (Alcyone). "quo sine me crudellis abis" (584): cf. *Her.* 8. 80: *sine me, me sine ... abis, Met.* 3. 477: *quo refugis? remane ... crudelis* (Narcissus to his image). "poteras non flectere puppem" (586): cf. *Her.* 10. 36: *flecte ratem, ibid.*, 151.

108. *Plut. Pomp.* 79.

109. "summissis precibus" (594): cf. (Verg.) *Ci.* 355, *Ov. Met.* 7. 90.

110. *Plut. Pomp.* 80 attests this wailing. "miserandis aethera conplet / vocibus" (638-39): cf. Verg. *Aen.* 7. 395: *aliae tremulis ululatus aethera complent, ibid.*, 12. 724, and *Ov. Fast.* 6. 513.

111. "ego te scelerata peremi" (639): cf. *Ov. Met.* 4. 110: *ego te miseranda peremi* (Pyramus upon finding Thisbe's bloodstained garment); cf. "miserandis" (638). Cornelia's self-accusation is reminiscent of that of Pyramus, who exclaims that since he gave his inamorata rendezvous in so perilous a place he is responsible for her death. "poenas non morte minores" (646): cf. *Tr.* 1. 2. 64. "hoc merui" (651): cf. *Met.* 2. 279: *si placet hoc meruique*. Like Pyramus (*Met.* 4. 115), Cornelia resolves to end her life. She contemplates three modes of death: jumping headlong (654), hanging (655), and being stabbed (656); Ovid's Phyllis, in her despair at being forsaken, had considered the same three: cf. *Her.* 2. 133-34 (jumping), 139-40 (being stabbed), 141-42 (hanging).

112. *Pomp.* 80.

113. 9. 51-116.

114. 8. 739-42: "sit satis, o superi, quod non Cornelia fuso / crine facit subicique facem complexa maritum / imperat, extremo sed abest a munere busti / infelix coniunx nec adhuc a litore longe est," and *ibid.*, 767-70: "fortuna recursus / si det in Hesperiam, non hac in sede quiescent / tam sacri cineres, sed te Cornelia, Magne, / accipiet nostraque manu transfundet in urnam."

115. 9. 19-50.

116. "fugam tenuit" (52): cf. *Ov. Met.* 1. 600 (Apollo halts Daphne). The recital of the various acts that she has been prevented from carrying out is closely modelled on the lamentation of Ovid's Canace over the destruction of her infant by wild beasts. The parallelism may best be illustrated by quoting the passages in question. Cornelia begins: "ergo indigna fui ... marito / accendisse rogam gelidosque effusa per artus / incubuisse viro, laceros exurere crines / membraque dispersi pelago componere Magni, / volneribus cunctis largos infundere fletus" (55-59). Canace had mourned: *non mihi te licuit lacrimis perfundere iustis, / in tua non tonsas ferre sepulchra*

comas, / non super incubui ... (*Her.* 11. 115-17), then, addressing herself to Macareus, entreated: *sparsa, precor, nati collige membra tui* (122), and (125) *lacrimasque in vulnera funde*. Imitation can go little farther without becoming a cento. With "gelidosque effusa per artus" (56) cf. also *Met.* 6. 249.

117. "haeret imago / visceribus" (71-72): cf. *Ov. Met.* 14. 204: *mentique haerebat imago*; *Pont.* 1. 9. 7-8: *tamquam praesentis imago / haeret*. "luce maligna" (73): cf. Verg. *Aen.* 6. 270: *sub luce maligna*. "iam flamma resedit" (75): cf. *Ov. Her.* 16. 190: *flamma recens parva sparsa resedit aqua* (erotic). "siqua fides" (83): (not employed by Virgil) is a favorite Ovidian expression: *Am.* 1. 3. 16, 1. 8. 11; *Ars Am.* 3. 791; *Met.* 9. 371; *Pont.* 3. 5. 53.

118. "Inane chaos" (101): this expression occurs *Ov. Ars Am.* 2. 470; *Fast.* 4. 600. For the modes of death (106-7): cf. 8. 654-56 and n. 111 above. "caput ... obduxit" (109): cf. *Ov. Met.* 2. 329-30: *obductos luctu ... / vultus*. "perfruitur lacrimis" (112): cf. *Ov. Her.* 8. 106: *perfruitur infeliz liberiore malo*.

119. In his reference to this fire Sextus expresses no certainty on this point (9. 141-43).

120. In the *Life* of Lucan attributed to Vacca it is stated that three of Lucan's ten books were published in his lifetime. It is commonly assumed that these were the first three, but Vacca does not say this. It may reasonably be conjectured, however, that he was not speaking of the last three. The latter part of Book eight shows signs of inadvertence (see p. 229 above). In the ninth book the story of Pompey's death told by Sextus to his brother evinces carelessness not to be paralleled in the earlier books, since he makes the absurd claim of having seen his father's head being carried through "the city" (Alexandria? Pelusium?) on a pike (136-38), and adds that report has it this head is being saved for Caesar (139-40); on the other hand he is, as has been noted, less well informed as to the disposal of Pompey's trunk than his stepmother.

121. *Ov. Met.* 11. 715-25.

122. Cf. 8. 739-41 and 9. 55-65.

123. 8. 742 and 9. 73-75.

124. 9. 1-18.

125. "solutas / in vultus effusa comas" (171-72): cf. *Ov. Met.* 13. 688-89: *effusaeque comas et apertae pectora matres / significant luctum* (cf. "luctus erat" [170]); *Her.* 7. 70: *tristis et effusus sanguinolenta comis* (Dido). "vestes miserieque insignia Magni" (175), "plectasque togas" (177): cf. *Pont.* 2. 1. 31: *pictas insignia vestes* (triumphal raiment of Germanicus).

126. 9. 276-77.

127. *Pomp.* 80.

128. 42. 5. 7.

129. *Periocha* 114. Cf. Caesar's pardon of Cato's daughter here attested.

130. 8. 836 f.

131. 16. 2. 33.

132. *Op. cit.*, pp. lxx-lxx.

133. 8. 843-45.

134. It has been observed, apropos of Julia's place of burial, that Lucan's knowledge of Livy is sketchy except for the period covered by his poem (n. 95 above). That Lucan had a dim recollection of Cornelia's return to Italy and associated Pompey's ashes with this event is indicated by Cordus' promise to deliver Pompey's ashes to Cornelia if he ever returns to Italy (8. 767-70).

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

NOTES ON THE FINAL SCENE OF *PROMETHEUS VINCTUS*

I

One of the remarkable features of the last two hundred lines of the *Prometheus Vinctus* is the large number of references to or descriptions of the thunderous consequences of Zeus's anger. Roused to triumphant excitement by the visit of Io, Prometheus utters his defiance of Zeus and confidently predicts that Zeus will ruin himself by foolish plans of his own devising (κενόφρονα βουλεύματα, vs. 762); a new ruler, whose behavior is characterized throughout by violence,¹ he will create a rival who will forge more violent weapons than his own. Conversation with Hermes, sent by Zeus in a natural feeling of alarm, merely evokes a repetition of Prometheus' defiant cry (vss. 992 ff.), and Hermes answers, in kind, that Zeus will accept the challenge; but he makes the threat more specifically applicable to Prometheus (vss. 1014 ff.). Even so Prometheus seems hardly able to realize the probable consequences to himself, and gives a more detailed description of what Zeus can accomplish (vss. 1043 ff.). With the picture now firmly established in the listener's mind, Hermes emphasizes the imminence of angry action by Zeus in his explicit warning to the Oceanids (vss. 1060 ff. and 1071 ff.).

No playwright can produce a thunderstorm and earthquake at will; and waving torches and the βρονταῖον—even if these devices were used in Aeschylus' time—would be of little use to an unprepared audience. But here, with the preparations carefully made, Prometheus can cry with conviction and persuasive force

καὶ μὴν ἔργῳ κοῦκ' ἐτι μύθος
χθὼν σεσάλευται [vss. 1080 f.].

II

What I have said so far is undoubtedly familiar to many, though rarely expressed. There is one feature, however, which, so far as I know, has not been observed by editors in

commentaries, in such essays as Hans Mielke's *Die Bildersprache des Aischylos*, or in books like W. B. Stanford's *Aeschylus in His Style*; I refer to the language in which Prometheus finally describes the stormy earthquake.²

Our interest should be roused by the word σκιρτᾶ. It surprised Dindorf, who remarks in his Index, tersely and unimaginatively, "improprie de ventis," failing like many others to relate the use of the verb here with Io's words in vss. 599 f. (σκιρτημάτων δὲ νήστισιν αἰκίας/λαβρόντος ἦλθον) and in vss. 675 f. (ἐμμανεῖ σκιρτήματι/ῆσσαν). The winds are leaping as wildly as the tormented Io; they are as unruly and unbridled as Prometheus himself. With this in mind, what are we to say of παραμυκάται, ἔλικες, κόνιν εἰλίσσουσιν? Here again we are in the vocabulary area of the transformed Io, the cow-maiden. As Io bellowed in anguish in vs. 743 (ἀναμυχλίζει; cf. *Supp.* 352 f., μέμνε φράζουσα βοτῆρι μόχθους), so the thunder-stricken depths re-echo in sympathy. The adjective ἔλιξ, whether inspired by the crumpled horns or the rolling gait of cattle, became so familiar an epithet as to require no accompanying βοῖς; as we recall its frequent association with εἰλίπους, we can hardly fail to see behind Prometheus' words a picture of maddened cattle twisting and turning, kicking up the dust, and in the very picture a symbol of Io herself.

The image does not come without warning. Most obvious is Hermes' phrase βροντῆς μύκημ(α) in vs. 1062. But in retrospect we realize how significant are the tortured cries of Io as she leaves the stage (vss. 877 ff). She is seized by a maddening spasm (σφακέλος), driven by a "shaft without fire" (ἄρδης ἄπυρος), her eyes dart and whirl (τροχοδινεῖται δ' ὄμμαθ' εἰλίδην); at the play's end comes the thunderous earthquake which Prometheus has already described in the words βροντῇ σφακέλῳ τ' ἀγρίων ἀνέμων (vss. 1045 f.), the lightnings

dart and whirl with their shafts of fire (Ξηλίκες δ' ἐκλάμπουσι στεροπῆς ζάπυροι).

And what of *σεσάλευται*? In medical terminology *σαλεύω* was applied to persons who walked with a rolling gait (Hippocrates *Art.* 56), and it would not be surprising if Aeschylus knew this usage. A more familiar association, however, is the distress of a ship at sea. Now Io is presented as facing a sea of troubles (vs. 746: *δυσχείμερόν γε πέλαγος ἀτρεῖς δύης*; cf. also 643 f.), but only in her closing words is the image fully developed:

ἔξω δὲ δρόμον φέρομαι λύσσης
πνεύματι μάργῳ, γλώσσης ἀκρατῆς·
βολεροὶ δὲ λόγοι παλινσ' εἰκῇ
στυγνῆς πρὸς κύμασιν ἄτης

[vss. 883–86].

The meaning of these words, I believe, has been generally misunderstood. Where there is an attempt at explanation instead of timid silence, little is said about vss. 883 f., and vss. 885 f. are strangely regarded as a picture of a muddy river battling with a clear estuary; just what connection this has with the preceding lines is not clear to me. Actually, Io likens herself to a ship driven off its course by a ravenous wind, utterly out of control, while its oars flail in disorder against the waves of ruin.¹ The nautical image so presented and recalled by *σεσάλευται* is emphasized by the next word *βρυχία*, which leads us into the other vocabulary area of this compound picture of storm-tossed and vacillating nature.²

Thus in the final lines of *Prometheus Vinculus* the sufferings of Prometheus and of the world to which he is so near akin are linked with the sufferings of Io—who, so many editors feel, was dragged into the story somewhat violently. To the poet Io was an integral part of the story: as she, through her ambitious desires and Zeus's interest in her, was tortured and convulsed, so

were Prometheus and the earth convulsed because of Prometheus' obstinate opposition to Zeus and because of Zeus's fear. But Io was to regain peace and sanity by the loving touch of Zeus (vss. 847 ff.); so, we may presume, Prometheus would ultimately achieve a calmer frame of mind and receive Zeus's touch of approval.

III

Mention of Io and her *πέλαγος ἀτρεῖς δύης* calls to mind the Oceanids and the *ἀπέραντον δίκτυον ἄτης* with which they are threatened by Hermes (vs. 1078). The phrase is listed by Earp as one of the "striking" metaphors. Striking, perhaps, *in vacuo*, but hardly in the context of this play. The Oceanids seem to have a slight—and perfectly natural—fondness for nautical metaphors. They speak of the new ruler on Olympus as *οἰακονόμος* (vs. 149) and *οἰακοστρόφος* (vs. 515), and the Arabian warriors' spears are *οξύπρωροι* (vs. 423). Most significant is their repetition of Prometheus' doubt as to when his torments would end: Prometheus cries, *πῆμα στενάχω, πῇ ποτε μόχθων/χρὴ τέρματα τῶνδ' ἐπιτεῖλαι* (vss. 99 f.); in the mouth of the Oceanids this appears as *δέδια . . . /πᾷ ποτε τῶνδε πόνων/χρὴ σε τέρμα κέλσαντ' ἐσιδεῖν* (vss. 184–86).³ What threat could be more appropriate for these sea-minded creatures than a *δίκτυον ἄτης*—probably the same net from which, as Cratos says, Prometheus will have to extricate himself (vss. 86 f.: *σε δεῖ προμηθέως/δῶ τῶν τῆσδ' ἐκκυλισθῆσαι τέχνης*)? As the *κτύπου ἀχὼ χάλυβος* caused them to shed their maidenly reserve and, at the risk of their father's displeasure, come to sympathize with Prometheus, so at the *βρυχία ἡχῶ βροντῆς* they are ready in their sympathy for Prometheus to defy the father of the gods himself.

CHRISTOPHER M. DAWSON

YALE UNIVERSITY

NOTES

1. *βίη* in vss. 15, 74, 359, 382; *πρὸς βίαν* in 210, 355, 592, 672; *βίαιος* in 737, as well as other terms like *τραχὺς*. References are made to the Oxford Classical Text of 1937.

2. The passage might well have been discussed in J. R. Bacon's interesting discussion of repeated words and phrases ("Three Notes on Aeschylus, *Prometheus*

Vinculus," *CR*, XLII [1928], 115–20), if the writer had not turned to a discussion of Orphic-Pythagorean influences. F. R. Earp (*The Style of Aeschylus* [Cambridge, 1948]), does list *βρυχία δ' ἡχῶ παραμυῖται* (vs. 1082) as one of the "striking" metaphors; but in his analysis of the animal metaphors he gives only one instance under the heading *Ox*, and has no heading

Cow, Bull, or even Cattle. Yet much of the imagery in the play is derived from the very presence of Io, ἡ βοῦκερως παρθένος; besides the passages discussed in this article, cf. the use of κέντρον in 325, 507, 601, and such phrases as ἀπολακτίσθαι λίχας (651) and κραδία δι' φόβου φρίνα λακτίζει (881).

3. Note the schollast's τεταραγμένοι (=θολοί) and cf. *Persians* 397: ἦτασαν ἄλμυρ.

4. I hesitate to assert that Greek word play could go so far as to associate βρόχιος with βρόχη, βρόχαιος

(cf. *Od.* 5. 412: ἄμφι δὲ κύμα βέβρυκεν ῥόδιον; *Il.* 17. 264; *Od.* 12. 242; cf. also βρόχεται: μαίνεται in Hesychius); but it is tempting to regard βροχία as translational, like σεσάλανται, between the sea-image and the cow-image.

5. This variation of phraseology resembles the distinction drawn by Prometheus in his addresses to the chorus and to Io. To the former he says, πρὸς γε στενάξεις (vs. 696); to Io, εὐδ' αὖ κίερα γας ἀναμυχθίζει (vs. 743).

A SOURCE OF THE MIRABILES AUSCULTATIONES

The spurious opusculum among the works of Aristotle entitled *Περὶ θαυμασίων ἀκουσμάτων* has a complicated history.¹ There are at least four MSS earlier than the 15th century, and each of them gives the text in a different order. The last part (§§ 152–78) is entirely lacking in two of these MSS² and is also not represented by any of the ample ancient testimonia, part of them as late as the tenth century.³ Consequently critics have agreed that this part of the work is a later addition.

The chief source for this part is the spurious opusculum *Περὶ ποταμῶν* ascribed to Plutarch. But other sources are represented sparsely: §152 is from Philostratus *Vita Apoll.* 1. 6, §§ 154 and 155 are from Aristotle *De mundo* 400^a and 399^b, §156 is from Aristotle *De poet.* 145^a (a unique testimonium), §168 is from Herodian *Hist.* 6. 7. 6. To these I wish to add the following source, which seems not to have been noted before.⁴

§ 169:—περὶ τὴν Θούριον πόλιν δύο ποταμούς φασιν εἶναι, Σύβαριν καὶ Κράθιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Σύβαρις τοὺς πίνοντας ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πτυρτικοὺς εἶναι ποιεῖ, ὁ δὲ Κράθις τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ξανθότριχας λουμένους.

§ 170:—ἐν δὲ Εὐβοίᾳ δύο ποταμοὺς εἶναι, ὧν ἀφ' οὗ μὲν τὰ πίνοντα πρόβατα λευκὰ γίνονται· ὅς ὀνομάζεται Κέρβης· ὁ δὲ Νηλεὺς, ὅς μελانا ποιεῖ.

Priscianus Lydus *Solutiones* 8:—dicit quoque et Strabon geometricus in Italia circa Thurion civitatem duo flumina esse Sybarim et Crathim: unum quidem Subaris bibentes equos ex eo rarios esse facit (propterea et greges abigunt ex eo); Crathis vero homines lavantes rubeos crines et albos crines facit habere et alias multas passiones sanat. dicunt autem et in Euboea insula Graeciae duo flumina esse, quorum unum quidem Cerces, alterum vero Neileus vocatur: quorum ab uno quidem bibentes oves albae fiunt, ab altero vero nigrae.⁵

Strabo 6. 263:—ἡ Σύβαρις δύοιν ποταμῶν μεταξύ, Κράθιδος καὶ Συβάριδος . . . τὴν δὲ πόλιν εἰς ἕτερον τόπον μετέθηκαν πλησίον καὶ Θουρίους προσηγόρευσαν ἀπὸ κρήνης ὀμωνύμου. ὁ μὲν οὖν Σύβαρις τοὺς πίνοντας ἵππους ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πτυρτικοὺς ποιεῖ· διὸ καὶ τὰς ἀγέλας ἀπείργουσιν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ· ὁ δὲ Κράθις τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ξανθότριχέων καὶ λευκότριχέων ποιεῖ λουόμενους καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ πάθη ἰάται.

10. 449:—εἰσὶ δὲ νῦν Εὐβοίταις ποταμοὶ Κηρεῖς καὶ Νηλεῖς, ὧν ἀφ' οὗ μὲν τὰ πίνοντα πρόβατα λευκὰ γίνονται, ἀφ' οὗ δὲ μελανα· καὶ περὶ τὸν Κράθιν δὲ εἰρηγται τοιοῦτόν τι συμβαίνει.

It seems certain that the anonymous author drew on Priscian, and he in turn on Strabo. Priscian was one of the seven Neoplatonists who went in exile to the Persian court when Justinian closed the schools of Athens in 529. His *Solutiones eorum de quibus dubitavit Choroë Persarum rex* has survived in a Mediaeval Latin translation, but now we have a trace of it in Greek in the addition to the *Mirabiles auscultationes*.

The alignment of sources given above is crucial for the date of the latest compilation. On this point Ziegler has recently declared (*loc. cit.* 1152), "Der Nachtrag 152–178 ist, wie Schrader und Müllenhoff gezeigt haben, nicht vor dem 3. Jhdt. n. Chr. zusammengestellt und angefügt worden, da in ihm Ps.-Plut. de fluviis, Philostratos und Herodian benützt sind. Bis ins 6. Jhdt. hinunter zu gehen (so Gercke), besteht kein ausreichender Anlass." Whether Gercke's *Anlass*, which, unfortunately, he withheld,⁶ was the same as ours or not, or *ausreichend* or not, in any case he was right and Ziegler is wrong: the *Nachtrag* is later than the year 529.

AUBREY DILLER

INDIANA UNIVERSITY

NOTES

1. Ziegler in *RE*, XXXVI¹ (1949), 1149–52, s.v. "Paradoxographoi."

2. Laur. 86. 3 and Vatic. gr. 1302. The complete text is found in Laur. 60. 19 and Marc. 4. 58.

3. Cougny, *Epigrammatum graecorum appendix nova* (Didot 1890), IV, 75, pp. 408–12, 434–37; see S. G. Mercati, "Intorno all'autore del carme *εἰς τὰ ἐν Πόδῳ δειπνῶ* (Leone Magistro Choirosphaktes)," *Riv. d. stud. orient.*, X (1924), 212–48; P. Maas in *Bys. Zeitschr.*, XXV (1925), 358 f. Const. Porph. Συλλογὴ

τῶν περὶ τῶν *ιστορίας* (*Supplementum Aristotelicum* [ed. Lambros], I¹ [1885]), *passim*; *Geoponica* (ed. Henr. Beckh), 13 (1895), 16. 3 (from §147).

4. Henr. Oehler, *Paradoxographi florentini anonymi opusculum de aquis mirabilibus* (Diss. Tübingen, 1913), pp. 56, 59, cites all these passages without pointing out their relationship.

5. Edited by Bywater, *Supplementum Aristotelicum*, I¹ (1886), 91.

6. *RE*, II (1896), 1049, s.v. "Aristoteles."

AN INTERRUPTED LETTER

In Seneca *EM* 51.1 the text of Hense's second edition (1914), if we omit a long parenthesis about the situation of volcanoes, which does not affect the sentence structure, runs thus:

Quomodo quisque potest, mi Lucili: tu istic habes Aetnam . . . : nos ulcumque possumus, contenti sumus Bais, quas postero die quam adtigeram reliqui, locum . . . devitandum.

The sentence pattern is, then, as follows: *quomodo quisque potest: tu, [ut potes], istic habes Aetnam: nos, ulcumque possumus, contenti sumus Bais*; "every man as best he can: you, [as best you can and it is best], have Etna down there: we, as best we can, are satisfied with Baiae." Not really "satisfied," of course, but "making out with," "getting along with." Lucilius is enjoying something choice; Seneca makes the best he can of Baiae.

There is no trouble in this very elementary sentence outside the slight adjustment in meaning which *contenti* calls for. But with the present tense *sumus* the following relative clause with its preterite and its pluperfect is incompatible, at least on the same epistolary time-level. The translators get around this by

giving *sumus* a twist to the perfect (so Gummere, La Grange, and Noblot, the translator in the new Préchac edition of the *Letters*);¹ Barker alone leaves the tense as it is, ignoring the resultant difficulty, or not admitting that there is one.²

I suspect, however, that the truth is that *EM* 51 got written as far as *Bais* at one time, and was then interrupted for any one of several conceivable reasons of the sort that happen often enough to ourselves. When the letter was recommenced, the change had already been made to some other resort; hence the epistle was resumed with a prompt correction of *sumus Bais*: "I left it the day after I arrived there." Can any better reason for the interruption be imagined than a precipitate flight from the *locum devitandum*? My translation runs therefore: "Everyman as best he can. You, down there, have Etna: we, doing our best, get along with Baiae." [Time gap.] "I left it the next day after arriving there. It is a place for one to avoid."

WILLIAM HARDY ALEXANDER

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

NOTES

1. Gummere in the Loeb Library, La Grange in the five volume ed. of *Œuvres de Sénèque*, Vol. II (Paris: an III de la République, i.e., 1794–95), Noblot in the

new Budé edition, 1947.

2. E. Phillips Barker trans., *Seneca's Letters to Lucilius* (Oxford, 1932), I, 156–57.

BOOK REVIEWS

Storia della letteratura latina, Vol. I: *La Repubblica*. By AUGUSTO ROSTAGNI. Torino: Unione tipografico-editrice torinese, 1949. Pp. xii+509+294 ills.+12 pls. L. 4600.

For the literary history of the Republic Italians have recently been unusually well provided, first with the two volumes of Bignone's history (not yet, to be sure, quite completing the republican period), and now with this handsome volume, which includes all the authors through the Ciceronian age, not neglecting many of those minor writers to whom shorter treatments, like that of Mackail, sometimes give inadequate attention. The present work is also noteworthy for its abundant illustrations, of busts of literary men, facsimiles of famous manuscripts or inscriptions, reliefs and vase paintings, and photographs of important ancient sites. Most of these are clearly pertinent, though a few seem rather farfetched in such a book.

Each chapter is followed by a brief but helpful classified bibliography, well brought up to date, and the whole work is carefully indexed. The paper, though handsome, seems unlikely to stand hard use.

Much attention is given to the preliterary period, with emphasis upon its rural origins (p. 27). Rostagni vigorously and often (especially in pp. 2-18) defends Latin literature against charges of intellectual poverty (pp. 17-18) and mere imitation of the Greek, stressing repeatedly the syncretism of Greco-Latin letters (pp. 149-50; 241), to which each country made its own contribution. Etruscan influences are recognized, e.g., in an Etruscan-Roman epic cycle dealing with the Tarquins, Vibenna, and other figures. Saturnians are treated, not as a type of verse-scheme, but as a system of rhythmic composition, at first probably accidental, but gradually adapted by more cultivated writers to quantitative rules (p. 62). The bald style of Naevius is well compared with the *elogia* of the Scipios, yet in defense of

the inventiveness of Naevius, Rostagni accepts *Dido* as the subject of the verb *percontat* in the famous fragment of the *Bellum Poenicum*, and perhaps gives insufficient consideration to other possibilities and their consequences (p. 111). Tenney Frank's arguments that *Afer* as the cognomen of Terence may be equivalent to *Poenus* are ignored (p. 215). On page 284 Rostagni stresses a considerable difference in age between Lucilius on the one hand and Scipio and Laelius on the other. He seems hardly at his best in dealing with Catullus but more congenially employed in discussing Lucretius, though (p. 399) he adopts *non multis luminibus ingeni* without warning of other readings, and does not accept the explanations of Ziegler and others of the origin of the tradition of the insanity of Lucretius (p. 418). Cicero is treated with enthusiasm, with emphasis (p. 423) upon the conflict between his thought and his actions, and a good defense of his eclecticism (p. 429) as a sign, not of weakness or indolence in thought, but of comprehensiveness of philosophic knowledge. Unlike other literary historians, Rostagni begins his account of Cicero's work with his verses, rather than relegating them to an apologetic appendix. To devote but seven pages to Caesar and nine to Sallust seems rather brief, in view of the scale of the work as a whole.

Some misprints occur, particularly in non-Italian words (e.g., pp. 33, 34, 87, 188, 275, 344, 387, 398, 419, 477), but they are hardly misleading. More serious are the identification of Cotta rather than Balbus as the Stoic champion in Cicero's *De natura deorum* (p. 450), and the blood relation of Marius to Cicero (p. 425) rather than to Caesar. Jerome's catalogue of Varro's works mentions the *De suavitate*, a title which Rostagni has, without warning, reversed in order as *De vita sua* (p. 463).

In comparison with Bignone's work this

reviewer feels that the present volume, though generally well proportioned, accurately informed, and clearly written, is a more conventional treatment, and that that of Bignone, less interested in archeological details, is more provocative of critical and appreciative reflection and richer in suggestive points of view. With the two combined a reader may secure a comprehensive picture of the literature of the period, still, however, for further details and for more impartial discussion of controversial questions, finding need of the indispensable work of Schanz-Hosius.

ARTHUR STANLEY PEASE

Harvard University

Mycenae: An Archaeological History and Guide.

By ALAN J. B. WACE. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. Pp. xviii+150+110 pls. \$15.00.

From ancient times to the present day the citadel and beehive tombs of Mycenae have excited the curiosity and wonder of travelers, while historians and archeologists have tried by patient research to comprehend the civilization that produced them. The most recent investigation under the direction of Professor Wace has been set forth in the present volume. The new material has been incorporated into a general archeological and historical account of the whole site of Mycenae. It should be obvious that such a twofold purpose could not be achieved without some impairment of the unity and coherence of the monograph. This lack of a single focus is of minor importance, however, because in either instance the author has obviously had the scholar in mind rather than the general reader.

The new excavations reported here for the first time were carried on in 1939. Though intended primarily to supplement the more extensive campaigns of 1920-23, they added some remarkable and unexpected material to the rich treasures of earlier excavations, at the same time as they helped to clarify several points that had long kept the scholars at variance. The discoveries have enabled the author to make certain corrections and additions to his more detailed publication in Volume

XXV of the *Annual of the British School at Athens* (1921-23).

The most startling result was the discovery of a Mycenaean deposit in the area of the Greek temple near the highest point of the citadel. The exquisite ivory group representing three figures, mother, daughter, and young boy, Professor Wace unhesitatingly rates as "the finest Mycenaean carved ivory yet found at any site," and this is still true even after the no less startling discoveries beneath the Artemision on Delos. The three figures are interpreted as an early version of the Eleusinian triad, despite the fact that the classical temple on the same site was apparently dedicated to Athena. The author's interpretation may be accepted with one reservation. The introduction of Iakchos into the Eleusinian cult can hardly antedate the political union of Eleusis with Athens, which is now regarded as having taken place not earlier than the seventh century B.C. Thus the boy of the ivory should be identified with Triptolemos or Ploutos rather than with the shadowy embodiment of the processional shout with its Dionysiac associations. A second object of great interest is a painted plaster head which is poorly illustrated without description or comment. These and other objects of religious significance seem to have come from a small shrine, the earliest predecessor of the temple of Athena. The investigation of the temple foundations led to the conclusion that the existing remains are Hellenistic, and that the temple was without a peristyle. It was the last of several successive structures, going back to the simple cult room of the Mycenaean age. The well-known poros relief of a veiled female figure the author believes to have come from an archaic altar, not from a metope of the temple.

Second in importance is the discovery of a prehistoric cemetery to the south of the Lion Gate. Fifteen graves, found outside the fortification wall, are part of a more extensive burial ground, to which the six royal shaft graves belong. The graves were arranged in family groups, and when the wall was constructed in the fourteenth century B.C. the cemetery, then no longer used, was divided in two. Subsequently the royal graves were enclosed within

the existing grave circle. The prehistoric cemetery dates from late M.H. to (but not including) L.H. III. These new discoveries are so obviously incompatible with the "transference theory" of Sir Arthur Evans *et al.*, that no further refutation would seem necessary. But this unhappy conjecture, like other ghosts of Mycenae, will not easily be laid to rest. The further investigation of the Treasury of Atreus, however, produced abundant material for dating this structure in the L.H. III period, more than a century and a half later than the shaft graves. Professor Wace's chronological arrangement of the tholos tombs, established twenty-five years ago, is amply corroborated by the new findings, and the relative dates of the shaft graves and the tholos tombs are fixed beyond any reasonable doubt.

The author has modified his earlier views about the date of construction of the Lion Gate and the cyclopean wall, which he formerly placed in the early fourteenth century. He now dates them in the third quarter of that century. He opposes the view expressed by the late J. F. Daniel and others that the massive ramparts of Tiryns and Mycenae are indicative of a prevailing fear of impending invasions from the north. Professor Wace would ascribe the enlarged fortification with its Lion Gate, the construction of the palace, and the grave circle to the same great ruler who also built the "Treasury of Atreus" as a tomb for himself and his family. The author declines to name this king.

It is characteristic of the discrepancies in our records that these great works would fall in the period before the accession of Atreus to the throne of Mycenae, according to the traditional date of the Trojan War. The reign of Agamemnon, the greatest of all the rulers of Mycenae, thus marks an era of decline, about a century and a half later than the unknown king builders buried in the third and most splendid group of the tholos tombs. To Agamemnon's reign would be ascribed the last futile efforts to make the Mycenaean ramparts impregnable by the extension in the northeast corner with its concealed sally port and subterranean fountain. These measures of defense are dated by the author at the end of the thir-

teenth century, more than a hundred years after the construction of the Lion Gate. They would thus be divorced from the construction of the granary to the west of the Lion Gate which Wace dates shortly after the building of the fortification wall but before the end of L.H. III A. The granary, however, seems to be an afterthought, planned after the construction of the grave circle, and, unlike the other buildings within the citadel, it was built directly against the inner face of the citadel wall. On the basis of the pottery discovered beneath the corridors of the granary and in a fill packed against its east wall, the conclusion is drawn that the granary was first built in L.H. III A (but after 1350 B.C.), and was reconstructed in L.H. III B (after 1300 B.C.). It would thus have been laid out sometime before the northeast extension of the citadel, with which the second period of the granary roughly coincides. The author is too honest a scholar to be dogmatic about the exact dates of these changes. In view of the incongruous location of the granary and the tenuous evidence for the date of the northeast extension of the citadel, would it not seem more logical that both these measures were part of a single concerted effort to insure a safe supply of grain and water against an impending siege? The exact date of the inception of this program is less important than the fact that similar safety measures can be observed in the citadels of Athens and Tiryns.

The volume contains a detailed discussion of the palace, the construction of which is contemporary with that of the citadel wall. That the existing complex including the court, vestibule, megaron, and throne room succeeded an earlier palace is made abundantly clear by its disadvantageous location. Its south side rested on a deep fill supported by the fortification wall, the collapse of which has brought about the disappearance of a large part of the megaron. The author has marshalled what direct evidence there is for the predecessor to the fourteenth century structure, but the result is not impressive. Very little concrete evidence—except pottery—remains to show the existence of the earlier palace and almost none to indicate its appearance. So far as extant remains go, the architectural history of the citadel and

its palace begins after 1350 B.C. The addition of the grand stairway belongs to a subsequent period, contemporary with the northeast extension of the citadel and the Perseia Fountain.

The volume includes a discussion of the houses excavated by the author during the earlier campaigns, and to these is added a complex building, called the "House of Columns," in the eastern section of the citadel. The author has some interesting comments on this building, "the most important Mycenaean house yet excavated," apart from the royal palaces. He finds in the disposition of its rooms and corridors a striking parallel to the palace of Odysseus described by Homer.

Because the book was conceived as a guide to the excavations, its contents are arranged roughly in the order seen by the visitor. Two sections were prepared and published as separate articles and one as a public lecture, and inevitably some overlapping has resulted. These parts, however, especially chapter XIV which contains a general discussion of the Mycenaean Civilization, are of particular importance.

As a guide book to Mycenae the volume leaves something to be desired. It is natural that the author should have treated his own investigations more fully than those of his predecessors, but the visitor who wishes to learn all about Mycenae from this single volume will find some regrettable omissions. The shaft graves are treated rather cursorily and their contents not at all. The description of the citadel wall is far less detailed than, for example, that of the houses or the tholos tombs. The unique and ingenious mortising of the lintel to the jambs is omitted in the brief description of the postern gate. The chamber tombs, published by the author in a separate volume in 1932, are mentioned but not described, whereas all nine tholos tombs have received separate discussion. There are some omissions in the material resulting from the author's own investigations. No satisfactory plan of the Hellenistic temple is given, and some of the individual finds, like the plaster head mentioned above, would deserve detailed discussion.

The illustrations are adequate and the colotype plates are perhaps as good as this process

will allow. It is regrettable that for reasons of economy this type of reproduction has come to supplant the more satisfactory half-tone process in most archeological books and journals published in this country. All but four of the illustrations are at the back of the book. The first four, consisting of folded plans and maps, are inserted in the text. This arrangement is very annoying to the reader. Once such a plan has been spread out it is impossible to use the pages beyond the point where it is inserted, and as a result the plan has to be unfolded and put back each time it is consulted. Folded plates should, of course, be placed after the single page illustrations at the very end so that they can remain unfolded without interfering with the reading of the text.

It would be ungrateful and unfair, however, to leave the impression that these minor defects, which may catch the reader's attention, seriously detract from the real merits of the book. Few excavations in Greece have been so ably and fully presented in authoritative one-volume publications. It is obvious, moreover, that the author does not consider his task finished. There are repeated references to the tentative nature of some of his conclusions and to the necessity for further investigation. It is to be hoped that Professor Wace will soon be able to return to his studies of the Mycenaean citadel. The brilliant results of his excavations in 1939, which were limited in scope, hold out promise of further discoveries at this seemingly inexhaustible source of archeological material and unrivaled artistic treasure.

OSCAR BRONEER

University of Chicago

How the Greeks Built Cities. By R. E. WYCHERLEY. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1949. Pp. xxi + 228. \$4.50.

The author of this unpretentious volume on Greek city planning and architecture describes the results of his investigation as "hardly more than a programme for a series of more thorough and detailed studies." At the same time he has aimed at a presentation that would "relate architecture more closely to Greek life." This twofold purpose has been admirably

achieved. The book is not an introduction to the subject, but rather a summary of our information on Greek cities and city planning.

The text is divided into eight chapters, the first four of which have to do specifically with cities and city planning: I. Growth of the Greek City; II. Greek Town-Planning; III. Fortifications; IV. The Agora. The second half of the book deals with different categories of buildings: V. Shrines and Official Buildings; VI. Gymnasium, Stadium and Theatre; VII. Greek Houses; VIII. Fountain Buildings.

Within this brief compass the author has succeeded in presenting a picture of the Greek city as a living, functioning unit, not the least remarkable of the achievements of Greek genius. In his discussion of individual buildings he is less concerned with their individual architectural development than with their function in the life and formation of the city.

The language of the book is remarkably free of technical jargon, so dear to the profession; the style is easy and readable. Though not specifically aimed at the non-classicist, it can be recommended to the layman as well as to the specialist who wishes to obtain a general picture of the subject as a whole.

The notes are wisely relegated to the back of the book. Sixteen half-tone plates of well selected photographs and restorations and fifty-two figures of line drawings, all scattered through the text, add much to the usefulness and attractiveness of the volume.

There is a definite need for books in English of this type on a variety of classical subjects, and the present volume would serve well as a model for such publications.

OSCAR BRONEER

University of Chicago

Römischer Staat und Staatsgedanke. By ERNST MEYER. Zürich: Artemis-Verlag, 1948. Pp. 467.

This book deals with the Roman constitution and the political concepts behind it. Dr. Meyer is not interested in political theory except as it influenced actualities. That limits the subject matter; but even so, it is an ambitious project for a book of 467 pages in which

the printed text can almost be covered with a 3x5 card. The Roman constitution is hard to understand and harder to explain, and only the most complacent college instructor can have missed feeling that his own classroom descriptions of it have been either confusing or superficial. Meyer has set himself the task of describing this intricate constitution at a level comprehensible to college undergraduates, and describing it as it ought to be described, as a living thing developing out of fundamental philosophic concepts and against a real political background.

He has succeeded very well. The attractive binding, small size, and easy style of the book, together with the relatively small space devoted to notes, suggest a popularized treatment of the subject; but if this is taken to mean a superficial treatment, appearances are deceptive. The author is aware of the difficulty of his theme. Despite the Romans' reputation for conservatism, their constitution was fluid and constantly developing. It was unwritten and thus based on tradition: as Meyer says (pp. 236 ff.), *mos maiorum* took the place of a written constitution. But there is no way to repeal an ancestral custom. Customs can be changed only by breaking them continuously, and the earliest change must be uncustomary and unconstitutional. Thus there were times when it was hard for the Romans themselves to say when a new precedent was being set and when the constitution was being violated. Was it, for example, constitutional for the senate to suspend civil liberty by *senatus consultum ultimum*? Probably not; but, as Meyer says (p. 200), the question was never quite settled. In the last century of the Republic, moreover, the constitution was violated so often and so flagrantly that some contemporaries felt that it no longer existed.¹

We may perhaps fix certain dates at which to regard the constitution as sufficiently stable for study—say, just after the passage of the *lex Hortensia* in 287 B.C. for the Republic and at the accession of Tiberius in A.D. 14 for the Principate. Even so, as Meyer points out (p. 236), the Roman constitution cannot be ade-

¹ Many Romans, says Appian (*Civil Wars*, 1. 2. 17), considered that the Republic ended with the murder of the Gracchi.

quately described in the political terminology invented by the Greeks and borrowed by us. No Greek writer seems really to have understood it. Polybius was only less confused than Plutarch and Dio Cassius, and we suffer from like difficulties. The Roman system of checks and balances differs as much from ours as it does from the ideal system of Aristotle, and its intricacies and contradictions are such that the wonder is that the Roman government functioned at all.

Dr. Meyer has presented the essentials of the subject in a clear and interesting manner. To ask more in the same space would be unreasonable. A book of this kind cannot treat everything thoroughly, and in some controversial questions the author can do no more than state the problem and cite the literature on it;² but Meyer has a thorough knowledge of the literature, and the book contains more source citations and argument than one might expect. Nor does he hesitate to take sides on controversial matters when he can state his position without using too much space. Thus he accepts the Roman tradition of an elective monarchy, in the face of the skepticism of some scholars who have questioned or flatly rejected it;³ and his arguments, while they do not exhaust all possibilities, seem sufficient to prove his case.⁴

The book begins with "Ursprünge und Werden," a short account of the development of the constitution to the time of the Punic Wars. Then comes a more detailed analysis of the "Form und Gedanke" of the fully developed Republican constitution. The third chapter, "Wandlung und Auflösung," treats the disintegration of the constitution during the civil wars; and the fourth, "Weltreich und

Ende," is a rather too brief postscript on the constitution of the Principate. It is easy to criticize this arrangement.⁵ It is not so easy to suggest a better one; and the plan adopted is perhaps the only one which permits a comprehensible description of constitutional forms without neglect of their historical and ideological background.

Meyer's treatment of the Roman constitution centers around the magistracies. The Roman magistrates, though limited by short terms of office, the principle of collegiality, the tribunician veto, and the right of *provocatio*, held enormous powers over private citizens and other agencies of government. Their power of *coercitio* enabled them to punish anyone who disobeyed them (p. 124). They embodied in their persons the majesty of Rome and were regarded with almost royal respect (p. 132). The assembly of the people could not meet unless summoned by a magistrate (pp. 178 ff.), who put the question to them to be voted on with a simple "yes" or "no." Even then, the magistrate did not have to accept their decision; he could reject it and call for a revote (p. 184). The people seemed sovereign only when a magistrate constituted them as such (p. 189). The senate also had to be summoned by a magistrate (p. 192). Even in religion, the magistrates acted for the people, the function of priests being simply to advise (p. 114).

The Romans called their state a *libera res publica*, meaning that the citizens chose their

² Thus the right of *provocatio*, though often mentioned, is never given a detailed study; but both the main sources and the most important modern treatments are cited (pp. 436 f., n. 99).

³ For example, Léon Homo (*Roman Political Institutions* [New York: Knopf, 1929], p. 12) argues that "the electoral machinery which tradition shows us governing the election of Kings was inspired directly by the procedure followed later in the election of the chief Republican magistrates, particularly the Consuls." Is it not at least as plausible that the election machinery of the consuls was copied from that of the kings whose successors they were? Or, even if we believe the opposite, does that necessarily prove that the kings were not elected in some manner?

⁴ The arguments (p. 21) are based on both history and archeology. The existence of the office of interrex cannot be explained if the monarchy was always hereditary. "Das Interregnum beweist, dass das alte römische Königtum keine erbliche Monarchie gewesen sein kann." Archeological evidence of a powerful despotism is also lacking. "Königsgräber, die sich durch Grösse und Reichtum vor anderen hervortun, gibt es in Rom nicht." It might be added that the tradition is quite plausible in itself. The Greek cities, in which Roman political developments were often anticipated, went through a stage of elective kingship in the transition from monarchy to republic.

⁵ Thus Arnaldo Momigliano (*JRS*, XXXIX [1949], 155 f.), in a generally favorable review, complains that Meyer has not integrated *Form und Gedanken*, and that "the two chapters on the origins and on the dissolution of the Roman Republican constitution are superimposed on the static description contained in the central chapter and neither explain it nor are explained by it."

own laws and magistrates (pp. 224 f.); but that was only the outward form, and we know from our own experience that a democratic or a totalitarian state can appear either as a monarchy or a republic. Though popular in form, the Roman constitution was aristocratic in essence. Even the Roman "democrats" wanted to broaden the base of the aristocracy, not to abolish it. Roman liberty did not imply equality; it was considered axiomatic that citizens differed in intelligence, character, and experience, and that the wisest and best should lead the others (pp. 245 ff.). Liberty consisted in constitutionality, in the safeguards erected around the life and property of every citizen, even the humblest, and in the distinction between *res publica* and *res privata*, which permitted the state to encroach on private rights no more than was absolutely necessary for the public interest (p. 240).

Generalizations are always dangerous, and those who look for them will find some dubious ones, especially in the section on "Die staatsformenden Gedanken und Kräfte" (pp. 221 ff.).⁶ More sympathetic readers will be impressed rather by the fact that the author is not satisfied simply with narration and description, but wishes to go beyond them to the spirit that created and vitalized the Roman constitution. It is this attitude which gives his book much of its interest and value.

LAURENCE LEE HOWE

University of Louisville

Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch. By ALLOIS WALDE and J. B. HOFMANN. 3d ed. Lieferung 15. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1949. DM 3.50.

Presumably the rapid progress of W.-H. since 1948, three new parts, which matches the rate of production in the early thirties,

⁶ The comparisons between Greek and Roman ideas of liberty (pp. 246 ff.) seem valid only if, at least in some places, one substitutes "Athenian" for "Greek"; and the statement (p. 249) that "in älteren römischen Geschichtswerken waren die Konsuln und sonstigen Beamten des Staates nicht mit Namen genannt" is surely far too inclusive. The phobia for proper names shown in Cato's *Origines*, to which Meyer's note refers, was the result of the eccentric author's reaction against the prevailing custom of contemporary writers.

and passes that of the middle and late thirties, means that editorial work was not completely suspended during the war. At this rate we shall reach Z, with addenda et corrigenda, and no doubt also addendis et corrigendis addenda et corrigenda, within the decade. But there is nothing more to be said, by way of praise or blame, about the plan and execution of a work that has already passed beyond more than half its course. Some comments may be useful to owners or users of the indispensable Walde-Hofmann. Yes, indispensable; but I always read Ernout-Meillet at the same time that I refer to W.-H. I know many others who do the same, and I advise my students so. Not only is E.-M. readable, while W.-H. barely is—its abridged but involved statements, with their barbed-wire entanglements of parentheses within parentheses, make for a brevity, which so far from being "the soul of wit" usually compels a second or third attack before it makes sense; but E.-M. is more enlightening on meaning and usage, and frequently on Romance developments, though not so useful to the specialist etymological enquirer. But it is news to no-one that the books complement one another.

P. 257.—The Gallo-Latin *paraxis*, *paroxis* (at La Graufesenque and elsewhere) is certainly a Gaulish rendering of the Greek *paropsis*. Although *p-* survived, *-ps-* was impossible for many speakers who retained Gaulish habits. In precisely the same way they turned *Mopsius* into *Moxius* (a potter's name, see Oswald's Index).

P. 259 (s.v. *parvus*).—For V.L. **pettitus* (?) see now *Die Sprache* (Havers Festschrift) 1, 1949, 127–28.

P. 261.—Pliny (35. 165) makes *passernices* Transalpine and identifies the word with *coles*. A very little of that etymological ingenuity, which when misplaced, can be made to go a long way, would suffice to relate *pass-* and *col-*. But perhaps the simplest way is to see an ethnonym turned into a trade name, cf. *Passerentiaci* (*-iacenses*) in ND Occ. 6. 14; 6. 57; 7. 175.

P. 263.—The curious divergence of meaning between *patrimonium* and *matrimonium* is not really made clear by Leumann's suggestion, cited by W.-H. The latter form clearly indicates lawful motherhood and implies, like the Prayer Book, the expectation at least of "procreation of chil-

dren"; the former, apparently, that children, not strangers, normally and legally inherit. But a study of the words in context, and compared with terms of the same meaning in other I.Eu. languages ought to be instructive. Is, for example, inheritance through the male line implicit? Or a refusal to recognize illegitimacy? Among Gaulish cognates of *pater* add *gutu-ater* and perhaps the personal name *Ateratus* (DAG 151).

P. 267.—For Stockes read Stokes. Gaulish *auotis* cannot mean "a uotis," see *Journal of Celtic Studies*, I [1949], 9-10.

The recognition by W.-H. of onomatopoeia in *pauo*, *paupulo* is wiser than attempts to equate *pauo* with *παῶς* (as in L.-Sc.).

The meaning of *pauper* is much more "beschränkt," which W.-H. put last, than "arm" (put first), as witness Horace's *meo sum pauper in aere*, more even than the etymology.

P. 269.—The Gaulish **pet(t)ia* (cited s.v. *peciulus*) is Meyer-Lübke 6450 (not 6490). Some such form must be assumed for Fr. *pièce* and other Romance words, as well as for *pec(c)ia*, *peciola* "piece" in Misc. Tir. But it is difficult to prove that it is Gaulish: what is the etymology, and whence comes the p-? That this word is distinct from the *-peccia* of *tripecchia* "three legged stool" in Sulp. Sev. is confirmed by Gaulish *cand-etum* "spatium centum pedum." The *treide* of the Endlicher glossary ("pede"), and perhaps to be seen in the local name *Briotreide* (Greg. Tur., modern Brizay), is usually supposed to stand for **traget-* (cf. W. pl. *traed*), so that the reading *treide* "tri pede," otherwise attractive, is less tempting.

P. 272.—This etymology of *pedis* "louse" (: *pedere*!) appears to be widely accepted. But it is about as credible as the old explanation of *gurgulio* as onomatopoeitic, Little Russian *bzdjuch* notwithstanding.

peculium in Galatia, with p-, cannot possibly be pure Keltic, as Calder (*CR*, XXXVII [1923], 9) supposed. But it is true that the Gauls did use the word in the sense of *παράθερα* (Ulpian *ad Sab. lib.* 31, Dig. 23. 3. 9. [3], cf. *AE* 1924. 63, *CR*, XXXVII [1923], 60-61) and in *CIL*, XII, 1005 (cf. Espérandieu, *ILG*, 227) it is used of public funds, cf. *peculator*.

P. 278.—*Pempedula* is the writing given by W.-H. (Diosc. *πυμπεδουλα* *πεντάφυλλον*). But as Pokorný points out (*Idg. Etym. Wtb.*, 1949, p. 234) the true form in Gaulish must have been **pimpedula*.

P. 280.—The connexion of L. *pendo* "weigh" with Gothic and Old English *spinnan* "spin,"

here confidently accepted, "n'est qu'une possibilité" (E.-M.). *Caueat lector*.

P. 292.—The correct reading at Plautus *Curc.* 192 is *ebriola's persolla*, as I showed in *CR*, XXXVI (1922), 166, cf. *Gloss. Lat.*, IV (1930), 69. And (p. 291) there is no *persollus*; the diminutive of *persona* is expected to be an a-stem, not o-stem.

In view of Umb. *perkaf*, Osc. *perek*, Pael. *pracom*, it would seem that Latin *pertica* stands for an older **per(e)k-ti-*. The Vulgar Latin *parricus* of the Lex Ripuaria (Dutch *perk*, Germ. *Pferch*), therefore, is closer to the dialect than to the Latin form, even though that does appear in an inscription of Rigomagus (*CIL*, XIII, 7816).

P. 299.—"*phaselus*, -i m." Stat. *Siluae* 3. 2. 31; 5. 1. 245; Martial 10. 30. 13; and Lucan 5. 518 (but the MSS are divided) fem.

P. 306.—For the meaning of *pinguis* see Catullus 39.11 where it is distinguished from *obesus*. The correct reading is clear from *Gloss. Lat.*, I (PI 152, cf. *CR*, XXXIV [1919], 105).

P. 319.—There are some eight examples of *platea* in the Latin inscriptions of the Rhineland to testify to the acceptance of this word on the fringe of German territory. Gothic has *plapjo* at Matt. 6. 5 (an error for *platjō* gen. pl., or less likely, -*þjō*?); but that may have come directly from Greek.

P. 324.—On *ploum* see *PID*, II, 63.

P. 327.—s.v. *pluo*. Cf. perhaps Gaulish *lidu-na* "neap tide" (**plēu-*?).

P. 343.—For *portus* in the sense of "dépôt" cf. the insc. of Bonn, Nesselhauf 16 (*R.-G. Komm. Ber.*, XXVII [1937]), with Rostovtzeff's comments *C.R.Ac.Insc.B.L.*, 1930, 250-260.

JOSHUA WHATMOUGH

Harvard University

Les Premières civilisations. By PIERRE JOUGUET, JACQUES VANDIER, GEORGES CONTENAU, ÉDOUARD DHORME, ANDRÉ AYMARD, FERNAND CHAPOUTHIER, and RENÉ GROSSSET. ("Peuples et civilisations: Histoire générale," ed. by LOUIS HALPHEN and PHILIPPE SAGNAC, Vol. I, New ed.) Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1950. Pp. xii+767+4 maps. Fr. 1200.

The series to which the present volume belongs seems deservedly to have been very successful in France and so to have been judged worthy of better paper and printing than it

received in the earlier editions. The volume has been thoroughly revised. The original edition of 1926, which has been reissued with some corrections and additions in 1929, 1935, and 1938, contained over two hundred pages less than the new edition. Of the original five authors, three—Contenau, Grousset, and Jouguet—are still listed on the title page, while Fougères and Lesquier have been replaced by Vandier, Dhorme, Aymard, and Chapouthier. The original plan of a division into three books has been retained, but the number of chapters has been increased by five and there has been considerable revision, expansion, and rewriting. The first book covers the early empires of the Near East; the second book, most of the second millennium B.C.; and the third, from the eleventh century to the Persian War.

We are thus offered, as it were, a modern substitute for the first six books of Herodotus. The modern authors are like their precursor in their breadth of interest, and they are at an advantage over him in the improvement of the methods of historical research in the intervening twenty-four hundred years. Hence we have the increased—and constantly increasing—knowledge derived from archeology and the decipherment of records in a variety of languages—languages, so many and so different that there no longer are specialists in the history and culture of the ancient Near East but Egyptologists, Assyriologists, Hittitologists, etc., who know little more about civilizations contemporary with their own special field than we classicists know about the entire group. Hence, in a series in which the preference is for one author for each volume, it was found necessary in the present case to have seven. And yet they do not go much outside the area described by Herodotus. There is a page on the Indus Valley civilization (pp. 102-3), but they do not go farther afield in Asia and have little to say about western and northern Europe—subjects probably reserved for the volume on the rise of Rome. At times the narrowing is excessive. Thus, in connection with the amber of Mycenae (p. 266) there might well be some reference to the northern end of the amber route, where in Denmark a high bronze age civilization utilizing imported raw materials

and exchanging amber and other articles for copper and tin was developed. A reference to this would make an appropriate complement to the statement that the wealth of gold at Mycenae was too great to be explained exclusively as booty.

The volume is well planned and executed, and the authors have correlated their work admirably. They write interestingly and uniformly seem to be cautious in their statements and ready to give information about conflicting theories and interpretations. The bibliographical notes are full enough to be helpful, the proofreading is good, and the scholarship, where I am able to judge, is admirable. Naturally, allowance must be made for differences of opinion, for the continued effect of the interruption of communications during the war, and for the new discoveries which practically make it impossible to publish such a volume before it becomes out of date on some point. Many may feel that a little more on Egypt and somewhat fewer details about Assyrian campaigns—though the account of Assyria is very effective—would have produced a better balance. Many may also prefer the interpretation of Wace and Blegen of Helladic trade to that of the present volume or be less sure of the general superiority of Ionia and the islands in all phases of archaic culture. But there is little object in enumerating points on which disagreement is possible. The volume deserves to be warmly recommended to all who wish to refresh their knowledge of the rise of civilization in the Near East and Greece.

J. A. O. LARSEN

University of Chicago

Éloge funèbre d'une matrone romaine (Éloge dit de Turia). Edited and translated by MARCEL DURRY. Paris: Société d'édition "Les belles lettres," 1950. Pp. xcvi+83.

Professor Durry has given much more than a translation and edition of a famous document. He has also written an important discussion of the *laudatio funebris* as a thoroughly native element of Latin culture and of the historical and legal problems connected with the inscription. All of this is done in a style which

is at the same time simple and direct and also vigorous and full of allusions. Much of his interpretation can be seen from the statement, "Ainsi la *laudatio funebris* avait résisté aux séductions et elle représentait, si j'ose dire, une *anti-Kunstprosa*" (p. xliii). As the title indicates, Durry does not believe that the woman honored and her husband were Turia and Quintus Lucretius Vespillo. His arguments seem convincing, and he naturally and wisely refrains from any further attempt to identify them and is satisfied with determining their relationship to contemporary events. It is impossible—and it would be out of place—to discuss here at any length the lessons to be learned from the document. Readers must dig that out themselves, will enjoy doing so, and will get much help from the introduction and commentary. Probably on every reading new thoughts and problems will arise: Is the reference to devotion to working with wool (i.30) anachronistic or were the ladies of wealthy families still occupied with such things in the time of Augustus? Does *familiae pietas* (i.32) have any lesson for the reader of Vergil except to confirm our usual interpretation of *pius*? Does the reference to *restituta re publica* (ii.25) mean widespread acceptance and understanding of Augustus' official program? Should the statement in Ernout-Meillet² concerning the disappearance of the spelling *vac-* of *vacō* etc. from the written language be modified in the light of *vocuum* in ii.33 (cf. Dessau, 6085.93)?

J. A. O. LARSEN

University of Chicago

Livy, with an English Translation, in Fourteen Volumes. Vol. VIII: Books 28–30. Translated by FRANK GARDNER MOORE. ("Loeb Classical Library," No. 381.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949. Pp. xii+562+8+9 maps. \$3.00.

With Volume VIII in this series Professor Moore has completed Livy's third decade and presented us an admirable translation of Books 28–30. The events narrated cover the period 207–201 B.C. and center largely about Scipio's conquest of Spain and Africa.

The volume is, for the most part, free of

typographical errors (cf., however, pp. 15, 75, 133 and the dates on pp. 303, 481, and 531). The second date on page 516 should be "A. U. C. 553" (not "552"). On the Latin side, correct *a bhoste* to *ab hoste* (28. 2. 3 on p. 4) and *quai* to *quia* (29. 1. 10 on p. 208); restore *fretos* between *armis* and *pugnatueros esse* (28. 32. 9 on p. 132).

The translation closely follows the Latin but is generally clear and free of the long and encumbering sentences which often mar English translations of Greek and Roman authors. The method which Professor Moore employs to break down the longer period is well exemplified in Fabius' speech near the end of Book 28. He also knows when to retain the Latin style as in the cumulative effect of Scipio's words in 28. 43. 10–12. Notes are adequate and, so far as it has been possible to check, correct.

To mention a few points of disagreement, again with emphasis on Book 28, I hesitate at "a fierce battle and indecisive" (p. 11) and "in seventy days' marches" (p. 69). Although this translation of *septuagensimis castris* (cf. similarly "five day's marches" on p. 471 and "five day's journeys" on p. 543) may be clear to the classicist, would it not be better to follow the example "in about five stages" (p. 79) or "a five-days' march" (p. 389, n. 2)? It would be more consistent to retain "Ebro" as the translation of *Hiberum* (as on pp. 99 and 447; "Hiberus" occurs on pp. 133 and 171).

"War" (pp. 37 and 39) as a translation of *res publica* (28. 9. 4, 7) may be justified in this context. On a similar usage of *res publica gereretur* (27. 6. 10) Weissenborn-Müller note *besonders der Krieg*; in this case, however, Moore translates "its affairs" with definite reference to the state. I question the interpretation "to tempt the barbarians' love of pilage" (p. 133) especially since the passage (*ad inritandam feritatem barbarorum*) is immediately preceded by *pecora, rapta pleraque ex ipsorum hostium agris* (28. 33. 2). The translation "It was time also, etc." (p. 81) repeats the preceding *venisse tempus* (28. 19. 8) but omits *in omne tempus*.

The text, except for minor variations, is essentially that of Conway and Johnson, to

which, as in the two preceding volumes, Professor Moore acknowledges "special indebtedness." The critical notes are more copious than previously. Apart from a few additions, they appear to have been taken from Conway and

Johnson. The minor variations in the text may be assigned principally to (a) spelling, (b) word inversion and separation, (c) number and tense of verb, and (d) change, retention, or omission of words, e.g. (all from Book 28):

CONWAY AND JOHNSON

MOORE

(a) spelling:

3. 9 *conl-*
3. 14 *partes*
4. 3 *hiemps*
9. 7 *dis*
16. 13 *dissipati*
etc.

coll- (but *conl-* in 4. 2, etc.)
partis (but *partes* in 5. 12, etc.)
hiems
deis (but *dis* in 39. 13)
dissupati (but *dissipatum* in 3. 1)

(b) word inversion:

3. 13 *portae et refringebantur*
14. 19 *in acie hostium*
17. 11 *non aliter*
22. 13 *ordine ullo*
24. 6 *rumores dubii*
etc.

et r. portae
in hostium acie
aliter non
ullo ordine
dubii rumores

word separation:

6. 1 *postquam*
9. 4 *quemadmodum*
9. 15 *etiamsi*
etc.

post quam (but *postquam* in 24. 12, etc.)
quem ad modum (but *quemadmodum* in 44. 17)
etiam si (but *etiamsi* in 35. 10)

(c) number and tense of verb:

5. 15 *recepit*
7. 11 *recipit*
10. 10 *habuisset*
12. 5 *deesset*
28. 7 *redieritis*
etc.

recipit
recepit
habuissent
deessent
rediretis

(d) change, retention, or omission of words:

5. 9 *laturum* (om. *se*)
6. 10 *deiciunt* (om. *se*)
7. 1 *impari tum maritimis*
7. 18 *in se*
9. 10 *quoniam* (om. *ut*)
13. 1 *parem* (om. *fore*)
etc.

laturum se
se deiciunt
inpari maritumis (om. *tum*)
ad se
ut, quoniam
fore parem

Since these variations reveal adherence to no particular MS or group of MSS, editor or editors, the choice of reading in each case may be due either to Professor Moore's own individual preference or to a conscious effort to avoid slavish imitation of the Conway and Johnson text.

In several instances of greater significance Professor Moore has preferred the reading of

other editors to that of the MSS and Conway, e.g.:

	MSS and Conway	Moore
3. 3	<i>Hispanae</i>	<i>Bastelanae</i>
7. 9, 11	<i>Toronen</i>	<i>Thronium</i>
(cf. 7. 13)	<i>Torone</i>	<i>Thronio</i>
	<i>recepta</i>	<i>recepto</i>

Where Conway and Johnson themselves express a difference of opinion, Moore frequently

sides with Johnson (cf. 3. 13; 6. 10; 7. 1, etc.). Also, at one point (27. 11 *at*) he adopts the reading suggested (not read) by Conway.

Moore has neither adopted nor suggested any readings of his own in this book. Variations in pointing from the Conway and Johnson text (cf. 27. 6; 41. 4, 8; 44. 4) are similar to, or can be derived from, the Weissenborn-Müller text, as can also such examples as *quem* (<*mallet*) in 45. 9. I found very few errors in the *apparatus criticus* itself. For "N" (p. 80, n. 2) read "N (*stag-*)," for "J" (p. 134, n. 3) read "J (*obic-*)," and delete K (p. 124, n. 7) cited for *et*. Fuller citations, of course, were restricted by limited space.

The volume is completed by an Appendix, Index of Names, and nine maps. The Appendix treats of "The Zama Problem," on which the campaign of 1943 has regrettably shed little or no light. The abbreviation "m. p." (p. 544) will trouble the non-Latinist. Although the Index of Names is (where checked) complete, the page references are not, e.g., add the following page references: Atrius, 116; Carthago Nova, 170; Palatium, 262. The page reference "30" should follow Boeotia, not Boeoti; after Pleminius, Q. . . . 240 for "(*quinquias*)" read "(*quinquies*)." The practice (though here inconsistent) of indicating the pronunciation of more unfamiliar names in both the Index and the English text is commendable (cf. Elatia, Heraclea, Orëum, etc.). The maps are based on those of the *Cambridge Ancient History* and are adequate to illustrate the historical and geographical descriptions contained in Livy 28-30.

FRANK GIVENS PICKEL

Washington University

Xenophon: Économique. Edited and translated by PIERRE CHANTRAINE. Paris: "Les belles lettres," 1949. Pp. 119.

Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* was valued in antiquity, especially in Roman times, as an ethical work. Cicero thought so highly of its moral teachings that he translated it into Latin and the Epicurean writer and teacher Philodemus used it as the starting point for one of his own books on ethics. In the nineteenth century,

however, perhaps through a kind of magnetic attraction from the title, a tendency set in to treat the brochure as a study in economics. The heritage of this misconception is still strong. For it is a misconception; there is scarcely a single sentence in the dialogue that can properly be called a proposition in economics and the new Liddell and Scott is quite precise in including among the meanings of the word *oikonomikós* "title of treatise on the duties of domestic life, by Xenophon." This fine new edition by Pierre Chantraine merits particular notice because it will serve to counteract the "economic" conception of the work.

The manuscripts of Xenophon's briefer writings are a mess. Chantraine's text, following rather closely Thalheim's Teubner edition of 1910, is justifiably conservative in emendation as well as eclectic in orthography and in the critical apparatus. That is the best anyone can do at the present, short of a detailed study of the MSS and their filiation; so authoritative a student of the Xenophon MSS as Luigi Castiglioni has recently expressed doubt that such an effort would prove fruitful (*Gnomon*, XXI [1949], 339-40). The introduction, bibliographical references, and notes are sound and straightforward, if not elaborate, in the best Guillaume Budé tradition. The typography and proofreading are excellent. One might disagree with Chantraine's evaluation of the merits of Xenophon as stylist and thinker or with his suggestion for dating the work, but he has not overstepped an editor's prerogatives here and one does not look to such an edition for a full scholarly treatment of these matters.

It is the translation that constitutes Chantraine's significant contribution. In one sense, the *Oeconomicus* is "easy Greek." But in another and more profound sense, it is most difficult to translate, partly because Xenophon chose to repeat a whole series of technical words with remarkable monotony and partly because the rendition of the simplest words, *οἶκος*, *χρήματα*, or *ἐπιμέλεια*, is inextricably bound up with the translator's conception of the work and even of the character of Greek agricultural economics. Perhaps no other aspect of the language of the ancient Greeks has remained so unexplored as its economic ter-

minology. Chantraine has previously shown his realization of the importance of the problem, notably in his articles on *κρήματα* and on the verbs meaning "to sell," in *Revue de philologie*, LXXII (1946), 5-11, and LXVI (1940), 11-24, respectively. In the volume under review, he makes explicit reference to the difficulties (see the notes on pp. 32, 34, 85, 109, and 117). And in his translation he has worked with care and great skill to produce a French version that achieves the proper shading and emphasis in most instances.

One illustration must suffice. The opening of the work (1. 1-15) is devoted to one of the rare attempts in extant Greek literature to analyze the nature of value. By systematically linking *κρήματα* and *χρήσθαι*, Xenophon centers his conception on the notion of usability, under which he subsumes knowledge of how to use to one's advantage. Chantraine obtains precisely the correct tone by translating *κρήματα* as "un bien" and by taking advantage of the ambivalent meaning of that word in French. Thus, when Xenophon writes the climactic sentence (1. 12), λέγειν ἔοικας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ ἀργυρίον ἐστὶ κρήματα, εἰ μὴ τις ἐπίσταιτο χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ, Chantraine's "l'argent non plus n'est pas un bien pour qui ne saurait pas en bien user" is just right. Marchant's version in the Loeb Classical Library (a translation which was generally, and in a measure justifiably, hailed as "admirable" when it appeared) reads as follows: "You imply, Socrates, that even money isn't wealth to one who doesn't know how to use it." The word "wealth" is false; it transfers the whole discussion to quite another ethical problem from the one Xenophon was raising. And it is the repetition of such seemingly minor discrepancies that adds up to the false picture of the dialogue as a whole revealed by Marchant's subtitle, "A Discussion on Estate Management." Duties of domestic life (the Liddell and Scott phrase) and estate management may overlap, but the points at which they diverge distinguish the purpose and quality of Xenophon's treatise from a study of the economics of gentleman (slaveholder) farming. "Xenophon," writes Chantraine (p. 6), "se soit intéressé aux conditions techniques et morales qui permettent à un agriculteur de

tirer de son bien le meilleur profit." The italics are mine; they underscore the absence of the word, "économiques."

M. I. FINLEY

Newark College, Rutgers University

L. Annaeus Seneca: *De brevitate vitae*. Herausgegeben von HELLFRIED DAHLMANN. München: Max Hüber Verlag, 1949. Pp. 88. DM 4.50.

This is the first number in a new series of classical texts with accompanying German translations; some handbooks are included as well to which the general title *Das Wort der Antike* does not seem so applicable. At all events it is a very inspiring "word of the ancients" that has been chosen to open the series.

The plan of the little book, brochure in form and modest in coloring and appearance, is as follows: (a) introduction, 6-27; (b) brief observations on the text adopted, 27-28; (c) Latin text with German translation facing, 30-79; explanatory notes on the subject matter of the translation, mostly historical or of the nature of cross-references to other works of Seneca.

The introduction seems long spun out and unduly ponderous. The name of the series would suggest something of a popular order (and why not?), but this *Einleitung* goes far beyond what that type of book would require. Of course, if classical professors are to be asked to edit popular editions, perhaps they should be afforded the opportunity of expressing themselves somewhere *in extenso*. Still, the Loeb series has been satisfied with the barest preliminaries. It might have been worth while using some of the space to explain the exact aim in mind of the series as a whole.

From the treatment of text, we may gather that the series will go lightly on that phase; after all, it is *das Wort der Antike* it proposes to provide, something more to the point than verbal scholarship, at least wherever paper and print are dear. Dahlmann rests his text on Hermes' edition, with a strong tendency to go with the Ambrosianus, however, even beyond Hermes' conservatism. The present reviewer has spent years in seeking to emphasize this

textual policy for the *Dialogi* as a whole, namely, that the readings of A are more often right than wrong in the doubtful places, and need, as a rule, subtle explanation rather than artful emendation; this is where Madvig fails as a Senecan text commentator so often. Dahlmann conceals his knowledge of any "moderns" other than Axelson in the field of Seneca's text, or is it that he is convinced that their contribution to the study of the text of *De brevitate* is, in total, zero?

The translation has been tested by sampling here and there; it can be said to exhibit the splendid effect produced on the German language by the necessity of translating something with a hard, specific core, such as a piece of good Latin. On the whole it strikes one as accurate, and, in spots, keen.

It may well be doubted whether the commentary following the translation will be of much help for a general reader, while the classical scholar might think it inadequate for his more esoteric purposes. If the Loeb is bare in these matters, Dahlmann has gone too far. Yet here again the question of the purpose in mind rises up; Professor Dahlmann may have achieved exactly what the general editor of the series wished, let us say a semipopular classic for the pocket, with enough learning prefaced and attached to set up the ordinary reader intellectually. One might suggest the value of a good biography of Seneca to replace the bulk of these notes.

The printing is good except that of some Greek words on page 80, where also *apophthegma* seems to have thrown the printer at last. The pages, no doubt through an effort at economy, are so tight-packed as to be a little formidable, or at least uninviting. This might conceivably be corrected in later volumes.

The reviewer's feeling is, on the whole, one of disappointment. But he will say once more that perhaps he had made up his mind to look for something that was not really intended. Meantime he much prefers a booklet like Rossi's *Apocolocyntosis*.

WILLIAM HARDY ALEXANDER

University of California

De officiis (3d ed.). Edited by C. ATZERT; *De virtutibus* (2d ed.). Edited by W. Ax. (M. Tulli Ciceronis scripta quae manserunt omnia, Fasc. 48.) Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1949. Pp. xlii+189. \$3.07.

Cicero's three books *De officiis* have not been the favorites with modern editors that some of his other philosophical writings have been. For that reason, as well as for many others, a welcome is assured for this little Teubner volume containing C. Atzert's text and extensive *praefatio*, along with ten pages of fragments of Cicero's lost work *De virtutibus*, edited by W. Ax. The text of *De officiis* is based on a personal study by the editor of about sixty of the manuscript sources and on the collations of Ernest Popp, who during the forty years between 1883 and 1923 re-examined all the manuscripts that had formed the basis for the editions of Baier, Müller, and several others.

Fearing that the first (1923) and second (1932) editions of his work might not be generally accessible (an apprehension unhappily well founded, so far as the libraries in this country are concerned), the author has repeated from the earlier editions that part of his *praefatio* which has to do with the manuscripts. In this many may find the chief value of the new edition. The rest of the *praefatio* has been revised or amplified to take account of relevant literature that has appeared since 1932, and includes more or less detailed discussion of five passages where the text presents unusual difficulties (1. 51: *ut quae discripta sunt . . . sic observentur*; 1. 136: *id agendum etiam . . . videamur irati*; 1. 155: *studiis officiisque scientiae . . . ad hominum utilitatem*; 1. 157: *homines . . . agendi cogitandique sollertiam*; 2. 23: *nec vero huius tyranni . . . valet ad pestem*), an elaboration of the author's view that *De officiis* was published posthumously by literary executors after the death of Cicero, and tables purporting to show (a) the use made of *De officiis* by Ovid in the third book of the *Ars amatoria* and by Seneca the Younger in several of his philosophical writings, and (b) the debt of Cicero to earlier rhetorical and popular philosophical sources, as attested by reminiscences of Isocrates' orations *Ad De-*

monicum, *Ad Nicoclem*, and *Nicocles*. It may be observed in passing that references to the *Ad Nicoclem* and the *Nicocles*, which are of course quite different speeches, are confused (pp. xxxvii-xxxviii) by the indiscriminate use of the abbreviation, "Nic.," for both of them. The parallels cited for *De officiis* 2. 15, and 1. 46, are in fact in the *Nicocles*, while all the rest occur in the *Ad Nicoclem*.

The editor's disposition is conservative. He sharply criticizes (p. xix) such scholars as Mollweide, Maler, and Weidner for perverse zeal in the hunt for glosses and interpolations to root out. "Ichneutai," he characterizes them, "nihil aliud spectantes, nisi ut tamquam mali medici secandi et urendi medela abutantur," and he quotes with approval the judgment of Vahlen, "Dici non potest, quantopere hi libri Tulliani [*De officiis*] deformati sint cupiditate spuria insequendi et extirpandi."

The manuscripts he assigns to three classes, in descending order of reliability denominated Z, X, and 5 (clearly conflate). Atzert dates the divergence between Z and X very early, adducing in support of this thesis (pp. xvi-xvii) one instance of agreement between Columella and X against Z, and four of agreement between Nonius Marcellus and X against Z. In all but one of these cases, however, the text of X appears to be sound and is in fact adopted by Atzert. No legitimate conclusions may be drawn from any one of these concerning the date of either archetype. In the fifth, the adopted text is an emendation of Ernesti involving the collocation *nostra nostrae*; X and Nonius Marcellus both omit *nostrae*. If X and Nonius were entirely alone in this quasi-haplography (which Atzert's own *apparatus* tells us they are not), the error might still quite easily have arisen independently with each, and could hardly be taken as convincing evidence that the archetype of X antedated Nonius.

The volume embodies the usual Teubner-type *apparatus*, for the fullness of which (as always) the scholar will be grateful. It also includes a very useful *conspectus subsidiorum*. That the *apparatus* sometimes fails to convey all the information in which the user may be interested is a fault which anyone who has

tried his hand at constructing an *apparatus* will readily excuse. The reader, for example, who tries to reconstruct the text of the manuscripts for *quod idem in poematis, in picturis usu venit* (*De off.* 3. 15) from the *apparatus* alone will go considerably astray on T, chief manuscript of 5, as may be seen by comparison with the reading of T cited in the *praefatio* (p. xvii). The trouble comes from the common, convenient, but in the opinion of this reviewer unsatisfactory expedient of using one siglum (5) for two things, the *codices deteriores* "aut omnes, aut singuli." A careful user of the *apparatus* would appreciate a statement, either with the sigla or in the *praefatio*, of the precise extent of a *codex mutilus* like L (he must now arrive at one for himself from *apparatus*-entries where a break occurs). The foregoing, however, is not meant in any way to disparage what is in fact a very useful and apparently well-constructed *apparatus*.

This third edition is commended as a handy text in the best traditions of the Teubner series.

ARTHUR F. STOCKER

University of Virginia

In C. Verrem actionis secundae libri iv-v.

Edited by ALFRED KLOTZ. (*M. Tulli Ciceronis scripta quae manserunt omnia*, Fasc. 13.) 2d ed. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1949. Pp. 351-528. \$2.15.

When it became known that all of the plates and virtually all of the stocks of the Bibliotheca Teubneriana had perished in the European catastrophe, even the most optimistic of us feared that a great age of scholarship had come to an end. It is in every way enheartening to see that we underestimated the courage and devotion of our German colleagues, who have now begun to re-create the whole of this indispensable series of texts. The new volumes are taller than the old, the margins have at last become adequate, the typography is excellent, and only the quality of the paper reminds us that the publishers and editors are working amid difficulties and hardships that probably exceed our wildest surmise.

To the reader the seven Verrine orations

form a single fabric of implacable logic and immortal eloquence, but the accidents of manuscript tradition have divided them for editorial purposes into three distinct parts. It is the last of these editorial units that Klotz has chosen to re-edit first, thus repeating the procedure which he followed in his edition of 1923. Since no manuscript of major importance has been discovered or identified in the interim, we naturally should not expect to find in the new edition any drastic changes in the text. What we have a right to expect is that the editor will have carefully reconsidered every line and word in the light of the most recent scholarship and his own more mature judgment. This Klotz has clearly done. I note sixteen changes in the text. Of the seven passages in which the editor now prefers the readings of β to those of α , all are, I think, distinctly improved. In 4.9.20, however, he now strangely follows α and prints "modios IX empti," which simply cannot be construed; we must, of course, read *modiūm*, as in Klotz's earlier edition. In five instances the editor now abandons conjectures to return to manuscript readings, one excellent new emendation is admitted to the text, and in 5.36.94 Hotoman's "acta commemoraba[n]tur" is replaced by Philippon's "acta(e) commemorabantur"—a clear and necessary improvement.

For the scholar—particularly in this age of conservative editing—the real interest of a new edition usually lies in the *apparatus*, which he expects to provide him with more perfect materials for the exercise of his own judgment. Here again Klotz has done his work conscientiously and well. The new *apparatus* contains twelve additional and valuable *testimonia* from ancient sources, corrects or amplifies in six places his earlier reports of manuscript readings, twice corrects earlier reports of conjectures, twice indicates changes in his own opinion concerning the relative worth of variants, and records ten plausible but unaccepted emendations suggested since his earlier edition. To these he might, perhaps, have added in 4.54.121 Havet and Bornecque's "aliis in locis <religiosis> videmus" for the sake of calling attention to an unusual, though not

impossible, *clausula*. There is in this, as in the earlier edition, one unfortunate omission in the *apparatus*. In 4.5.10 Klotz's text reads "Si quod venale habuit Heius, si id quanti aestimabat tanti vendidit. . . ." Few readers will find this tolerable, and the *apparatus* should therefore inform them that there is precedent in the late manuscripts for the reading *quid*, which is necessary for both grammar (if we retain the second *si*) and sense. Both protases of Cicero's condition must be ironical: "If, indeed, Heius *did* put things up for sale, and *if* he sold them for what he thought they were worth. . . ." The first protasis simply anticipates the question that is put more vividly a few lines later: "Quaerendum credo est, Heius . . . num auctionem fecerit." If there is anyone who is inclined to reverse manuscripts in such matters, he should note that in 4.3.6, "quid dico 'nuper'?" the correct reading is found only in the palimpsest, which is available at this point, and the *deteriores*; all the good manuscripts offer an incredible *quod*.

There are a few unimportant typographical errors. In the text, p. 370, l. 15, read *a*, delete period; in the *apparatus*, 354. 24, read $\Theta\epsilon\sigma\pi\iota\alpha\iota$; 391.15 *patieris* α ; 400.4 *inscripserat* β ; 415.1 *Schlenger*; 425.33 italicize *post*; 463.19 $\text{V}\beta$; 479.1 delete bar before *cf.*; 502.12 *spectatae*; 509, last line, 35 (what follows, "p. r α " does not seem to be a typographical error, but I do not know what it means).

Klotz's new edition, excellent despite a few insignificant blemishes, is worthy of its place among the first volumes of the great series that now, like the Phoenix, is reborn and *emeritos artus fecunda morte reformat*.

REVILO P. OLIVER

University of Illinois

Oratio pro P. Sulla. Edited by H. KASTEN.
Oratio pro Archia poeta. Edited by P. REIS.
 (M. Tulli Ciceronis scripta quae manserunt omnia, Fasc. 19.) 2d ed. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1949. Pp. x+62. \$1.00.

The present revisions of the *Pro Sulla* and the *Pro Archia* reproduce the original editions printed by the same editors in Vol. VI. 2 of the

Teubner *Cicero* (pp. 119-62 and 163-80) in 1933 with a minimum of alteration. The *Praefatio* of the *Pro Sulla* has been condensed; the troublesome passage *de supplicio* † *de Lentulo* (10. 30) has been made clear by the insertion of *sumpto* after *supplicio*, as R. Sydow suggested (see *app. ad loc.*); in 24. 68 (p. 29, ll. 10-11) the editor has abandoned his previous conjecture *ante an um<quam>* in favor of the *antea num* of all the MSS, and the *nos* that was inserted after *deseruerit* (28. 77) has been removed. The *Praefatio* of the *Pro Archia* has not been changed at all; in the list of *Sigla* the dates of Σ, γ, β, and χ have been added; the text is that of the first edition, barring one or two corrected misprints. Except for the replacement of *sed* by *at* (p. 43, *app.* to l. 15, and p. 44, *app.* to l. 26), the only difference between the *apparatus* of the second and first editions is the inclusion of two conjectures put forward by Sydow in 1942 (*app.* to p. 53, l. 11, and to p. 57, l. 1). The second one is not plausible, but the first is at least as good as the reading maintained by the editor: "cupere debemus quo *eminus* manuum nostrarum tela pervenerint, eodem gloriam famamque penetrare (10. 23)." *Eminus* is *Gulielmius'* emendation; except for the second hand of c and the fifteenth century k, which omit the word, all four MSS read *minus*. *Eminus* is excellent from a palaeographical point of view, less admirable from that of meaning. Sydow's *viribus* makes adequate sense, but is awkward palaeographically. Madvig's deletion of *minus* is Procrustean. Conceivably the correct reading is *quatenus manuum* etc. The spelling *quatinus* occurs in late antiquity; this relatively uncommon word might well be mistaken for the common *quominus*; the separation to *quo minus* would represent a halfhearted attempt to emend the passage. The pairing of *quatenus* with *eodem* need cause no surprise; as E. Wölfflin pointed out in *ALL*, V (1888), 401, Cicero and others sought to avoid the cumbersome legalistic balance *eatenus . . . quatenus* by substituting a synonym for one of the correlatives.

RICHARD T. BRUÈRE

University of Chicago

Oratio pro Sex. Roscio Amerino. Edited by ALFRED KLOTZ. (*M. Tulli Ciceronis scriptae quae manserunt omnia*, Fasc. 8.) 2d ed. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1949. Pp. viii+63. \$0.90.

This second edition of the *Pro Roscio Amerino* is substantially the same as that published by the same editor in 1923 in the fourth volume of the Teubner *Cicero*; the text has, however, been improved in several places and the *apparatus* augmented and brought up to date. A number of slips and misprints of the first edition have been corrected: *provocatam* (p. v, last line) has replaced *provocatam*, *Priamum* (32. 90; p. 35, l. 12), the former *Preamum*, *exoptata* (*app.* to l. 1, p. 56), *expetita*. A wrong reference preceding the quotation from the *De finibus* (p. 33, *app.* to l. 24) remains unchanged (instead of "fin. 4. 54" read "fin. 4. 34"). Occasionally errors have appeared in the new edition where there were none before. For *Gulielmus* (p. v, l. 1) *Gulielmius* should be read; in the passage from the *De finibus* just mentioned *diligendum* has been corrupted to *deligendum*; "cf. *Dictys*" has become "1 *Dictys*" (*app.* to p. 1, l. 1), and <ut>, <et> (*app.* to p. 4, l. 1).

No exception can be taken to the removal of the brackets which formerly enclosed *quae* (2. 6; p. 3, l. 4) and *et iam videtis* (46. 135; p. 53, ll. 16-17), nor to the bracketing of *legationis* (40. 117; p. 45, l. 22). The *crux* in 32. 90 has been happily removed by the adoption of Martin's *omnes eos* (p. 35, l. 11) for the †*Mameos* of the first edition. The variants *relegavit* and *relegarat* (15. 42; p. 16, l. 31 and *app. ad loc.*) have changed places, the former now being in the text and the latter in the *apparatus*, and the *indicii* of the first edition has been supplanted by *indicivae* (37. 107; p. 42, l. 1).

The *Praefatio* is that of the edition of 1923, except that the additional *testimonia* there listed (pp. ix-x) have been placed in the *apparatus*, and a paragraph added stating that the *Codex Bononiensis 28 palimpsestus* discovered by E. Reitzenstein is of no value.

The new matter contained in this edition would justify it even if the original one had not

been destroyed. It is a welcome addition to the renascent series of Teubner texts.

RICHARD T. BRÜÈRE

University of Chicago

Maximini duo Iuli Capitolini: Aus dem Corpus der sog. Historia Augusta. Edited by ERNST HOHL. Berlin: Verlag Walter de Gruyter, 1949. Pp. 40. Rm. 3.50.

An annotated edition of a single *vita* from the *Historia Augusta* by the editor of the most recent and best text of the entire collection is a welcome addition to the literature of this controversial work. The choice of the *Maximini duo* is particularly apt, since the close dependence of the *vita* on Herodian makes possible a detailed study of the author's use and misuse of sources. Professor Hohl considers authentic the author's references to the Athenian historian, Dexippus, but regards as fictitious his so-called "authorities," Aelius Junius Cordus and Aelius Sabinus. The brief introduction provides a useful summary of the theories which have been advanced to establish the date and authorship of the *Historia Augusta*. Hohl concludes that it is still impossible, in spite of numerous attempts to prove a more exact date, to fix closer limits for the writing of the work than the *terminus post quem* of the *Caesares* of Aurelius Victor (360), which unquestionably was a source for the *Historia Augusta*, and the *terminus ante quem* of the *Historia* of Q. Aurelius Memmius Symmachus (consul, 485; executed, 525), a work which, as is shown by a quotation in the *Getica* of Jordanes (15. 83-88), made direct use of the *Maximini duo*.

A statement by Werner Hartke appended to the introduction is of special interest because of its bearing on the general problem of the *Historia Augusta*. Professor Hartke here abandons his theory¹ that the author was the younger Nicomachus, but argues that the work must have been a product of the pagan literary circle of the Symmachi and Nicomachi, and the writer a literary servant and secretary

of these powerful families who represents their political interests. Hartke would see in the *Maximini duo* an example of a special use of the myth-making tendencies of ancient writers. The fantastic feats of strength attributed to Maximinus are a deliberate burlesque of the aretological myths which magnify the deeds of heroes. The overdrawn picture of the emperor was intended to disparage his character and satirize him as a Thracian barbarian and peasant, an interpretation which would be relished by members of the Roman senatorial nobility, whose class interests are typified by such emperors as the three Gordians.

The text follows with only minor variations the editor's version in the Teubner series (1927). Careful notes indicating parallel passages in Herodian and bibliography of modern critical studies add to the value of the work. Misprints are rare, but any misprints in the text of an author are unwelcome. The following should be corrected: p. 12, l. 24: for "tanto" read "tanta"; p. 12, l. 30: for "cum" read "eum"; p. 28, l. 19: for "contra Maximum" read "contra Maximinum."

J. A. McGEACHY, JR.

Davidson College

Saint Augustine's De fide rerum quae non videntur: A Critical Text and Translation with Introduction and Commentary. By SISTER MARY FRANCIS McDONALD. ("The Catholic University of America Patristic Studies," Vol. LXXXIV.) Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1950. Pp. xvi+147. \$1.75.

This volume, like eleven of its predecessors in the same series, presents a patristic Latin text and translation, with ample introduction, commentary, bibliography, and indices. This is the first critical text to appear in the "Patristic Studies," although four have been published in the "Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin," by the same university press. The *De fide rerum* is short (ten columns in Migne's *Patrologia*), and, for a work of Augustine, the manuscripts are few. Dr. McDonald found twenty-nine listed in the catalogues, and of these she was able to secure photostats or

¹ W. Hartke, "Geschichte und Politik im spätantiken Rom: Untersuchungen über die *Scriptores historiae Augustae*," *Klio*, Beiheft XLV (1940), 161-68.

microfilms of twenty-six.¹ These are completely collated, along with the four editions of Amerbach (1506), Erasmus (1528), the Louvain theologians (1664), and the Benedictines (1685). The editor explains her method of work so fully that the book might serve as a guide to the novice in textual criticism. The translation is generally clear and fluent, strikingly superior to the stiff rendering of Cornish in the *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, III (1900), 335-43. (One might ask for a better version of 9. 20 f.; 9. 30; 10. 28, and perhaps other passages—but where is the faultless translation?)

The *De fide rerum*, sometimes described as a sermon (Bardenhewer) or a "kurze Abhandlung im Predigtstil" (Schanz-Hosius-Krüger) is not named by Augustine in his *Retractationes*, nor by his biographer Possidius in his list of Augustine's works. Rejected by Erasmus, it was vindicated by the Benedictine editors, who note that it is mentioned by Augustine in one of his letters (*Epist.* 231. 7). It is an apologetic work which points out, first, that faith in the unseen is a necessity of daily life, then that the Christian faith is supported by the fulfilment of prophecies relating to Christ, the Jews, the extirpation of paganism, and the conversion of the nations. Both the argument and the style are shown to be Augustine's. The style resembles that of his finished books rather than that of his sermons.

WILLIAM M. GREEN

University of California at Berkeley

Consolation in Saint Augustine. By SISTER MARY MELCHIOR BEYENKA. ("The Catholic University of America Patristic Studies," Vol. LXXXIII.) Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1950. Pp. xxiv+119. \$1.50.

In this dissertation a "Select Bibliography" of 140 titles is followed by an Introduction on "The Consolation as a Literary Form in Antiquity," and four chapters on "The Christian Consolation before Augustine," "Death and Grief in the Experience of Augustine," "Au-

gustine the Christian Consoler," and "Augustine and the Conventional Forms of Consolation." Four pages of "Conclusion" follow, in which we are told, "A study of the writings of Augustine shows that he expressed consolation to the grief-stricken in terms of Christian teaching and with less dependence upon conventional norms of consolation than any of his predecessors. . . . In the body of his works very little consolation is expressed in the traditional form; most of the consolatory matter is scattered and does not follow a formal pattern." There is a convenient table of *topoi* relating to death, grief, and the resurrection, with some eighty references to various works of Augustine (pp. 48-59), followed by a more detailed study of consolation in the *City of God*, the *De cura pro mortuis gerenda*, ten sermons, and four letters.

WILLIAM M. GREEN

University of California at Berkeley

The End of the Seleucids. By ALFRED R. BELLINGER. ("Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences," Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 51-102.) New Haven: Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1949. \$1.25.

How important an ally of history the science of numismatics may be is vividly illustrated in this monograph. The author aims to clarify the sequence of events during the last sixty-five years of the Seleucid dynasty by using the new evidence which has appeared since the earlier accounts of Kuhn, Bevan, and Bouché-Leclercq. Of this new material the monographs by Newell on the Seleucid mints of Antioch, Tyre, Ptolemais, and Damascus are the most important, but the works of earlier as well as of later numismatists, including some of the author's own recent studies, have also been utilized. Welles' *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period* contains two letters which belong to this period of the dynasty, and for the history of the last two members Bellinger had at his disposal a study by the Czech scholar, Joseph Dobias.

A list of the kings, with the dates of their reigns, and genealogical tables of the families

¹ To the list of 26 manuscripts collated for this dissertation one may add Paris B. N. 14856, a twelfth-century manuscript from the abbey of St. Victor.

of Demetrius I, Ptolemy V, Ptolemy VII, and Antiochus VIII are of great help to the reader in following the history of this rather complicated period. After summarizing the events from 162 to 129 B.C., the author begins his detailed account with the second reign of Demetrius II. A comparison of this with the earlier accounts will show how many lacunae have been filled by the use of the numismatic material. The footnotes are evidence of a careful reappraisal of the ancient historians, when they present different versions of the same event, and also of a critical examination of the conclusions of modern authorities.

Excursus I deals with the coinage of the wars between Grypus and his half-brother Cyzicenus. The table there given graphically demonstrates the way in which the principal cities changed hands and the exhaustion of the resources on both sides after 103 B.C. Accepting Welles' suggestion of Grypus as the author of the letters written in 109 to Ptolemy and to the people of Seleucia Pieria, Bellinger regards this city as the place where Grypus probably found refuge during the first and third reigns of Cyzicenus in Antioch (113/2 and 110/9). During the second reign (112/1) Grypus escaped to Aspendus, which, Bellinger states, had passed to Rome with the rest of the territory of Attalus III. Undoubtedly the Romans controlled Aspendus at this time, but not by the will of the last of the Attalids. Only the western half of Pamphylia had been granted to Eumenes II, and this city, as well as Side, had remained independent.

The coins of the brothers Antiochus XI and Philip I form the subject of Excursus II. Their joint issue was limited to one year, but Bellinger questions the propriety of assigning to Philip all of the large number of coins hitherto attributed to him and suggests that those with a portrait unlike that on the joint issue may be coins of his son Philip II. In the same way he believes that the discrepancies in the accounts of the death of Antiochus X are due to a confusion of this king with his son Antiochus XIII. The chronology of the second reign of Philip I, 87-83 B.C., is discussed in Excursus III.

Among the sources for the history of the

last two Seleucids is the Byzantine author Malalas. The flagrant contradictions in his account of Pompey's relations with Antiochus deserve to be pointed out, as they are, but when Bellinger censures Malalas for calling Cicero and Sallust the most learned poets of the Romans, it is worth recalling that both Plato and Isocrates used the term *ποιητής* to designate a maker of speeches.

Excursus IV deals with Trogus as a historian of the late Seleucids and incidentally also with the contemporary historian Posidonius.

Two minor typographical errors may be noted: Cyzicanus (p. 67) and Chacis (p. 78).

ESTHER V. HANSEN

Elmira College

Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung.

By MAX POHLENZ. 2 vols. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1948-49. Vol. I, pp. 490; Vol. II, pp. 230. Bound, 40 DM.

Pohlenz brings together in these two volumes the results of a lifetime's work on the Stoa. The first volume relates the history of the Stoa, with only the minimum of annotation and controversy; the second volume provides the documentation, referring the reader to ancient texts and modern interpretations. The whole thus makes a major contribution to the study of Stoicism: it provides at once a readable account of the school and a guide to the sources and literature. One must keep in mind, of course, that Pohlenz often gives only the results of his researches, referring the reader to earlier publications for the arguments and inferences by which these results were reached. It is a limitation (no doubt intentional) of his procedure that he does not always acquaint the reader with the very great differences of opinion regarding almost all phases of Stoicism.

As the subtitle indicates, this extensive work is concerned not merely with a presentation of the philosophical system of the Stoics, but also with the place of Stoicism in the history of the western world—the causes that produced and shaped it, the internal changes it underwent, and the effects of its teachings on contemporary and subsequent periods. Stoi-

cism is to Pohlenz the savior of Hellenistic Greece. The political disintegration that followed the decline of the city-state found expression in the Epicurean isolation of the individual and denial of political bonds. Epicurus thus brought about a crisis in the intellectual life of Greece—a crisis that was met by the Stoic philosophy, itself rooted in the new age, and capable of arousing once more a community feeling.

Pohlenz stresses the debt of the Stoics to their predecessors, especially Heraclitus, Socrates, and Aristotle; but at the same time he finds in Stoicism certain new elements, some of which (e.g., materialism and individualism) he attributes to the *Zeitgeist* of the Hellenistic world, others (e.g., the concept of "duty") to the Eastern origin of Zeno and other Stoic leaders, and still others (e.g., Chrysippus' intellectualism) to the individual characters and inclinations of the leaders. He points out that Zeno was certainly, and Chrysippus probably, of Semitic origin. This origin, he says, is reflected in Stoic religion and ethics. The doctrines of providence and fate and the acceptance of astrology all point to the East; the concept of an immanent creative power in nature may have resulted from the impact on Greek thought of the Eastern idea of a transcendent creator; and the Stoic doctrine of duty combines Oriental religious ethics with Greek *physis*. Moreover, the view that virtue and emotion are corporeal and observed through sense-perception suggests certain Old Testament phrases; the classification of tenses as "definite" and "indefinite" shows the influence of Semitic languages; and in general the concern of the Stoics with problems of language and their appreciation of the important role of language for the expression of thought may best be explained if one recognizes that to Zeno Greek was a foreign language that had to be mastered and utilized for the expression of Stoic ideas.

Pohlenz makes much of the personalities of the Stoic leaders: Zeno's austerity, Cleanthes' poetic and religious temperament, and Chrysippus' intellectualism. Each had its effect on the history of the school. In later times the Stoa was "Hellenized" by Panaetius, an aris-

toerat of pure Greek background, who combined Greek aesthetic feeling with the self-reliance of the Dorians. Posidonius, the greatest scientist and the greatest prose writer of the Hellenistic period, was of Greek or Macedonian descent; but to his birthplace, Apamea, he owed his deeply religious feeling and his belief in an afterlife. Many subsequent alterations and adaptations of Stoicism are similarly explained, in terms of social and political conditions, national differences, and individual character.

Pohlenz recognizes that the development of Stoicism was not entirely determined by such nonphilosophical factors as race and personality. In one of its major aspects, the history of Stoicism involves the working out in detail by later Stoics of their predecessors' ideas. Chrysippus extended the field of logic far beyond the point that Zeno reached; Panaetius worked out in detail moral precepts, and Posidonius, in Pohlenz' view, elaborated the doctrine of cosmic "sympathy." Beside this kind of development is the tendency to depart from the views of the founders, under the influence of rival philosophies. Polemics with the Academy caused many modifications, and renewed interest in Plato and Aristotle led first to the weakening, and ultimately to the destruction, of Stoic orthodoxy. But Stoicism survived, and still survives, as an important influence on the thought of the Western world.

Considered as history, Pohlenz' account of Stoicism may be criticized on several points. He appeals too much to national differences. He admits that the differences between Greeks and Phoenicians in Zeno's time cannot be definitely established, because we know so little about the Phoenicians. And I should add that it is not possible after Alexander's death to make a clear-cut distinction between Greek and non-Greek, or between Roman and non-Roman after the Punic Wars. The claim that Panaetius, who transmitted Stoic teaching to Rome, was the first to make the Stoa truly Greek is a paradox not unworthy of the Stoics themselves.

Pohlenz makes maximum claims for the influence of Stoicism. For example, he believes that the original "democratic" tradition of the

school helped to inspire the agrarian reforms of the Gracchi, whereas the aristocratic Panaetius, who considered the chief function of the state to be the protection of private property, played an important part in the anti-Gracchan movement. But surely the Gracchi were very much concerned with the strengthening of Roman imperialism; and Scipio's conservatism was more probably the cause than the effect of Panaetius' political views (cf. I, p. 261).

Even more questionable is Pohlenz' picture of rivalry between Epicureanism and Stoicism, Epicureanism threatening to destroy Greek life, and Stoicism effecting a timely rescue. One can hardly imagine, he says, what course Hellenism would have taken, if Epicurus' individualism had won supremacy (I, p. 166). But Stoicism did not win a decisive victory over either the Epicurean school or the Academy, and those successes that it had were brought about more by its adapting itself to existing social and political structures, than by reforming these structures according to its own principles. Moreover, though it was often on the side of good causes, it was sometimes allied to bad ones, for example, in its defense of various forms of superstition. Not infrequently Stoics could be found on both sides of a controversy, as Pohlenz points out in the case of the Gracchi. In the *De officiis* Cicero gives startling examples of disagreement among the Stoics on moral problems. Stoicism was certainly an important element in the history of Hellenism, but one can hardly agree that for five hundred years it exercised "massgebenden Einfluss auf das Denken, Fühlen und Handeln der Menschen" (p. 167).

Pohlenz' partiality toward the Stoa is evident in the importance he attaches to it; it is evident also in the high praise he gives some of the leaders of the school, especially Panaetius and Posidonius. But the reader soon detects that he is overly fond of some Stoics, and quite impatient with others. Most evident is his dislike of Chrysippus, whose intellectualism, in Pohlenz' view, destroyed some of the better features of Zeno's teaching. Chrysippus' Asiatic successors, Diogenes and Antipater, became entangled in dialectical disputes with

Carneades and the Academy; but finally the school was rescued by Panaetius' revolt against dialectic and intellectualism.

It is here that I should differ most sharply from Pohlenz. It is true that Chrysippus' dialectic sometimes appears to be mere casuistry, and that his applications of dialectic sometimes led him to paradoxical doctrines; yet, as Pohlenz recognizes, his contribution to logical analysis was a very real one, and it might well be considered among the most significant achievements of the Stoic school.

Logic is for the Stoics the formal analysis of the operations of reason, or *logos*; and *logos*, in its metaphysical and ethical aspects, is central to the entire Stoic position. The Stoic logic is therefore of the greatest importance to the structure of Stoicism, and its rules are valid not only for thought, but also for metaphysics and morals. I should maintain that it is the key to the unity and consistency that the Stoics claimed for their system—a unity which Pohlenz' lack of sympathy with logic, along with his emphasis on external causes and historical changes, has failed to convey to the reader.

PHILLIP DE LACY

Washington University

Die geheime Schutzgottheit von Rom. By ANGELO BRELICH. ("Albae vigiliae," N.F., Heft VI.) Zurich: Rhein-Verlag, 1949. Pp. 66. Fr. 8.

Vesta. By ANGELO BRELICH. ("Albae vigiliae," N.F., Heft VII.) Zurich: Rhein-Verlag, 1949. Pp. 120. Fr. 9. 50.

The first of these two fascicles of *Albae vigiliae* is devoted, as Kerenyi tells us in his foreword, not to the identification of the divinity in question, but to an analysis of its nature, and the quality of its secrecy. The second discusses the cult of Vesta in the light of the findings of the first. Brellich brings to his work a fresh point of view with a lively imagination, and produces some original and interesting interpretations. His general theory, that the characters of individual divinities are to be understood through an analysis of the complex of basic ideas from which they are formed, is

sound, though perhaps not as unfamiliar to his readers as he suggests, except for the manner in which it is formulated. That the interrelations of divinities in myth or cult result from the fact that they have in common certain basic ideas, while their individual characters result from the particular combination of basic ideas which they express, is also a useful observation. Many readers will, however, hesitate to accept the results of his analysis because of the method which he pursues. He defends himself against the possible accusation of selecting his evidence arbitrarily by pointing out that in the first study he is dealing only with one aspect of the divinities involved. This is legitimate, but in selecting his evidence he has too often failed to observe that some of the material which he does not use is not irrelevant but actually contradicts his theories. The arbitrary quality of his work is sometimes shown in his interpretation of texts. He seems also to have a tendency to reject the obvious explanation of a situation simply because it is obvious, and to produce another without considering whether it fits into the picture of Roman thought and practice as we know it. The most serious example of this is his analysis of the "Geheime Schutzgottheit," a concept which he traces to the Roman awareness of a divine guarantee of the life and survival of the city, associated with the cults of the gods of Rome's origin. The Romans, he maintains, believed that to ensure the survival of the city its life must be derived from the same sources as the life of the cosmos, a source which is androgynous in nature, eternally producing from its self inexhaustible life, through the mystery of sex. The argument by which he arrives at this conclusion is difficult to follow, chiefly because of the assumptions by which it moves forward, but it is more difficult to understand how in this connection he can omit entirely any reference to the auspices and the part played by augury in the foundation legend. Surely it was in the auspices that the Roman of the republic found his guarantee of divine help. Even if, as Koch has shown, the figure of Jupiter, from whom the auspices derived, underwent a considerable transformation in becoming the cen-

ter of state cult, still the science of augury and the importance of the auspices must antedate the Capitoline cult. Brelich makes no effort to explain how the auspices fit into the picture which he draws.

In the second study, Brelich interprets Vesta, with her festival in the first half of June, as representing the unbroken circle of the horizon at the summer solstice when the light of the sun is at its maximum. This unbroken circle is the pre-cosmic state, the "Voraussetzung" of the life of the cosmos, and Vesta's priority in the cosmic scheme is portrayed in her character of virgin mother who, with the help of the secret male element (the *fascinus* worshipped by the Vestals), is the source of cosmic life. The chief evidence on which Brelich bases his cosmic interpretation is the "Calendar of Numa" with its fixed festivals. He dates the Calendar, on a somewhat subjective interpretation, to the period of the first synoikismos before its reform, marked by the introduction of the Capitoline cult, suppressed Rome's official interest in cosmic life. He does not seem to realize, however, that a calendar which uses intercalation already shows lack of interest in such phenomena as the solstices, for the simple reason that the festivals are fixed only in their sequence, not in relation to particular events. If the Divalia on December 21st, for example, had been regarded as vitally connected with the winter solstice (although in the Julian calendar *bruma* falls on the 25th), the men who framed the calendar would have had to have kept it *feriae conceptivae* in order to ensure its celebration on the right day. Thus the fixed festivals of the "Calendar of Numa" can be at best only a survival of a once lively interest in cosmic movements, and the interest would have to be pushed back to an earlier period, in which Brelich denies its existence.

Many aspects of Vesta's cult, such as the association with Janus, the character of her temple, the importance of the donkey and the mill, and the myths of the Vestals, are ingeniously worked into the author's interpretation. Others, such as the connection with the Argei, the meaning of Q.St.D.F., and the extinguish-

ing and rekindling of the holy fire on March 1st, are not dealt with. In his explanation of the shape of the temple, Brelich assumes that it was unique in not being an inaugurated *templum*, and seems to be unaware of the passage in Varro which shows that there were other examples (De L L 7. 10). Nor does he explain why a temple which symbolized the unbroken circle of the horizon should be built in the one place in Rome from which one has probably the poorest view of the horizon.

In general one feels that Brelich's originality of interpretation has been gained at the expense of a thorough consideration of the evidence, even sometimes evidence which he might have found useful. One is surprised, for example, in his discussion of androgynous divinities in classical religion to find no reference to Aristophanes' description, in Plato's *Symposium*, of an androgynous sex nor his characterization of the moon as androgynous. One also wonders why he did not make fuller use of the inscriptions of Lanuvium in this connection. The main reason why the books fail to carry conviction, however, is that they convey no sense of reality. The ideas expressed seem to float in cosmic space, not to spring from the soil of Rome. One finds it difficult to associate Brelich's picture of an almost metaphysical awareness of cosmic forces with the characteristic concentration of the Roman on himself as the center of the universe, or to imagine the early Roman as concerned with the movements of the heavenly bodies except as a guide to his own seasonal activities. The Roman had neither the curiosity nor the perspective of the Greek which might have lead him to attempt an explanation of his world rather than its domination. Ingenious and interesting as Brelich's suggestions are, they do not fit into the framework of Roman thought as it is expressed in Roman literature. It is possible that such ideas preceded those of the period with which we are familiar, but if so it

is curious that they should have disappeared so completely. As Brelich himself says, in religion the ancient does not disappear but is reinterpreted in a new setting.

AGNES KIRSOPP MICHELS

Bryn Mawr College

Books and Readers in Ancient Greece and Rome.

By FREDERIC G. KENYON. 2d ed. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1951. Pp. viii+136. \$1.75.

This is an excellent and very useful book. The first edition appeared in 1932, so a second edition is a necessity. This is not a reprint with a few corrections, but an attempt to bring the work up to date. There are seven major additions varying from a paragraph for the shortest to nearly two pages for the longest. I noted over thirty minor changes. These changes were mostly occasioned by consideration of the recent excavations at Ras Shamra, Ugarit, Byblos, Mari, and Nuzi, and of the newer finds of papyrus and parchment fragments. Most of the recent discussion of these subjects has been at least mentioned, but I miss a reference to the work of Carl Wendel, *Die Griechisch-römische Buchbeschreibung* (Halle, 1949) which would have been useful in the treatment of Greek libraries antedating the Alexandrian. Also in the final chapter on Vellum and the Codex Sir Frederic maintains his earlier view that the codex form of books arose under Christian influence in Egypt, though in a footnote to page 91 he cites C. C. McCown for the view that the codex came into use with parchment outside of Egypt. References to other studies on this subject are given in the McCown article. Except for these two points, on which perhaps further study is suggested, the reader will find this new edition the best treatment of the whole subject.

HENRY A. SANDERS

University of Michigan

BOOKS RECEIVED

[Not all works submitted can be reviewed, but those that are sent to the editorial office for notice are regularly listed under "Books Received." Offprints from periodicals and parts of books will not be listed unless they are published (sold) separately. Books submitted are not returnable.]

- AGARD, WALTER RAYMOND. *Classical Myths in Sculpture*. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1951. Pp. xvi+203+97 figs. in text. \$5.00.
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